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"The labour of writing is reduced, 
if the thought is in condensed form" 
C.C. Crawferd 
ABSTRACT 
Parliamentary privileges are indispensable to the effective discharge pf 
the functions and duties of Parliamentarians. Being representatives of 
people, they are expected to hold fair and free deliberations within the 
House which are guaranteed to a large extent by these privileges. They 
not only ensure a congenial atmosphere in the House but also help in 
upholding the sanctify of the sovereign institution. The present thesis is 
a modest attempt to anal5rse these privileges, their effective use, abuse 
and misuse. 
Thesis is divided into five Chapters with an introduction, 
conclusion, bibliography and few charts showing the background of the 
parliamentarians, their behavior in the House etc. 
The Introduction tries to analyse the meaning, content and extent 
of privileges in restrospect. Laws and rules are essential for governing 
any country. Parliament is the institution which is primarily associated 
with law-making. Its Members and Committees have therefore been 
provided with certain privileges which enable them to function without 
any hindrance or obstacle, fear or favour for or favor. These are the 
special rights and liberties, provided to the Members individually and to 
the House collectively for the effective performance of their duties as 
representatives of the people. In the initial years these powers and 
privileges were not the same as what we have today, rather it is a result 
of hard and bitter s t r u ^ e of many centuries. Petitioners were very 
humble and could not make constitutional claim to share parliamentary 
functions. With the passage of time, a gradual and steady change came 
in their way. During eleventh century only high ranking clergy were 
entitled to advice the king. But king John, in the thirteenth century, 
initiated the process of calling elected knights for important meetings of 
the Great Council. The Charter Act of 1716 further enhanced the House 
of Commons. The Charter Act of 1853 established the Legislature. The 
Morley Minto Reforms Act, 1909, Govt. Of India Act, 1919 and 1935 
further contributed towards the development of parliamentary 
institutions. Prior to independence, almost all the efforts had been made 
to codify the privileges in order to get equal status with that of the House 
of Commons. The Constitution of India under Article 105 specify the 
privilege of freedom of speech while made others same as those of the 
House of Commons. Apart from the Constitution, certain privileges are 
specified in the statutes while others in the Rules of procedure. Members 
enjoy certain consequential powers also in order to safeguard their 
privileges. 
The second chapter highlights the significance of privileges. Very 
often a question is posed as to why the House or its Members need 
privileges when they themselves are the representatives of the people. 
Further it is said that no Member of ParUament has higher privileges 
than those enjoyed by an ordinary citizen as regards the appUcation of 
law. No doubt this is true but the functions entrusted to Parliament 
are so enormous and that without these immunities and privileges they 
can not be accompUshed with greater efficiency. As a microcosm of the 
nat ion, Par l iament h a s consis tent ly reflected the feelings, hopes, 
aspirations and even weaknesses and frustrations of the people. It has 
clearly emerged a s the most crucial political inst i tut ion on whose 
working depends the future of the nation because the success of any 
nation depends on how much its policies Eire effective and implemented 
in the real life of a cit izen. This can be possible only when the 
representatives are granted somewhat wider powers than others. The 
Bill of Rights, 1688, laid down that the freedom of speech, debates or 
proceedings in ParUemient ought not to be impeached or questioned in 
any court or place out side the ParUament. Article 122 of the Constitution 
of India categorically s ta tes tha t the validity of the proceedings in 
Parliament can not be called in question in a court of law on the ground 
of any alleged irregularity of the procedure.^ 
1. AIR, 1959, SC. 395. 
Each House reserves to itself the power to suspend any rule of 
procedure in its application to a particular business before it. To make 
their movements free and observe secret sittings other privileges are also 
bestowed to them. Thus, on the basis of this, it can be said that powers, 
privileges and inmiunities act as shield against the high handedness and 
onslaughts of the party in power. The Constitution of India has not listed 
the privileges because any codification might have put a premium on 
them However, if a specific privile^ undermines the dignity of the House 
or tends to obstruct the House as a whole or individual Member, in the 
discharge of their constitutional functions, is considered breach of 
privileges or contempt of the House because the very aim of providing 
privileges is to enable the House and Members in upholding its sanctity 
and defend itself against disrespect and affrontation which can not be 
brought or could be brought only by implication under any accepted 
specific privilege. According to Halsburys, any act or omission which 
obstructs or impedes any Member or Officer of the House in the 
discharge of their duties, or which has a tendency to produce such a 
result would constitute ^contempt of l^slature' . 
The third Chapter analyses one of their major privileges i.e. 
freedom of speech which is an essential attribute of any legislature. This 
privilege enables the Members to hold free and frank discussion on any 
matter and provide immunity to Members from any action against them 
for any thing said or from casting vote on the floor of the House. Its 
original purpose was to protect the Members against the King and was 
first confirmed by practice of selecting the speaker in 1376 to cany out 
their agreed reply to the King. The first express claim for liberty of speech 
was made in the Commons in 1455 when Thomas Younge, one of the 
knights for the shire brought a petition into the Commons, complaining 
about his arrest and imprisonment in the Tower five years back. Thomas 
More (1523) was the first speaker to be asked from the royal indulgence 
for any untoward expressions by individuals in debate. Same petition 
was moved by speaker Moyle in 1542 and was allowed by Henry. In case 
of Duncan Sandys, 1938, the House of Commons resolved that it was a 
breach of privilege to attempt to require a Member of Parliament to 
divulge to a court of inquiry, set up by the Army Council, the source of 
his information concerning the anti aircraft defence of London which he 
had used for the purpose of framing a question in the House. It is also 
said that this privilege is nessary for wise and beneficial legislation and 
can never be secured if Members function under restraints imposed by 
the law of slander and libel upon private character. 
In India this privilege is embodied under Article 105 (1) and (2) and 
was granted to Indian legislators for the first time under the Montague 
Chelmsford Reforms Act and given statutory recognition. It was argued 
that the immunity granted under Article 105 (2) is related to what was 
relevant to the business of Parliament and not to some thing which was 
utterly irrelevant. But the argument was rejected by the Supreme Court. 
The Chief Justice of India once observed "having conferred freedom of 
speech on the legislators cl (2) emphasizes the fact that the said freedom 
is intended to be absolute and unfettered^*. For speeches and actions in 
Parliament Member is subjected only to the discipline of the House. The 
High Court under Article 226 can not take cognizance of the dispute."' 
Molestation or bringing legal proceedings against any person for 
giving evidence in relation to any proceeding in the House is considered 
breach of privilege. The freedom is guaranteed almost to all Parliaments 
but the duration of immunity varies from country to country. To observe 
freedom of speech it is necessary on the part of the House to secure 
privacy. 
The House has the power to exclude strangers from the House. 
Parliamentary Papers Act, 1840, made the publication of any report, 
papers, votes or proceedings, of the Houses of Parliament, completely 
privileged but can take action against immature publication or 
publication of expunged proceedings as it is considered breach of 
privileges and contempt of the House. The Houses are the sole judges of 
2j ^R , 1965, SC 745 
3) AIR, 1902, J &K 23. 
their own privileges. No action can be taken in one House for any thing 
that is said in another House. 
The fourth Chapter is an attempt to analyse freedom from arrest. It 
is considered a breach of privilege if a Member is arrested in civil cases 
during the session and forty days before and forty days after the session. 
Only under criminal chaiiges, Preventive Detention Act or Defence of 
India Act or in the interest of Public safety the arrest can be made. A 
brief account of the history of this privilege has been given. In India this 
exemption from arrest was conferred on the members of legislative body 
by the Legislative Members Exemption Act, 1925, which has been 
continued in a slightly modified form after independence. 
Members can not be served with a legal notice within the precinct 
unless in case of urgency where the matter can not be delayed. Whenever 
an arrest is made, even in criminal cases, the House requires inmiediate 
intimation of arrest, detention and conviction or even release of the 
Member together with reasons and place of arrest or detention. The 
senior most person who causes the arrest is required to furnish the 
information. In custody, the Members are supposed to be treated with 
utmost <lignity and their correspondence addressed to the chairman or 
Slicker m the House or Committee can not be witheld. A part from this 
^ thy ttfld abusive language, ill treatment, assault or any obstruction 
called by the outsiders is also considered breach of privilege. The 
chapter also examines the judicial response in safeguarding this 
privilege. 
The fifth Chapter highlights the relative importance of the two 
esteemed institutions - legislature and judiciary. The troika, legislature, 
judiciary and executive are three different but important parts of the 
Constitution, their powers are different but still marked by some sort of 
interrelationships, specially between the judiciary and legislature. A 
greatest reservoir for suppljdng power to judiciary to invalidate the 
statute is provided by the fundamental r i ^ t s mainly under Artide 14 
and 19 of the Constitution but attempts has been made by the 
Parliament to weaken this reservoir. Both authorities are supreme in 
their own sphere neither of which can challenge the authority of the 
other. In England on the contrary, both Houses claimed to be the sole 
judges where as the court maintained that privileges are the law of the 
land and therefore the court is bound to decide questions coming before 
it in any case within their jurisdiction even if the privileges are involved. 
Till early eighteenth century the position was quite in favour of the court 
as in case of Stockdale. V. Hansard, the majority opinion of the court did 
not admit the suf>eriority of the High court of the House of Parliament 
over other law court as the judicial matter cannot be decided inside the 
House, only the matter coming out from its internal proceedings would 
be the jurisdiction of the House. But over the years the Parliament in 
England has established its supremacy vis a vis the judiciary and its acts 
can not be nullified by the court on any ground whereas in USA, the 
Supreme Court is in a more advantageous position as far as judicial 
review is concerned. In India we have adopted a via media between the 
American system of judicial paramountcy and English principle of 
parliamentary supremacy. 
After prolonged contradiction and conflicts in a number of cases an 
understanding has been emerged between the two on the lines that; 
courts will recognise those privileges which have the sanction of common 
law; new privileges can be created for the House only by a law passed by 
the Parliament and not merely by the resolution of one House; whether a 
particular privilege 'exists or not' is a question to be decided by the 
courts etc. 
In ordinary cases, the courts have accorded the privileges to the 
speaker of the House but where they are in conflict with the fundamental 
rights and the doctrine of judicial review it is not easier to claim and 
there is a possibility of a confrontation between the judiciary and 
Legislature. It is advisable that the area or sphere of privil^es be 
determined by the courts in context of the rights of the citizen, Judiciary 
is thought to be the guardian of the rights of man and protects these 
rights from all possibilities of individual and public encrochments and if 
there is no adequate provision for the administration of justice, the 
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liberty of the people is jeopardized, for there is no definite means which 
should ascertain and decide rights, punish crimes, and protect the 
innocent from injury and usurpation. The courts themselves show great 
reluctance to interfere with the working of the legislature, onty in case of 
malafide or perversity they go into the matter otherwise the power of the 
House is so wide that it can enforce its own decision. 
An overview of the problem has been given in the conclusion. The 
importance of the privileges has been focused as without them the task 
of the Parliament can not be achieved. They are essential for the 
functioning of effective democratic legislature. But on the other hand 
every organ of government in a democratic set up is equally important 
thus, a proper harmony among them is an imperative. Further, it is also 
true that today, the greatest threat to their privileges is not from out side 
but from their own acts and attitudes. Making irresponsible statements 
within the privileged precincts of Parliament have the effect of unjustly 
injuring the reputation of individual citizen or a group. The privileges 
should not be used as a cover to indulge in character assassination or 
political vandalism. Fine Vandekh. Shouting slogans, or^mising 
dhamas, reaching and demonstrating at the podium of the House, 
tearing of jjapers and throwing articles are now not unusual in the 
House, which cast a heavy cloud on Parliament and its institutions. The 
situation can be averted only if proper attention is paid. The need is to 
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restore the priestine past of these institutions so as to enable them to 
work for the establishment of an egalitarian society where there is 
equality, justice and freedom. Describing the importance of 
parliamentary system, R. Venkataraman, President of India, on his 
inaugral address to the 37* Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, 
at New Delhi, on Sept. 23, 1991, rightly said as "superior* to all other 
systems that human ingenuity has to far been able to devise". If it works 
properly and honestly, there is perhaps no better substitute than the 
representative parliamentary democracy. 
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PREFACE 
Powers and privileges of MPs and MLAs have always been a 
problematic issue before the concerned persons. During the 
British empire very few privileges and powers were vested with 
Indian legislators and that too just for the namesake as the then 
Govt, was of the opinion that if equal power would be awarded 
to Indian legislators as those given to the House of Commons, 
they could misuse them. But their non satisfaction lead them to 
do hard struggle as a result of which the Govt, of India Act, 
1919, and 1935, came into existence which empowered them a 
little but not fully as punitive powers were still not rendered to 
them which were conferred on the Members of the House of 
Commons. Similarly the functions and powers of the presiding 
officers too were very limited, mostly for preserving their orders 
and regulating the business of the House. After independence the 
position changed entirely. The functions of the Dominion were 
handed over to the Cons t i tuen t Assembly' by the India 
Independence Act, 1947. 
The Consti tution of India under Article 105 and 194 
equated their rights with those of the House of Commons of 
IV 
British Parliament. Article 105(3) reads as the powers, privileges 
and immunities of each House of Parliament and of the Members 
and Committees of each House, shall be such as may from time 
to time be defined by Parliament by law, and untill so defined 
shall be those of that House and of its Members and Committees 
immediately before the coming into force of Section 15 of the 
Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. 
The Presiding officer is also vested with sufficient power in 
the capacity of guardian of rights and privileges of the Members 
of the House. To strengthen his capacity, punitive powers have 
Law also been vested with him. 
Privileges when asked for the first time were very few in 
number. They were mainly for freedom of speech and discussion, 
freedom from arrest, access to the royals and power to regulate 
their own constitution. But now apart from these, the Members 
have enjoyed two in broad, a lot more as they are uncodified. 
Prior to Independence more efforts were made to get them 
codified as it could enable them to acquire equal position with 
those of the Members of the British House of Common in order 
to enhance their active participation and contribution in the 
legislative functioning. But after Independence almost all the 
efforts have been put to save them from codification since there 
is a belief that codification can restrict the strength of privileges. 
But the noncodification too poses a problem because it is due to 
the noncodification unres t r ic ted deba tes abusive language 
undemocratic scenes and low standard in delibration is quite 
common. Further, unlike Britain we have a written Constitution 
under lying a chapter on 'Fundamenta l Rights ' which are 
justiciable in the Court of Law. Thus, any act which violates the 
right of an ordinary citizen of the country which is provided 
under Fundamental Rights can be challenged in the Court. We 
have a "Judicial Review" system empowering each and every man 
to knock the judiciary if the acts of the legislators do not have 
any consistency with that of the citizen. Courts have the power 
to held them guilty. Our Parliament is not as much sovereign as 
that Britain. 
Because of the clear and detailed provision, the people and 
the press both are very much conscious of their rights. They do 
not even hesitate to challenge the acts of Parliamentarians and 
Parl iament in court of law. They demand from them more 
accountability for their omissions and commissions which in any 
wa3' is not found in England, Parliament is Supreme there and 
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can do every thing which is physically not impossible because of 
its unwrit ten character , t hus , making it the High Court of 
Parliament there but not in India. 
In this connection I have divided the whole study under 
five chapters. 
Chapter I deals with the background of powers and 
privilege. How did they come to exist. A comparative look of past 
and present have been highlighted. Chapter Ilnd focuses the 
importance of powers and privilege as why they had been needed 
the most, their consequences on the function of legislators. 
Chapter llird high lights the "Freedom of Speech" to the 
Members of Parliament and State Legislatures under Acticle 105 
and 194 respectively. Its effects on Fundamental Rights which 
guaranteed the freedom of speech and expression to ordinary 
citizen & Press. 
In Chapter IVth an attempt has been made to d iscuss 
another crucial privilege i.e. Freedom from Arrest. 
Chapter Vth focuses the relationship between Parliament 
and Judiciary which highlights the importance of privileges but 
not so easy to claim them in the presence of doctrine of Judicial 
vu 
Review and Fundamental Rights. 
Concluding par t shows their importance and the 
consequences which now days are faced by the common man 
because today the threat is not to the legislators from out side 
rather their own acts and activities as legislators pose a major 
problem to themselves and to the common man, and the nation 
is the victim of their degrading standard of deliberations. 
Broadly speaking every chapter is divided in three parts, 
which deals the nature , position in England, and position in 
India. 
Material collection have been done and information gathered 
from Library, Newspapers and Journals . Consti tutional and 
Legislative Assembly Debates, Debates of Parliaments, Lok Sabha, 
and Rajya Sabha have been an important source consulted 
extensively. Reports of privilege committees of Lok Sabha and 
Rajya Sabha constituted another important source, utilized most 
for the study. 
CHAPTER-I 
INTRODUCTION 
Laws and rules are imperative for the governance of a state 
or Kingdom. Parliament is the body which is primarily engaged in 
law making. It is not a new body rather its history goes back to 
many years but in the initial years its powers and privilege were 
limited. It was in the 11th century when the kings began 
consulting great men on state matters. Gradually it took the 
shape of a committee to which the King assigned specific duties 
which later on became an assembly court. However, the decision 
of the assembly court was not final, the King had the final vcto.^ 
The Royal courts were held thrice a year on the occasions of 
Christmas, Easter, and Whitsun when the king wore his crown. 
All the greatmen of England such as archibishops, bishops, 
abbots, earls, thegns and knights used to grace the occasion. A 
special writ of summons sent to each tenant in chief and 
penalties were imposed if they did not attend it. Hundred years 
later, in 1176, Henry II held his Christmas Court at Nottingham 
and immediately after wards held a Great Council with bishops, 
1. Adams- Constitutioncd Historu of England. Jonathan Cape, London, 1960, 
p. 22. 
earls and barons of the Kingdom to discuss various issues.^ In 
the middle of the next century i.e. 1258, the barons at at Oxford 
demanded three Parliaments a year. During this period the King 
relied upon a small number of personal advisers who belonged to 
the royal families. These were mainly drawn from the baronage 
group but with the growing complexity of administration men from 
non baronial groups with professional expertise were also included 
to fill some most important offices of the Chancellor, Treasurers 
and those of Just ices . Thus, on the one hand there was a 
general assembly of the tenant-in-chiefs wherein the whole nation 
was conceived to be present and met at intervals to advice the 
King on the major issues and on the other side there was a 
small body of personal advisors to assist him in the actual day 
to day business of the government. Parliament is the successor of 
occasional national assemblies and therefore still retains its 
essential character of advisory body. 
With the passage of time the importance of advisers got 
enhanced however, they never governed. The King and his Private 
Council constituted the government i.e. the ministry and civil 
servants or the legislature and the executive. This is the basic 
concept of Parliamentary government. The moot point is as to 
2. K. Machenize The English Parliament - The English Language Book 
Society, London, 1962, p . l l . 
what converted the feudal great council into Parliament and why? 
The word came into use to describe assemblies consisting 
only of Kings, his personal advisers, and the prelates, earls and 
barons. The word 'Parliament* as Parliment was first came into 
being in the 11th century to hold discussions between two 
persons.^ In 12th century Italian cities were called Parhtmenti, 
describing such meeting in which Harold took his Oath to 
William. At the meeting of barons King John gave the great 
charter as a "Parliament" and was applied first to its great 
councils of the English Kings emphasizing their delibrative 
functions. First time Parliament was justified by 1258. In June of 
the same years barons at Oxford demanded a reform for three 
Parliaments a year to treat the King and Kingdom's business. In 
1261 Henry III issued writs to the sherifs in which he said that 
barons had called three k n i ^ t s from each county to meet (at st, 
Albans) and discuss the common ajRairs of the kingdom.* hi 1264 
Simon I>e Montford (ruler of England) in the name of King 
declared to send four most legal and descrete knights from each 
county to the Parliament at Oxford to discuss the King's and 
Kingdom's business with prelates and magnate.^ In June, 1265, 
3^  Ibid., p. 12. 
4. Adam, op cit.. P. 177. 
5. K.Mckenzie, op. cit.. p. 
he summoned his second famous Parliament at West Minister 
calling only five earls (Leicester, Glaucester, Nor folk, Oxford, and 
Derby) and eighteen barons. The middle class was represented by 
two knights from each shire. The special features of th is 
Parliament was the innovation of two citizens from each city and 
two burgesses from each borough as representatives.^ To make the 
participation more direct writs were not summoned to them 
through sherifs of the county as the customs was but sent 
directly. The Parliament of Simon E>e Morttford contained all the 
constituting elements of Historical English Parliament like lords, 
burgesses, knights and sherifs, thus provide an opportunity not to 
tender individual advices but to discuss and petition their local 
liberties apart from more financial matter. Making the strict feudal 
ideas disappearing, the burgesses were rapidly increasing the 
power and means of making their power rapidly felt. What was 
more in 1275 the commons were included in more genuenly 
national assembly when the Edward I held his first general 
Parliament summoning knights, citizens and burgesses to discuss 
with magnate the affairs of Kingdom which were more than the 
mere financial matter. But despite the fact of getting recognition 
in Parliament they were summoned to attend just four or five 
6. Stubbs, Constitutional History of England. Oxford University Press, 
London, 1873, p.97. 
Parliaments out of thirty Parliaments in twenty five years of his 
regime. 
A remarkable change noticed in 1295. The Parliament of 
1295 was called as model Parliament because of it's complete 
embodymcnt of all the elements of Parliament.^ There were 
bishops, abbots, earls and barons, knights and burgesses and 
even more crucial the representation of lower clergy* but the lower 
dergy representation was not a permanent feature, the king even 
did not insist their presence rather arose a distinction between 
the majors and minors, the idea behind their representation was 
just to have the nation's support behind him and make them 
ready to bear heavy expenses necessary in urgency. With t he 
passage of t ime, the process tended to become even more 
selective and some great men also used to receive summons years 
after years. The presence of Commons which seems so natural 
today is novel indeed in t ha t age, t h u s brought about a 
structural change in composition contributing the formation of 
House of Commons. In February, 1305, writs were issued to 
summon Parliament to enable persons or groups seeking favours 
on the redress of grevianccs to present their peti t ion. ' The 
7. Faith Thompson, A Short Hisotrv of Pnrliatni.nt 1295-1642, St. Paul, 
London, 1959, p.5. 
8. Adams, op. cit. p. 184, 185. 
9. Faith Thompson, op.cit.. p. 11. 
s ta tute of 1322 did not include the lower clergy among the 
estates whose consent is necessary in mattes touching the King 
and the realm which was insisted in 1321. The withdrawal of 
inferior clergy helped to make possible the formation of the 
Commons into one body. In 1339 and 1340 they took the burden 
of supply and internal peace and became an active pa r t ' ° In 
t ime, the habi t of separa te deba te began in the form of 
petitioning and to bring the petition of the Commons into being 
as unique Parliamentary function, exercised without the magnates 
(though after some times consultation with them) and in 1343 
Common's deliberations found record in special section of the role 
under the heading "Petitions of the Commons and the responses 
to them.*" In 1348 their petitions were still more clearly marked 
as being delivered to the cleark of Parl iament. While the 
individual petitions continued to be handed to the chancellor. In 
1351 some thirty nine petitions were sponsored by the commons 
some of which were favoured by the King, some became statute 
while others were considered unreasonable and refused. It was the 
time when their legislative functions sought dominance, the grant 
of supply became conditional upon the redress of their grievances 
10. J. E. A Jollifer, Constitutional History of Medivial Enplanri P & R Clark 
Ltd., G. Britain, 1958, p.377. 
11. Ibid.. 
and said that the redress of the grevance shoul actually precede 
the grant of supply. In 1376 the practice of electing a speaker to 
carry their agreed reply to the King also s ta r ted" and in the 
same year the process of •Impeachment' though not in perfect 
form was used for the first time against Edward and in 1386 
against Richard's ministers.'^ 
Impeachment was the sign of the growth of Parliament and 
powers of its' Members. It was considered a transforming feature 
in the development of modem Parliament. The King was bound to 
enlarge the law making body which was stated in the Magna 
Carta, after this the feudalism was no longer existed. Thus, 
fourteenth was the century with more advancement of Parliament 
in powers. This advancement in reality was not that of both 
Houses of Parliament equally but that of the House of Commons. 
The House of Lords was considered to be relatively less important 
at the end of the century. The House of Commons evidently had 
in that age, advirable leadership, high degree of self confidence 
and a felling of equality with lords and royal ministers. 
In the fifteenth century (1407) the King declared the 
Commons lawful in discussing the financial matters of the state." 
T2! Adams, op. cit.. p.209. 
13. Kenneth Mackenzie, op. cit.. p.34. 
14. Ibid. 
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This was the Golden age for the Commons so far as liberties 
were concerned, A number of privileges were demanded during 
this period, though the claim for freedom of discussion and 
immunities was first raised unsuccessfully in the beginning of the 
12th century. In 1455 the first express claim for liberty of speech 
in the Commons was made. Sir Thomas young, one of the 
knights for the Shire and town brought a petition into the 
Commons complaining his arrest and imprisonment in Tower. 
Freedom of speech and expression was thought convenient and 
desirable without any restrictions to allow the House to discharge 
its duties effectively. This was considered unique in the Middle 
Ages, and it is true that political circumstances of the moment 
happened to be favourable to Young. Thomas More was the first 
speaker (1523) to beg the royal indulgence for any untoward 
expressions by individuals in debates. In his speech before the 
King he pointed out: 
"among so many wise men neither is every man wise a like and 
pleaded the King as" to give to all your commons here. 
Assembled, your most gracious licence and pardon feely without 
doubt of your dread full displeasure, every man to discharge his 
conscience, and boldly in every thing incident among, declare his 
advice and what soever happened any man to say, it may like 
your noble Majesty of your inesteemable goodness to talk all in 
good part, interpreting eveiy man's words, how uncunningly soever 
they may be couched, to proceed yet of a good zeal towards the 
profit of yovir Realm and honour of your Royal person."" 
In 1542 a similar petition was moved by speaker Moyle which 
was allowed by Henry with great humility and was followed 
regularly in Elizabeth's reign and by 1565 it had become 
sufficiently usua l to be included in Sir Thomas Smi th ' s 
parliamentary procedure. 
Though the discussions to English Parliament were free and 
unrestricted and the Crown had no power to limit their debates 
or to control the votes of the Member but each higher authority 
in his reign had his own method of controlling the Commons. 
During the reign of Elizabeth Commons were warned not to 
discuss certain subjects particularly related to religion, trade and 
the succession. 
The claim to freedom of sp>eech was not finally substantiated 
in practice untill the constitutional struggle of the sixteenth 
century had been won by Parliament. In Charles VI reign the 
struggle for freedom of speech was merged in the greater conflict 
between the King and Par l iament . It received s t a tu to ry 
confirmation after the revolution of 1688. The Bill of Rights 
declared that the freedom of speech and debates in proceedings 
15. Ibid., p.35. 
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in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any 
court or place out of parliaments^ thus, the freedom of speech 
finally established. 
The privilege of the Member of Parliament to freedom from 
arrest had also existed from the days of the Saxom Assembly but 
it was formally recognised by Henry IV in 1403 and regulated 
and extended by statute under Henry VI which provided that 
persons should not be hindered by arrest from coming or going 
to parliament. In the early fifteenth century the Commons began 
to claim freedom from arrest except for treason, felony or breach 
of the peace. In sixteenth century the right to determine all 
questions relating to the election of Members was also claimed by 
the Commons. Previously these questions had been determined by 
the King-in-Council. The Commons had also appointed a 
committee to enquire the matter. In 1586 the Commons in 
opposition to the Queen, insisted that it is for them to inquire 
into the circumstances of a disputed election. So far as their 
control over taxation is concerned their position as the exclusive 
originators was conclusively affirmed in 1660s and refused the 
Lord's first reading on bills seeking to impose taxes. In 1667 they 
16. Hood Philips, Constitutional & Administrative Law. Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1962, p. 174. 
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resolved that in all aids given to the King by the Commons, the 
rate or tax, ought not to be altered by the Lords and by 1678 
all aids and supplies and aids to His Majesty in Parliament are 
the sole gift of Commons and all the bills for granting such aids 
and supplies began with the Commons and Lords were not 
allowed to reject Money bills. 
During the early stuart period, the conflict between the King 
and Parliament developed into a civil war but at last he was 
made to sign the "Petition of Right' in 1628 and when denide, 
put on trial, condemned and executed. After the execution of 
Charles. I the governmental changes came in quick succession. 
The Kingship and the House of Lords were abolished. The 
Parliament of 1640-41 which lasted for ten months , (Nov, 3 , 
1949-Sept. 14) passed the first Act to secure regular meetings of 
Parliament. It provided for a meeting at least once in three 3^ars. 
It was also provided that no Parliament should be dissolved or 
prorogued within 50 days of its meeting without its own consent 
but the life of Parliament was limited to three years. This was an 
act changing the constitution as it had come down from the past, 
and it was in principle, permanent though not in the enacted 
form. A little later Parliament went a step farther in the same 
direction by a still more revolutionary enactment that existing 
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Parliament should not be dissolved or prorogued without its own 
consent, asking the king to surrender more than the previous bill 
required, and deprived him of all his usual weapons against 
Parl iament . In 1649 Parl iament proclaimed England a 
"commonwealth," without either King or the House of Lords, 
ordinances now became Acts. The significant thing of the Stuart 
period in the constitutional development was the parliamentary 
supremacy and an a t tempt to compromise it with s t rong 
monarchy, taking away the King's constitutional power. The 
collection of tunage and poundage without the au thor i ty of 
Parliament was made illegal; ship money was abolished, abuse of 
forest were done away with and the royal right of purveyance 
limited. G.B. Adams stated "the result of 1660 was a compromise, 
not less truly a compromise because it was expressed in facts 
rather than in words. The question which had arisen at the 
beginning of the reign of James I as *whether it would be 
possible to make the strong monarchy of the sixteenth century 
and the strong parliamentary control of the fifteenth' work 
together in practice ? What boundary line could be found between 
the King and the Const i tut ion had been answered by the 
discovery of a compromise but it was a compromise of peculiar 
type. It meant that forms and appearance remained with the 
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King, the reality with the Parliament. The King in theory is 
sovereign but his sovereignty can be declared and exercised only 
in Parliament. The King gave up the power to determine by his 
individual will, the policy of the state but the surrender was 
disguised by an appearance of power and for a long time by the 
exercise of very substantial power and permanent possession of 
important rights and influence. It was more than a hundred years 
before all that the compromise implied was clearly recognized and 
the balance established at its present level. But it was really 
made in 1660."" 
The outline of English Constitution was practically completed 
by 1688-89 during the Hanover period, Britain had become a 
limited monarchy. Parliament had established her supremacy over 
the royal prerogative. It was for the first time during this period 
that the Commons considered the army, navy, and ordinance 
estimates and the accounts of expenditure and loans for these 
services. In 1691, they appointed a number of their members as 
commissioners of public accounts and rejecting the claim of the 
lords to participate in this work. The other significant features of 
this period included the declination of the actual powers of the 
17. Vishnoo Bhagwan & V. Bhushen, The Constitution of G. Britain. Sterling 
Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1984, p. 11. 
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Kings, the growth of the cabinate system, the democratization of 
the House of Commons, the rise of the House of Commons to a 
position of superiority over the House of Lords and the growth of 
the party system. 
Though the Bill of Rights had established the principle of 
parliamentary supremacy but the King still constituted the pivot. 
For nearly two decades King continued to exercise the right of 
veto. Thus, the Parliament though supreme in principle, was 
subjected to limitations in practice. It was during 1714 that some 
important changes took place as far as the relative importance of 
the two Houses of the Parliamnt are concerned. Before Glorious 
Revolution the House of Lords used to exercise unqustioned 
supremacy and was the dominating chamber for all purposes. But 
gradually the House of lords began to loose its powers and the 
House of Commons succeded first in attaining equal footing with 
the House of Lords and later supremacy over the Lords. Various 
factors contributed to this changed position one of them was the 
fact that during the reign of the first two Georges the dominating 
figure in the government was Walpole who was the Member of 
the House of Commons, using his personal qual i t ies and 
outstanding abilities in management managed the Commons and 
made it the centre of legislature and political leadership. And the 
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important principle "that the support of the House of Commons is 
necesary for the Kings' ministry in Parl iament , was first 
recognised in his time and maintained it steadily. Though the 
democratisation of the House of Commons was brought during 
nineteenth century but their victory was finally confirmed in 1919. 
The 'Septennial Act" of 1716 also contributed to the strength 
of the House of Commons as it extended the life of the House 
from three years to seven years. It was however, the Act of 1911 
which sharply curtailed the powers of the Lords and definitely 
settled the ultimate supremacy of the Commons other wise from 
its earliest days the House of Commons had consisted of men 
who could hardly claim themselves to be the representatives of 
the peoples inhabiting the several counties and boroughs. County 
member were elected by the^rural peoples and borough members 
by the borough residents. Many seats had fallen under the 
control of land lords and magnates and many were openly sold 
and bought. Under these conditions the House of Common could 
hardly be called a democratic and was more representative to the 
House of Lords than to the nation. In words of Munro, "The 
House of Commons at the end of the eighteenth century was a 
representative body in form but a very unrepresentative in fact." 
18. V. Bha^^wan op. cit.. .pp. 14-15. 
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It was in 1832 the process of democrat is ing the House of 
Commons was set when the Reform Act of 1832 widened suffrage. 
It also enhanced its prestige and increased its strength. The 
successive Reform Acts further extended the suffrage and 
regulated the conditions under which compaign were to be carried 
on. These reforms culminated in the epochal representation of the 
People Act 1919 and in 1928 which brought the House of 
Commons to a point where it can easily be counted amongst the 
most democratic parliamentary bodies in the world. 
Position in India: 
In India the Charter Act of 1853 established the Legislature. 
The Act provided for an establishment of a twelve members 
legislative Council including the Governor General, four members 
of the Executive council and Chief justice and other judges of the 
Supreme Court. By the Act of 1861 council was reinforced by 
additional members usually not more than twelve, nominated by 
the Governor General for two years. 
With a view to reach more near to the people's aspiration for 
more purposeful representation in the legislative process, the 
Indian Council Act of 1892 was enacted, introducing a method of 
election for filling up some of the new official seats in the Indian 
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Legislative council. Further it gave the Legislative Council the 
right of asking questions and discussing certain financial matters. 
Since these measures did not satisfy the Indians they continued 
to press further for more representa t ive and responsible 
government. Thus, the Act of 1909, also called Morely Minto 
Reforms Act, was enacted to enlarge the Indian Legislative Council 
so as to include a greater variety of Indian opinion and interest 
than had been included ever before. Another advancement in the 
democratisation of the Legislature reached under the Government 
of India Act, 1919, which provided the Indian Legislature to 
consist the Governor General and two chambers i.e. Council of 
States and the Legislative Assembly. Each Chamber having the 
majority of of elected members and headed by a president , 
appointed by the Governor General in case of Council of States 
and elected for the Legislative Council. Though the Assembly 
constituted under the Government of India Act 1919, did not 
possess the same powers as enjoyed by the legislatures of other 
independent countries. The then presiding officer Patel wanted the 
Assembly to function with maximum independence and tried to 
discharge his duties not as a mere presiding officer but also as 
the custodian of the rights and privileges of the Members 
individually and of the House collectively and also to uphold the 
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dignity of the House. The legislature as a representative body of 
the peoples and trustee of their sovereignty used to watch their 
interest and did all to ensure that the executive government must 
act within and according to the authority given to it by the 
legis la ture . To ultilize their r ights and discharge their 
responsibil i t ies without fear or favour, the Members of the 
legislature demanded the liberty of criticizing all aspects of 
administration and bring them to the public scrutiny. To function 
effectively with competent manner and independent of the control 
of the executive government they also needed a secretarial 
a ss i s tance , the independence of which is essential for the 
parliamentary democracy and interest of the people. This demand 
was made in 1921 and constituted in 1929. Govt, of India Act, 
1935, conta ins provisions of the privileges for Federal and 
Provincial Legislature. Section 28(3) and 71(31) expressly denied to 
those ligislature any penal jurisdiction of the House of Commons 
whereas section 28(4) and 71(4) obliged the said Legilsature to 
approach the court for punishing persons who refused to give 
evidence or produce documents before its committees. Since it's 
coming into force the quiestion Vhether the section 28 and 71 of 
the Act should be amended so that the privileges of the Indian 
Legislature where made the same as those enjoyed by the British 
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House of Commons' rose. The Indian Indepedence Act, 1947, 
contained provisions and powers for framing a new Constitution 
as well as for adapting the Govt, of India Act, 1935, in the 
changed situation. Till the new Constitution was framed it was 
this Act (1947) by which the functions of the Dominions were 
handed over to the Constitutent Assembly of India. 
So far as their privileges and power are concerned on no 
aspect of the life of Parliament has India since her independence, 
modelled her ways more carefully on those of Britain than in 
regard to the privileges of the House and their Members. The 
Constitution itself prefers not to attempt to describe those powers, 
privileges and immunities but instead, says simply that untill they 
are defined by law they "shall be those of the House of Commons 
of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.'^' These have been 
described as "the sum of the fundamental rights of the House 
and of its individual Members as against the prerogatives of the 
Crown, the authority of the ordinary courts of law and the 
special rights of the House of Lords.*^ Some are available against 
the Crown, some against the House of Lords, "and others against 
the citizens, they are much more important. The Privileges are 
19. W. H. Morris Jones, Parliament in India. LopBmans green & Co, 
London, 1967, p.245. 
20. Hood Philips, op. cit.. p. 172. 
20 
commonly divided into two classes, namely those specifically 
claimed by the speaker at the opening of a new Parliament and 
those not so claimed. Though the fact of a privilege being claimed 
by the speaker carries with it no superior force Indeed, some of 
those specifically claimed by the speaker, have been confirmed or 
limited by the statute. The privileges formally claimed by the 
speaker since very early are; freedom of speech in debate and 
freedom from arrest during session. And those which were not so 
claimed by the speaker are; the right of the House to regulate its 
own composition in the right to take exclusive cognisance of 
matters arising within the House; the right to punish members 
and strangers for breach of privilege and contempt; and the right 
of impeachment. 
The status of Indian legislative bodies from the view point of 
privileges and immunities had been a matter of concern to Indian 
legislators and^ in particular to Indian presiding officers almost 
from the inception of the 1921's Assemblies. Upto 1935, the 
Assemblies tried to pretend that they had privileges analogous to 
those of the House of Commons and persuade others to respect 
them as if they were supported in law, but whenever actual cases 
arose it was only too clear that privileges were neither part of 
the law of the land nor had it been statutorily conferred, even if 
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newspapers offended against supposed privileges there could be no 
question calling the editors to the Bar of the House'. In 1933 
dur ing the consideration of reforms for India in the Joint 
Parl iamentary committee, a memorandum was sent by the 
presiding officers of Indian legislative bodies urging that since they 
were helpless to deal, for instance, with press abuse, they should 
have conferred upon them the powers, privileges and immunities 
of the Commons. The Act of 1935 protected the freedom of 
speech in legislature and empowered the legislature to make laws 
whereby the courts would be able to punish person refusing to 
give evidence before legislative committees. It did empower 
legislatures to attempt the definition of their privileges by law but 
it expressly forbade the conferring on any legislature the status of 
a court or any punitive or desciplinary power other than a power 
to remove or exclude persons infringing the rules. 
Codification of Privileges: 
The privileges of the House and its Members are neither 
defined in England nor in India. In United Kingdom no attempt 
so far has been made to codify the entire law of privilege. The 
privileges of the Parliament are based "partly upon customs and 
precedents which are to be found in the Rolls of Parliament and 
the journals of the two Houses and partly upon certain statutes 
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which have been passed from time to time for the purpose of 
making clear particular matter wherein the privileges claimed by 
either House of Parliament have come in contact either with the 
prorogatives of the Crown or with the rights of individual.*^* The 
subject had engaged the attention of the Presiding officer since 
1938. At the conference in 1939 it was agreed that there should 
be a definition of privileges. According to the section 28 of the 
Government of India Act which was amended by an adaptation 
order on 31st March, 1948, said that the 'Privileges of the 
Members of the Dominion Legislature shall be such as may from 
time to time be defined by Act of Dominion Legislature and untill 
so defined, shal l be such as were immediately before the 
establishment of the Dominion enjoyed by the Members of the 
House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.'^a in 
September , 1949, the Chai rman, (speaker Mavalankar) in 
conference of speakers of Legislative Assembly, expressed his views 
as: 
•It is better not to define specific privileges just at the moment 
but to rely upon the precedents of the British House of Commons. 
The disadvantage of codification at present moment i s that 
wherever a new situation arises it will not be possible for u s to 
21. S.L. Shakdhar, Olimpsps of the working of Parliament. MelFopolitan Book 
Co., New Delhi, 1977, p.84. 
22. Kaul & Shakdhar, Practices & Procedure of Parliament. Metropolitan 
Book Co., New Delhi, 1986, p.81. 
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adjust ourselves to it and give Members additional privileges. 
Today, we are assured that OAir privilege are the same as those of 
the Members of the House of Commons In the present set up 
any attempt at legislation will very probably curtail our privileges. 
Let us , therefore, content oursolves with our being on par with 
the House of Commons. Let that convention be firmly established 
and t h e n we may, later on, think of put t ing it on a firm 
footing.'^^ 
the terms of the Constitution of India laid down that 'the status 
equivalent to that of the House of Commons.'^'* In 1954 the Press 
commission pleaded for the codification of privileges,^^ to which 
the speaker G.V. Mavalankar in the Conference of Presiding 
Officers at Rajkot on 3rd of January, 1955, replied as: 
T h e Press commission considered this matter purely from the 
point of v iew of the Press. Perhaps they may have felt the 
difficulties of the Press to be real; but from the point of view of 
the legislature, the question has to be looked at from a different 
angle. Any codification is more likely to harm the prestige and 
sovereignty of the legislature without any benefit being conferred 
on the Press. It may be aigued that the Press is left in the dark 
as to what the privileges are. The simple reply to this is that 
those privileges which are extended by the constitution to the 
legislature, its Members etc., are equated with the privileges of the 
House of Commons in England. It has to be noted here that the 
House of Conunons does not allow the creation of any privileges; 
and only such privileges are recognised as have existed by long 
time custom. No codification, therefore, appears to be necessary*. 
23^ S. L. Shakdhar. op. cit.. p^86! 
24. W. H. Morris Jones, op. cit.. p.24. 
25. Report of the Press commission, 1954, part 1, p.421. 
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therefore, it was decided unanimously as "in the presen t 
circumstances codification is neither necessary nor desirable." 
Article 105(3) of the Indian Constitution also provides that 
•the powers, privileges and immunities of each House shall be 
such as may, from time to time be defined by Parliament by Law 
and untill so defined, shall be those of the House of Commons of 
the Parliament of the United Kingdom and of its Members and 
Committees at the commencement of this Constitution on 26th 
January , 1950." Since than no comprehensive law has been 
passed by the Parliament under this Article and hence, in the 
absence, the powers, privileges and immunities of the House and 
of its Members and Committees thereof continues to remain the 
same as those of the British House of Commons. On the 23rd 
March, 1967, when the speaker made an announce in Lok Sabha 
regarding a Writ Petition filed in the Supreme Court against the 
Speaker and Members of the Committee of privileges, questions 
were ra ised in the House, whether legislation should be 
under taken to define the privileges of the House. The then 
Minister of law, P. Govinda Menon, stated that if the view of the 
House was that legislation should be undertaken on the subject 
defining the privileges of Parliament, that would be a welcome 
step and he would be happy to have s t eps taken in t ha t 
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direction." He further replied to a question on 21st of June, that 
the question of defining Privileges was under consideration. In this 
connection M. Hidayatulla, ex-chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
observed: 
'If there is mutual trust and respect between Parliament and 
Courts there is hardly any need to codify the law on the subject 
of privileges. With a codified law more advantage will flow to 
persons bent on vilifying Parliament, its Members and Committees 
and the Courts will be called upon more and more to intervene. 
At the moment, given a proper understanding on both s ides , 
parliamentary right to punish for breach of its privileges and 
contempt would rather receive the support of Courts t h a n 
otherwise. A written law will make it difficult for Parliament as 
well as Courts to maintain that dignity which rightly belongs to 
Parliament and which the Courts will always uphold as zealously 
as they uphold their own."^ 
The amended Constitution (forty second amendment act, 1976) did 
not presuppose any law to be passed by Parliament in the matter 
of defining the powers, privileges and immunities of each House, 
it's Members and Committees but are sought to be evolved by 
each House of Parliament from time to time. Some of the 
Privileges of Parliament and of it's Members and Committees are 
specified in the Constitution, certain Statutes and the Rules of 
Procedure of the House, while a large number of them are 
26. A Judge Miscellany, Bombay, 1972, pp.210-11. 
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continued to be based on precedents of the British House of 
Commons and on conventions which have grown in India also. 
A. Privilege which are specified in the Constitution are: 
Freedom of speech in Parliament .^ ^ 
Immunity to a Member from any proceedings in any Court in 
respect of any thing said or any vote given by Member in 
Parliament or any Committee thereof. The given Article also 
said that no person shall be liable to any proceedings in any 
Court ' in respect of the publ icat ion by or under the 
authority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, 
vote or proceedings.*^" 
Prohibition on the Courts to inquire into the proceedings of 
Parliament.^' 
B. Privileges which are specified in Statutes are: 
Freedom from arrest of Members in civil cases during the 
continuance of the session of the House and forty days 
before and forty days after its commencement.^" 
Immunity to a person from any proceedings civil or criminal, 
27. Constitution of India. Art. 105(1) 
28. Ibid., (2) 
29. Ibid.. Article 22. 
30. Civil Procedure Code. S.135. 
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in any court in respect of the publication in newspapers of a 
substantially true report of any proceeding of either House of 
Parliament unless the publication is proved to have been 
made with malice.^^ 
C. Privileges which are specified in the Rules of Procednre: 
Right of the House to receive immediate information of arrest, 
de tent ion, conviction, impr isonment and release of a 
Member.^^ 
Exemption of Member from service of legal process and arrest 
within the precincts of the Huse.^ 
Prohibition of disclosure of the proceedings or decisions of a 
secret sitting of the Huse.^* 
D. Privileges which are based upon precedents: 
Members or Officers of the House can not be compelled to 
give evidence or to produce documents in Courts of law 
related to the proceedings of the House without the 
permission of the House. 
Members or officers of the House can not be compelled to 
"ST. Farliamentary prooj^jdinp; tyrotection ol l*ublication) Act. 19/9. S. 53. 
32. Procedure of the Buainess of the House. Rule, 229 & 230. 
33. Ibid., 232 & 230. 
34. Ibid.. 252. 
28 
attend as witness before the other House or a Committee 
thereof or before a House of State Legislature or a Committee 
thereof without the permission of the House and without the 
consent of the Member whose attendance is required.^^ 
Apart from these privileges and immunities each House 
enjoys certain consequential powers also which are necessary 
for the protection of its privileges and immunities. These 
powers are: 
To commit persons, whether they are Members or not, for 
breach of privileges or contempt of the House. 
To compell the attendance of witnesses and to send for 
papers and records.^ 
To regulate its procedure and the conduct of business.^' 
To prohibit the publication of its debates and proceedings 
and to exclude strangers.^* 
Position in some other Commonwealth Countries: 
In the United Kingdom privileges of the Parliament as said, 
have not been codified so far. They are largely based upon 
35! 6th R(CPR-2LS). 
36. OP. cit.. Rule 269 & 270. 
37. OP. cit.. Article 118(1) 
38. OP. cit.. Rxile 387. 
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customs and presidents. However, there are certain statutes which 
have been passed from time to time for the purpose of making 
particular matters clear wherein the privileges claimed by the 
Houses of Parliament have come in contact either with the 
prerogatives of the Crown or with the rights of the individuals. 
The Select Committees of the House of Commons, U. K., on the 
Official Secret Acts, in their report in 1939, Observed: 
T h e privileges of Parliament, like many other institutions of the 
British Constitution, are indefinite in their nature and stated in 
general and sometimes vague terms. The elasticity thus secured 
h a s made it poss ib le to apply ex i s t ing privi leges in new 
circumstances from time to time. Any attempt to translate them 
into precise rules must deprive them of the very quality which 
renders them adaptable to new and varying conditions, and new 
or unusual combinations of circumstances, and indeed, might have 
the effect of restrict ing rather than safeguarding Member's 
privileges, since it would imply that, save in the circumstances 
specified, a Member Could be prosecuted without any infringement 
of the privileges of the House. The dignity and independence of 
the two-House, says Sire William Blackstone with great force, 'are 
in great measvu'e preserved by keeping their privileges indefinite'. 
If all the privileges of Parliament were set down and ascertained 
and no privileges to be allowed but what was so defined and 
determined, it were easy for the executive power to devise some 
new case, not within the line of privileges, and under pretence 
thereof to harass any refractory Member and violate the freedom of 
Parliament."^^ 
39. S.L. Shakdhar, op. cit.. p.98. 
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In some other countries e.g. Australia and Canada, Parliament 
has been empowered under the Constitution to define by law its 
powers, privileges and immunities however, no such legislation has 
so far been enacted. In Australia, the powers, privileges and 
immunities of Parliament are governed by section 49 of the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, which is much 
similar to Article 105(3) of the Constitution of India. In Canada, 
Section 18 of the British North America Act, 1867, substituted by 
the Parliament of Canada Act, 1875, empowers the Parliament of 
Canada to define from time to time, by Act, the privileges, powers 
and immunities of each House of Parliament and of the Members 
thereof thus the powers, privileges and immunities of the House 
of Parliament of Canada are potentially those of the British House 
of Commons. In South Australia, Section 35 of the Constitution 
Act, 1855-56, empowered Parliament to define powers, privileges 
and immunities of the two Houses and its Members, provided 
they did not exceed the privileges, immunities and powers of the 
British House of Commons as at the time of passing the Act. In 
pursuance of this Authority Parliament of South Australia in 1858 
enacted Par l iamentary Privileges Act which se t out in 
comprehensive detail the privileges of the legislature. But this Act 
was repealed in 1872 since great difficulties were experienced in 
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its exercise. While speaking on the second reading of the same 
bill, James P. Boucaut, the Attorney General, quoted lord cairns 
as saying: 
•Parliament's most important privilege i s not to define their 
Privileges. A privilege to commit which is dependent upon the 
chance or some other body to whom a narrative shall be given of 
that which was done before their own eyes, being of the same 
opinion as you are as to whether it was a contempt or not, is no 
privilege at all."'^ 
Thus the Act of 1872 declared the powers, privileges and 
immunities of the two Houses and its Members same as those of 
the Houseof Commons at the time of passing of the South 
Australian Constitution Act, 1856. 
Contempt of the House/Breach of Privilege: 
The power of legislature to punish for contempt is very 
important. This power has been firmly established by the Speaker 
of the House of Commons, and he may issue a warrant on these 
groupd§ witl^PVit fufthef specifyii>g t^e n^fu]:^ pf thp bre^^^ 
committed.** In India, so long as privileges remain those of the 
House of commons, the Supreme Court would probably uphold 
this power and protect it against restriction even by the 
40. S.L. Shakdhar, op. cit.. p. 101. 
41 . W. H. Morris Jones, op. cit.. p.247. 
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Fundamental Rights. However, if they get codified or set out in 
an Act of Parliament the Court would certainly be entitled to 
enquire into the Matter. It is of recent Origin in India. Breach 
of privilege is considered contempt of the High Court of 
Parliament, and the power to punish the commission of it rests, 
as in the case of the Courts, upon the inherent power of an 
authority to do all that is necessary to maintain its own dignity 
and efficiency. The courts do not check each other in committing 
for contempt, and on the whole the accepted doctrine is that they 
do not interfere with the action of either House in this matter. 
Some of its examples which were given by May has been 
Summarised by Anson as:^^ 
a) disrespect to any Member of the House, as such, by a non-
member eg. An attempt to threaten or intimidate Members for 
their action in the House have been declared 'breache of 
privilege' by the House and offenders have been punished in 
numerious ways as reprimand, imprisonment etc. The offering 
of a bribe to a Member is a breach of privilege, and the 
acceptance of bribe by a Member has been punished. Even 
the acceptance offers by Members for professional services 
42. G.F.M. Champion, An Introduction ot the Procedure of the House of 
Cntninnns. Philip Allan & Co. Ltd. London, 1929, p.47. 
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connected with any proceeding in Parliament is prohibited as 
•contrary to the usage and dignity of the House.* 
b) disrespect to the House collectively, whether committed by a 
Member or any other. This is the original and fundamental 
form of breach of privilege, and almost all breaches can be 
reduced to it. Any misconduct in the presence of the House 
or a committee thereof, whether by Members of Parliament or 
by members of the public who have been admitted to the 
galleries of the House or to s i t t ings of commit tees as 
witnesses will const i tu te contempt of the House. Such 
misconduct may be defined as disorderly, contumacious, 
disrespectful or contemptuous behaviour in the presence of 
the House e.g. Interrupting or disturbing the proceedings of 
the House or of Committees thereof; Impersonating as a 
Member of the House and taking the Oath; Serving or 
executing a civil or criminal process within the precincts of 
the House while the House or a committee there of, is sitting 
without obtaining the leave of the House; Refusal by a 
witness to make an oath or affirmation before a committee; 
Refusal by a witness to answer questions put by a committee 
and refusal to produce documents in his possession; Pre-
varicating, giving false evidence, or wilfully suppressing truth 
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or persis tent ly misleading a committee; Trifling with a 
committee resulting insulting answers to a committee, or 
appearing in a state of intoxication before a committee. 
c) disobedience to the orders of the House, or interference with 
its procedure, with its officers in the execution of their duty 
or with witnesses in respect of evidence given before the 
House or Committees. Among this class placed the breach of 
privilege as publication of debates which was frequently 
published when complaint is made of misrepresentation in the 
report of a speech. The Motion censuring the printer is a 
breach of privilege. Publishing of evidence taken by a 
Committee before it has been reported to the House is 
considered a breach of privilege. Misconduct of witness before 
the House or a Committee and for doing of signature to a 
petitions are other examples. This power of the House to 
punish for contempt or breach of privilege has been described 
as 'the Key Stone' of Parliamentary privilege and considered 
necessary to enable the House to discharge its functions and 
safe guards its authority and privileges. It owes its origin to 
the powers possessed by the Courts of law to punish for 
contempt and without such a power the House would sink 
and loose its efficiency. But the matter raised certain serious 
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questions about the area of jurisdiction between the Courts 
and Legislature and has led to conflict between them. The 
Act of 1919 which conferred certain privilege on Indian 
legislators did not give them the power to punish for 
contempt or breach of privilege/^ Even the Government of 
India Act, 1935, which widened the scope of privileges, 
expressly stated that nothing in that Act or any other Indian 
Act should be constructed as conferring or empowering the 
Federal Legislature to confer, on either chamber or on both 
chambers sitting together, or on any committee or office of 
the legislature, the s ta tus of a court or any punitive or 
disciplinary powers other than a power to remove or exclude 
persons infringing the rules or standing orders, or otherwise 
behaving in a disorderly manner. It was again with the 
commencement of the Constitution, this power to punish for 
contempt or breach of privilege and to commit the offender to 
custody or prison was conferred on the Houses of Parliament 
and the State Legislatures and was upheld by the Bombay 
High Court in 1957. The then Chief J u s t i c e (Coyajee) 
observed: 
the framers of the Constitution intended the House alone to 
be the sole judge on a question of admitted privilege. To my 
43! Govt, of India Act. 1935. S.677 (Set out in the 9th Scheduled 
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mind, it is quite clear, therefore, that under Article 194(3), when 
it prescribed that the privileges shall be those of the House of 
Commons of the Parliament of United Kingdom, the power to 
punish for contempt is expressly conferred on the House in clear 
and unequivocal terms and therefore it must follow that the 
exercise of that power is identical with that of the House of 
Commons."'*'' 
Because of the unwilled importance a large number of 
privileges are recognised by the Courts. 
Privilege which are claimed hii the House for its Members and 
recognised the courts are: 
1. Freedom of Speech 
2. Freedom from Arrest in Civil Cases. 
Privileges which are claimed by the House for itself and are 
recognised bu the Courts they are manu: 
1. The right of each House to be the sole judge of the 
lawfulness of its own proceeding. 
2. Power to frame Rules for procedure under Article 118 and 
208 of the Constitution. 
3. Right to punish for parliamentary misbehaviour 
4. Right to call witnesses before its Committee 
5. Right to exclude strangers. 
6. Right to punish outsiders for breach of its privileges. 
44l Homi P. Mistry V. Nafisul Hasan. 1. L. R. 1957. Bombanv 218. 
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7. Right of the House to publish debates and proceedings. 
8. Publication of proceedings under the authority of the House, 
There are certain privileges also which although, are claimed 
by the House but still not recognised by the Courts. Such as: 
1. Houses claim that power to punish for contempt is not 
subject to judicial review. 
2. Right for its proper constitution. 
Thus, it can be said that the present position is the result 
of continuous development of English Constitution through many 
centuries. The first distinctive period in the History of Constitution 
extends from the time of the settlement and rule of the Anglo-
Saxons through Norman dynasties to 1485, this period is called 
the one in which the foundations of the Constitution were laid. 
The second period begins from the establishment of the Tudor 
dynasty through the early and later stuart period including the 
Puritan Revolution and Commonwealth coming to end with the 
Glorious Revolution (1485-1688). The third period extends from 
the Revolution of 1688 to 1919 while the fourth one extends from 
1919 to the present day. The age-long struggle between the ruler 
and the ruled went for centuries till it became a central thread 
in the constitutional development of England and ended only 
when the English people had made themselves their own masters. 
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In this great struggle the leading role on behalf of the nation was 
played by a great institution- 'Parliament' which was essentially 
an extension of the Royal Council and came in the present form 
only after a long transformation. It's present form is the result of 
Great Revolution of 1688 which immensely contributed to the 
growth of Parliamentary System of Government. The Revolution 
and the Bill of Rights mark a culminating point. By the close of 
the seventeenth century the frame work of the English 
governmental system was almost completed in its larger aspects. 
It sounded the death knell of the Devine Right of King which 
meant that the King ceased to posses or at least to exercise once 
for all many powers which had been disputed. Since this great 
revolution, the Parliament acquire more and more powers making 
the King restricted to only some areas. This is the important 
change of shifting the power from the King or the House of Lords 
to the House of Commons along with it's democratisation. 
India has followed more or less same pattern suitable to the 
conditions prevailing in India. Powers and privileges of the 
Members of the Houses are same as those of Britain. They are 
not defined or codified any where in the Constitution rather 
Article 105 says that they should be similar as those of the 
House of Commons in the United Kingdom. Thus, Members have 
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full autonomy to utilize all those powers, privileges and 
immunities which are available to them in their deliberations 
within the precinct of the House. The executive government, under 
the Constitution, is responsible to the House of the People. 
Therefore, supremacy and independence of Parliament and the 
independence of its Members are vital and essential because 
without this supremacy and independence the Houses of 
Parliament and the Members thereof can not be expected to give 
effect to the will of that power which in our Constitution like all 
other democratic states, is the true political sovereign. This 
independence & supremacy of the Houses are needed today more 
than ever before. The modern state is a hydraheaded political 
organisation whose multifarious activities touch and concern the 
citizen at every point of his life. By slow and painful stages, the 
police state has transformed itself into the welfare state as the 
most potent instrument devised by men for attacking the five 
giants of poverty, disease ignorance, squalor and idleness. The 
executive government in the modern state is, therefore, endowed 
with vast and enormous powers. It is very necessary in these 
circumstances that Parliament should have constant watch over 
the activities of the Executive Government and in order that this 
can be properly done. It is absolutely necessary that neither the 
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executive government nor any body else, whether it be any 
member of the public, should be able to criticise or otherwise 
interfere with the functions of the Houses or their Members and 
their principal functions. All these privileges appertain equally to 
both Houses, Privileges are declared and breaches therefore, are 
punishable by each House. In such legislature neither House by 
itself can create a new privilege rather each one has exclusive 
jurisdiction to enforce its privileges. Approval of both the Houses 
is necessary in creating a new privilege. In U. K. and Thailand, 
the privileges and immunities have to be confirmed after every 
election by the Sovereign or Head of the State. The Speaker of 
the House of Commons, by customs, on his election asks still for 
the confirmation of the privileges of the Commons. 
Collective privileges of Parliament and immunities of Members 
have, besides being derived from the Constitution and law, grown 
from the decision and practice of Parliament and decision of 
courts. There are potential areas of conflict between the Courts 
and the Legislature where courts have jurisdiction implied or 
explicit, as in U. K. and Canada and to some extent in India. 
But in India so long as privileges remain those of the House of 
commons, the Supreme Court would probably uphold this power 
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and protect it against restriction even by the Fundamental Rights. 
If the privileges were codified, set out and defined in an Act of 
Parliament the court: would then at once, feel entitled to enquire 
into the constitutionality of such privileges. 
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CHAPTER-n 
IMPORTANCE 
Pgirliainent is generally a name given to that institution of 
state which is primarily responsible for the task of making laws 
of the country. It is one of the most three important institutions 
of the government namely, the Executive, Judiciary and the 
legislature having occupying the superior position among all. To 
enable the Members to discharge their functions independently 
the Const i tu t ion provides certain powers and privileges, 
individually to each Member and collectively to the house. 
Privileges are considered to be an important part of the law and 
custom of Parliament. They tend to preserve the relationship 
between Parliament and the courts as well as the public. Except 
so far as it has been made statutory, a privilege is part of the 
common law.^ In totalitarian regimes, ParUament either does not 
exist or where it exists its role is hardly significant. But in a 
democratic country like India it is the ParUament that C£U-ry out 
the affairs of the state and attend to the grievances of the people 
. The role of Parliament is more significant in a developing 
country like India, where the people look to it to meet their 
growing aspirations. 
1. G. Fray and Philips, Constitutional Law. Lomgmans green and Co., Lond, 
1953, p . l l 3 . 
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It is a popular fallacy that the procedures and practices of 
the Indian Parliament are the exact replica of the West Minister 
model. What we have today is the result of centuries of struggle 
by the English from twelvth century when the Commoners were 
not giving the same status as that of the Lords and Abbots. They 
did not have a say in the affairs of the s ta te and were 
considered the followers of what was conveyed to them by the 
King and his Council. They had the status of mere the petioners. 
No doubt the British Parliament has provided the inspiration 
and set a model for the legislature in India as well as in other 
Common Wealth countr ies as for as basic features and 
fundamental principles are concerned. But over the years, the 
ins t i tu t ion itself has gone through t remendous changes to 
accommodate new challenges and problems posed by fluid political 
scenario. After independence, framing a Constitution best suited to 
its basic needs occupied the top priority with the Constituent 
Assembly in India. It heavily relied on the British Model primarily 
because they also used to the British Political Culture but in the 
process the conditions peculiar to India, its traditions were never 
ignored. The new Constitution tried to incorporate the best from 
the British and Indian traditions and conventions. 
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Parliament in India however, is not as spvereign as the 
British Pariiament which enjoys unlimited law-making powers and 
its sovereignty is unquestionable. Parliament in India on the 
contrary has to function within the parameters of the Constitution 
and its amending power is limited by the basic structure. Its 
legislative authority is also constrained by the federal distribution 
of powers between the union and the states and Fundamental 
Rights which are justiciable. Judicial review has also affected its 
hegemony, Inspite of these limitations Parliament enjoys immense 
authority as a law-making body. After Independence one of the 
very important task that had to be undertaken was to enable 
Parliament to fulfil its obligations as the sovereign legislature of 
an independent nation. Because of its tremendous responsibility it 
is supposed to have an edge over other organs of the 
government. It enjoys the legislative, financial and administrative 
matters. It is precisely because of this that it enjoys certain 
privileges and uphold its dignity and ensuring smooth functioning. 
Why Privileges Are Needed ? 
Very often a question is posed as to why the House or its 
Members need privileges or power above the citizens when they 
themselves are the representatives of the peoples and further it is 
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said that no Member of Parliament has higher privileges than 
those enjoyed by ordinary citizens as regards the application of 
laws. In other words, the privileges do not exalt the member 
above the ordinary restraints of law which apply to his fellow 
citizens. 
This is no doubt true but the House is associated with such 
important functions that needs certain freedom and power to 
carry out the business effectively thus, it was needed to grant 
certain powers and immunities to the House as a whole and its 
Members and Committees. The tasks entrusted to Parliament 
a s sumes so much importance tha t without immunities and 
privileges it is difficult to carry out its functions and maintain 
the dignity of the House. Further in order to maintain the highest 
tradition in Parliamentary life. Members are expected to observe 
certain standards to enhance the dignity of Parliament as well as 
their own dignity. Nothing should be contrary to the usage or 
derogatory to the dignity of the House or in any way inconsistent 
with the standards which Parliament is entitled to expect. 
Functions of the House: 
It is one of the top three o rgans of the government 
occupying unique position. It enjoys the highest power in 
legislative, financial and executive fields. The functions it is called 
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upon to perform are many which can be categorised as 
1. Law making 
2. Financial 
3. Control over Executive 
4. Control over administration 
5. Power to amend Constitution 
6. Control over public corporations 
Law making is its primary function. The power to enact laws 
rests with it. Laws are enacted after a thorough debate by the 
Members of the House and assented to by the head of the state.^ 
Article 107(2) says *a bill shall not be deemed to have been 
passed by the Houses of Parliament unless it has been agreed to 
by both Houses , e i ther without a m e n d m e n t or with such 
amendments only as agreed to by both Houses. Previously it was 
in the form of petition but now it is a full fledged legislative 
body which has developed a procedure of law making, having 
unwielded authority to make, confirm, enlarge, restrain, abrogate, 
repeal, revive and expound laws.^ It has the right to legislate on 
each and every topic and no other body may legislate except with 
the authority of Parliament.'' 
2. Kaul & Shakdhar, P!a^ liam^^ Tlfarv Practice & Procedure. New E>elhi, 1993, p.441. 
3. I.D. Sharma, Modem Constitution at work. Lidcknow, 1950, pp.32. 
4. GodfrsQT and Philips, op. cit.. p.95. 
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Control over finance: enactment of the budget is yet other 
important function of Parliament so far as the financial matters 
are concerned. It wields greater authority which has developed the 
lower House to a position of like the House of commons. It 
controls the purse of the nation and closely monitors the 
expenditure. This system of Parliamentary control over public 
finance had its origin in England which was gradually accepted 
and adopted by other countries all over the world. Article 149 
empowers the Parliament to lay down the duties and powers of 
the Auditor General. He functions as an agent of the Parliament 
and keeps vigil over public finance. Besides the Standing 
Committees of Parliament, the public account committee and the 
est imate committee are also associated closely with public 
accounts and expenditure. Many a times these committees have 
brought to the notice of Parliament the financial irregularities, 
notable among them was the Jeep scandal. It is largely through 
these committees the financial accountability of the Council of 
Ministers to Parliament is ensured and enforced. 
No less important is the control of the executive by the 
Parliament. The executive is responsible to the Parliament, both 
individually and the Council collectively. Article 75(3) says that 
Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House 
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of the people. The Council of Ministers can remain in office so 
long as it enjoys the confidence of the House and it must resign 
whenever the policy of the government proves fundamentally 
unacceptable to the House, Control over the executive is exercised 
through Parliamentary quest ions, debates and discussions , 
adjournment motions and no confidence motions. It is also 
empowered to impeach the President and Judges of the Supreme 
Court and High Courts. It is actually the Parliament that makes 
and unmakes the Executive and always keeps it on its toes. 
Article 368 empowers Parl iament to amend by way of 
abolition, variation or repeal any provision of the Constitution. 
There is no separa te const i tuent body for the purpose of 
amendment of the Constitution. Parliament's power to amend the 
Constitution is, however, limited by the doctrine of basic structure 
propounded by the Supreme Court in the case of Keshvananda 
Bharti vs Union of India and the Minerva Mills. In the name of 
amendment Parliament can not amend or repeal or destroy the 
basic structure (which is yet to be spelled out by the Supreme 
Court) of the Constitution. It's amending power, is therefore, 
limited. 
It also exercises control over public corporations mainly 
through the committee on public under tak ings . Being the 
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custodian of public interest it is bound to maintain highest 
standards of integrity and efficiency more so in commercial and 
industrial enterprises, which are financed out of public funds. 
Parliament's control over public corporation is manifest in their 
creation, discussion on their Annual Reports and approval of 
their budgets. Parliament is not only a law making body but also 
a debating assembly. It criticizes the administration and policies 
of the government, highlights the administrative lapses and 
financial irregularities and keeps the administration on tender 
hooks. The fear of Parl iamentary quest ions often acts as a 
deterrence to the administration. 
It is because of these important functions and enormous 
responsibilities that it requires certain amount of freedom to cany 
out these tasks effectively and fearlessly. The law making process 
in itself is long and cumbersome involving prolonged debates and 
discussions. For the effective enforcement of this task it is 
essential that Members of Parliament should be given freedom to 
present their views without fear or favour. These freedom owe 
their origin to the exalted position of the House, considered 
indispensable for its effective functioning and hence, their 
importance can not be under emphasized. Pyme rightly observe 
that "Parliament without Parliamentary liberties are but a fair 
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plausible way into bandage.' ^ In the words of May "the distinctive 
mark of the privileges is its ancillary character. They are enjoyed 
by individual Members because the House can not perform its 
functions without the unimpeded use of the service of its 
Members and by each House for the protection of its Members 
and the vindication of its own authority and dignity.*^ The 
principal reason of such privileges is that "unless Parliament can 
not keep its membership intact from out side interference, 
whether or not the interference was the motive of embarrassing 
its section it could not be confident of any accomplishment."' 
Thus each House of Parliament collectively, and its members 
individually, enjoy certain privileges i.e. certain r ights and 
immunities without which the House and its Members can not 
discharge the functions entrusted to them by the Constitution. 
They safeguard the authority and dignity of the House, its 
Committees and Members and where there is any question of an 
alleged breach of privileges the matter is examined by the House, 
but generally by the committees. 
The Speaker of the House nominates the committee. In 
constituting the committee, the speaker takes into consideration 
5. D.C. Jain, ParliamentnPrivileges under Indian Constitution. Sterling 
PubUsher, New Delhi, 1975, p.2. 
6. Ibid., p.7. 
7. Ibid. 
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the claims, interests and the strength of various parties and 
groups in the House so that the committee is fully representative. 
The first committee for the purpose was appointed by the Speaker 
in April, 1950, consisting of ten members which has now been 
raised to fifteen. The most important function of this committee is 
to examine every question of privilege referred to it in the light of 
facts and c i r cums tances leading to it, making the 
recommendations which deems fit.'* Some times it has also been 
required by the House to consider questions of procedure relating 
to the privileges of the House. Apart from the standing Committee 
of Privileges which inquires the matter of privileges of the House 
and its Members, adhoc committees are also appointed from time 
to time to consider and investigate the conduct of the Members 
of the House and to find out whether such conduct was 
derogatory to the dignity of the House and inconsistent with the 
standard expected of the Members. One such committee was 
appointed in 1951 to consider the Mudgal case and again in 
1963 and 1971. 
Being a sovereign body, subject to the constraints of the 
Constitution, the House has an inherent right to conduct its 
affairs without any interference whatsoever. 
8. Rule 314, of the Business of the House. 
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It is the most important function of the Parliament to receive 
petitions from people since it is the Parliament to which people 
look to ventilate their grievances. This is not a new practice but 
has been in vogue since time immemorial when the petition was 
demanded by the kings or rulers of the s t a t e . In early 
Parliaments position was entirely different, the representative 
elements were humble and precarious. For most of the reign of 
Edward II they could not make constitutional claim in sharing 
parliamentary functions. Those functions were supposed to be 
exercised by the council only but even then the Commons became 
conscious, they made their grants of supply conditional (made 
supply only when provided a chance to share in legislation and 
counsel on policy matter). But they could not become the judges 
in the High court of Parliament therefore, not possesed the power 
to perform in the same manner as their peers did as counsellors 
of the King. 
The relationship of the Commons with legislation was in the 
capacity of petitioners, at first as individuals and soon as a body. 
The statute of York, 1322, laid down a principle that laws of 
general application should be made in Parliament and secondly, 
the Common's assent is necessary. These principles had never 
been definitely laid down ever before. To so succeed in enforcing 
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the general observance of these principles, the Commons had a 
long struggle. This struggle was conducted on two main fronts. 
First, the King's power to make laws outside the Parliament had 
to be restricted. This was done by appropriating the name of 
•statute to Parliamentary legislation," and leaving the name of 
ordinance for concillar legislation. Secondly, by restricting the 
sphere of ordinances. 
At the beginning of a new Parliament in sixteenth century 
the speaker, when went up to the House of Lords to receive the 
royal approbation of this election, laid claim by humble petition to 
•the ancient and undoubted rights and pr ivi leges ' of the 
commons, particularly to four; freedom from arrest, liberty of 
speech, access to the royal person and a favourable construction 
of all their proceeding. 
The lord chancellor responded that "Her Majesty most readily 
confirm all the rights and privileges which have been granted to 
or conferred upon commons by her majesty or any of her royal 
predecessor.^ The matter was of such an importance that it finds 
its place in the Indian Constitution. In United Kingdom, this right 
has been regarded as a fundamental principle of the Constitution. 
9. Lord Campion, An Introdcution to the Procedure of the House of 
C.ntnjnnmi Philip Allan and Co. Ltd., London, 1958, p.62. 
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The right to present, and for the house to receive, petitions 
is clearly laid down by the House of Commons in 1669 as "that 
it is the inherent right of every commoner in England to prepare 
and present petitions to the House of Commons to revive the 
same'. It is an undoubted right and privilege of the Commons to 
judge and determine, touching the nature and matter of such 
petitions, how they are fit and unfit to be received. In India it 
owes its origin to a resolution moved in the preindependence era 
in the then council of states by a Member (Sir Manekji Byramjee 
Dadabhoy) on 15th September, 1921, which sought to empower 
the council, if necessary, by statute interaction to receive public 
petition on all matters relating to public wrongs, grievances or 
disability to any acts of public servants or to public policy.'° 
Thus the process of development was slow but steady. The 
Parliament began acquiring more and more power and the role of 
the King was restricted to few areas. The Great Revolution of 
1688 particularly marked this development. The closing years of 
the period notable since they contributed immensely to the growth 
of Parliamentary system of government in England. The Revolution 
and the Bill of Rights marked a cu lminat ing point to the 
development. All that exists today is nothing more than a detailed 
10. S.L. Shakdhar - Glimpes of the Working of Parliament. MetroOPolitan 
Book Co., New Delhi, 1977, p. 
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application of principles established in the seventeenth century. 
None of the principles postulates like the sovereignty of the 
nation, supremacy of law, and omnipotence of Parliament were 
seriously challenged again. 
Parliament in India has played a pioneer role in working 
towards the goals of national reconstruction and nurturing the 
values of freedom, secularism and democracy. Its pivotal position 
in India's democratic polity is not only a matter of fundamental 
principle in constitutional theory but it is also a well established 
fact in our political life. As a microcosm of the nat ion 
Par l iament h a s consistently reflected the feelings, hopes , 
aspirations and even weakness and frustrations of the peoples of 
India. It was clearly emerged as the most crucial political 
institution of India the future of which depends on the working of 
that key institution since the success of any nation depends on 
how much are its policies effective and implemented in the real 
life of public to encourage and enhance their development. This 
can be resulted only if the Members devote themselves whole 
heartedly and also with a great degree of freedom so as to come 
out with their hidden ideas and express suitable proposals. This 
is possible only when they are given certain privileges over others. 
These privileges and immunities mfist be attached to each House 
i ( A\CC. N O . 
\-^ — - ' - - ' ' 
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collectively, and to the Members thereof individually, enabling the 
Parl iament to act and discharge its functions without any 
interference or obstruction from any quarter. Thus, for the 
effective and efficient deliberation the Members have been given 
some what wider personal liberty and freedom over an ordinary 
citizen to ensure their uninterrupted services. These are necessary 
to vindicate its authority, prestige and power and protect its 
Members from any obstruction in the performance of their 
Parliamentary functions. 
According to Article 88 and 105 (4), the privileges are not 
only available to the members of the Hose but also to those who 
under Consti tution, entitled to speak and take part in the 
proceedings of the House or any of its committees e.g.. Attorney 
General, hence, to make the Members able to express their ideas 
and to ensure their movements freely during the business of the 
House a large number of privileges are thus granted to them. 
Area Sphere of Privileges: 
The privileges constitute an important part of Parliamentary 
life Article 105 (1) and (2) provides for freedom of speech in 
Parliament which falls outside the purvew of the judiciary. Jaspat 
Roy Kapoor suggested that a nonmember of Parliament who had 
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a right to speak in Parliament should also be granted immunity 
from any proceedings in a court of law not only in respect of 
what he might say on the floor of the House but also in respect 
of what he might say before a committee of Parliament" and his 
suggestion was accepted. The ideas behind these immunities is 
not only to protect the person from any proceeding any where 
but also to enable them to speek freely and come out with their 
free and frank ideas. Otherwise no express ideas can be emerged 
and proper information can not be sought. Parliament is the 
Store House of information and ideas, and this is made possible 
only when the Members participate freely without any hesitation. 
To get information from the government of what is happening in 
various fields, Members ask for information. Even to criticize 
government's policy they move different motions and put the 
government on their toe to act according to the prescribed line. 
The Right to put questions for seeking further information from 
the government was first provided in 1892, and in 1909 and 
right to ask supplementary questions was also conceded. The Act 
of 1909 provided that any Member who had asked a question 
could put a supplementary question for the purpose of elucidating 
further information and for this nothing said in the House is 
11. Subhash, C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India. Shipra 
Publication, New Delhi, 1993, p.278. 
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justiciable thus, Members are protected for what they observe and 
speak in the House. 
Under section 67(7) of the Government of India Act, 1919, 
the Members of the legislature for the first time enjoyed, in 
express terms, the right to freedom of speech and vote inside the 
legislative chamber. They are also not liable to any proceeding in 
any court for their speech or vote in either House for any thing 
said in official reports ." This also applies to the publication of 
any proceeding or paper under the authority of the House. In 
England, the House of Commons has the right to Prohibit the 
publication of its reports, debates or other proceedings. In search 
light case, the question was whether the publication, by a news 
paper, of those parts of the speech of Member in the House 
which were ordered to be expunged by the speaker constitute 
breach of privilege of the House. The Supreme Court held that 
the publication of expunged portion of speech constituted a 
breach of the privilege of the House. 
Generally there is a decline in the functioning of most of the 
institutions during the last few decades and it should surprise no 
one if one finds this erosion in s t a n d a r d s affecting the 
performance of our Parliament. It is of main concern that the 
12. Ibid. • 
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House of the Parliament constitute the acme of our democratic 
polity. Their proceedings are an open book, constantly watched by 
the people through newspaper, reports and T.V. coverage, any 
such lowering in the quality of its functioning or deviation from 
the requisi te norms become much more perceptible and 
pronounced. Parliament being the supreme forum for deliberating 
over national issues and matters of public importance is expected 
to set the tone and provide pa t t e rn of d iscuss ion and 
deliberations for other forms to follow and also set norms of 
behaviour for others to emulate. 
Our founding fathers had chosen in the Parliamentary System 
over the President ial Form of Government . This was not 
incidentally but was deliberately chosen as its secures greater 
accountability. Though the presidential form provides more stability 
but accountability over stability was preferred as it constitutes the 
essence of democracy and Rule of Law. It would not be out of 
contest to ment ions that in 1642 Char les I enter into the 
Parliament with army men to arrest some Members, the king said 
to the speaker "Mr. Speaker, I am not able to identify the 
Members whom I want to arrest. You please identify them and 
hand them over to m e ' " the speaker told him in a fearless voice 
13. Journal of Const i tut ional & Parl iamentary S t u d i e s . Ins t i tute of 
Constitutial and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi, 1993, p.41. 
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that he had no eyes and ear of his own but see with the eyes 
of the House and hear with their ears while functioning as 
speaker of the House. He further said that he could not oblige 
His Majesty. And when the King was leaving with his army men 
the Members of the House shouted at him" Your Majesty, Breach 
of Privilege, Breach of Privilege. This only es tabl i shes the 
supremancy and its ability to assert even against the King. 
The essence of Parliament democracy lies in free, frank and 
fearless discussions. This enables Members to express themselves 
freely in the House. Freedom of speech and debate in Parliament 
in England dates back to 17th century in the famous case of Sir 
John Eliot who was convicted by the Court of King's Bench for 
seditious speeches made in the House of Commons. The House of 
Lords reversed this decision on the ground that "the words 
spoken in Parliament should only be judged there in.""* The Bill 
of Rights, 1688, laid down that the freedom of speech and 
debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached 
or questioned in any court or place out side the Parliament. A 
Member may thus say whatever he thinks proper within the 
House and no action can be brought against him in any court 
for this. The validity of proceedings within a House also can not 
14. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law. Wadhawa and Co., Agra, 1994, 
p.56 
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be called in question in a court even if the House does not 
strictly follow its own rules of procedure. It is an exclusive right 
of the Parliament to regulate its own internal proceedings and to 
adjudicate, The courts will not interfere with what takes place 
inside the House. As in Bradlaugh V. Gossaf case. Bradlaugh was 
prevented from entering the House by the order of the House of 
Commons. The plaintiff asked the court to declare the order of 
the House as invalid. But the court held that the House of 
Commons was not subject to the control of the court in matters 
relating to its own internal proceedings, The House of Commons 
has exclusive right of being the exclusive judge of the legality of 
its own proceedings, no court of law can interfere with the rights 
of the House to regulate its internal affairs. 
In India, Article 122 categorically states that the validity of 
the proceeding in Parliament can not be called in question in a 
cour t of law on the ground of any alleged irregularity of 
procedure. In M.S.M. Sharma V. Sri Krishna Sinha, Supreme 
Court held tha t "the validity of the proceedings inside the 
legislature of a s ta te cannot be called in question on the 
allegation that procedure laid down by the law has not been 
strictly foUowd.^^ Each House reserves to itself the power to 
I s ! Searchntight Case. A.I.R.. 1959. S.C. 359. 
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suspend any rules of procedure in its application to a particular 
bus iness before it. The cour t s do not interfere with the 
functioning of the speaker inside the House in the matter of 
regulating the conduct of business of the House by virtue of 
powers vested in him. The High Court would not issue prohibition 
to restrain the Committee on Privileges appointed by the House to 
consider a privilege matter.*^ It is an exclusive right of the 
members to regulate the internal proceeding of the House and to 
adjudicate upon matters arising there in within the precinct of 
the House. As May apply obscenes, it is "the sum of the peculiar 
rights enjoyed by each House collectively as a constituent part of 
the High Court of Parliament, and by members of each House 
individually, without which they could not discharge their 
functions and which exceeds those possessed by other bodies or 
individual." Redlich considers the privileges of the Commons as 
the sum of fundamental rights of the House and of its individual 
Member as against the prerogatives of the Crown, the authority of 
the ordinary courts of land and the special rights of the House of 
Lords.' 
16. T.F. May Parliamentary Privileges. Butter Worth and Co. Ltd., London, 
1974, p.82. 
17. In R.C.S. Sarkar, "Privilege of the Press and Parliament," Journal of 
Constitutional & Parliamentary Studies. VoL I, 1967, p.42. 
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Other privileges are extended to make their movements free 
while the House is in session. Members can not be arrested in a 
civil proceeding within a period of forty days before and forty 
days after a session to ensure the safe arrival and attendance for 
their parliamentary duties which are so important that they can 
not be ignored or overlooked at any cost. The same privilege is 
extended to the state legislators. In K. Ananda Nambiar V. Chief 
Secretary Government of Madras case, the petitioner who was a 
Member of Parliament, detained under the Defense of India Rules, 
1952, He challenged the order of detention on the ground that a 
legislator can not be detained and prevented from exercising his 
constitutional rights as legislator while the legislative chamber to 
which he belongs is in session. The privilege are extended not to 
endanger the security and efficiency of the nation rather to the 
good and prompt services of the country. The privilege is 
extended not only to the civil cases but in criminal cases too, the 
House has the right to receive immediate information about the 
arrest and if the House is not being informed about the detention 
the act amounts to breach of privilege. The detenue is authorized 
to correspond with the legislature and make correspondence with 
the speaker and the chairman of the committee of privileges, the 
executive authori ty h a s no right to withhold such 
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correspondence."^' Rule Making power is yet another privilege. The 
business of the House is so technical in nature that the House 
is authorized by the Constitution to frame their own rules and 
procedures for smooth conduc t of bus iness .* ' Whenever 
circumstances change and new situations arise, the rules needs to 
be changed accordingly which is done by the House itself. 
Impact of Privileges: 
The word immunity is used simultaneously with privilege. It 
implies immunity against any action outside the House for any 
thing said by its Members or vote cast in the discharge of his 
parliamentary duties. It also implies freedom form legal process in 
connection with the proceedings in Parliaments freedom from 
arrest in civil cases, immunity from law of slander for words 
spoken in Parliament, exemption from obeying subpoenas and 
exemption from serving on juries and attendance as witness in a 
court during a session of Parliament.^ It is an essential thing for 
the proper exercise of their parliamentary functions. The privileges, 
powers and immunities of the Houses of Parliament and their 
members, therefore, act as a shield and, to some extent, as a 
Ts. M.P. Jain, op. cit.. p.61. 
19. Ibid., p.58. 
20. Aslam Abdullah Khan, "Privileges of Parl iament , ' In Journa l 
Constitutional and ParliaTnentary Information. Association of Secretaries 
General of Parliament, New Delhi, 1977, p. 
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sword where by the Houses and their members are not only 
protected but also assert their right to "talk" with dignity and 
independence, without any fear or favour. Thus, the Parliament 
and its Members today are not guarded against the challenges to 
its freedom, from the executive and judic ia l b r anches of 
government but also in greater degree from the fourth state, 
namely a power full free press and from the citizens themselves, 
who individually and collectively are endowed by the Constitutions 
with several fundamental freedom of which the most important 
one is the freedom of speech and expression. They enjoy the 
complete freedom therein by virtue of power vested in them. 
The Constitution does not exhaustively enumerate all the 
privileges of the Parliament, it simgly lays down under Article 105 
(3) that other powers and privileges of the House, and its 
Members and committees would be the same as those of the 
House of Commons in England on the date of commencement of 
the Constitution. On this basis the Houses enjoyed enormous 
privileges in the discharge of their work. 
Apart from privileges of freedom of speech and freedom from 
arrest and rule making, other privileges enjoyed by the House 
and its Members are to elicit information and knowledge about 
administration and its working. The Members are free to ask 
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quest ions to keep themselves well informed. Members or 
committees have the right to ask for necessary information, date 
of events or other material from the government needed for the 
performance of their functions by tabling questions, moving 
resolutions or raising discussions on matters of public importance. 
Ministers too have the right to claim privilege to maintain secrecy 
in sensitive matters. Executive Members though, are not bound to 
supply information on such mat te r s to a Members in his 
individual capacity but the committee or House as a whole can 
ask for access to records , papers and persons and the 
government is obliged to supply such information. The matter is 
so important that the very first hour of every sitting is utilised in 
asking ques t ions on a wide range of subjects . Deliberately 
providing wrong information to the House amount breach of 
discipline. Privileges also exempt Members from jury services. They 
may decline to give evidence and appearance as a witness in a 
court of law when Parliament is in session. The House also has 
the right to exclude any s t ranger from the House during 
discussion on issues of national security to maintain secrecy. The 
speaker or chairman has the power to order the withdrawal of 
strangers from the premises of the House. 
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The High Court would not issue a writ under Article 226 to 
a House of Parliament or Speaker or any of its officer to restrain 
the House from enacting any legislation even if it may be 
ultravires. The court would not interfere with the legislative 
process in a House either in the formative stages of law making 
or with the presentation of the bill as passed by the House of 
Parliament to the President for his assent.^^ A member of the 
House cannot be restrained from presenting any bill or moving a 
resolution in the House. It is only when a bill becomes a law, 
the courts would adjudicate upon its constitutional validity, 
Neither House can compel the attendance of a Member of the 
other House. If the attendance of a Member of one House to give 
evidence before the other House or a Committee thereof is 
desired, it is necessary not only to obtain the leave of the House 
to which such Member belongs but also the consent of that 
Member. Member of one House is not bound to attend the other 
House or its committees to give evidence. 
A specific privilege yet undermines the dignity or authority of the 
House or tends to obstruct the House or an individual Member 
thereof in the discharge of the cons t i tu t ional functions is 
considered breach of privilege. The very aim of the term breach of 
21. M.P. Jain, op. cit.. p.59. 
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Privileges is to enable the House to uphold its dignity, defend 
itself against disrespect and affronts which could not be brought, 
or could be brought only by implication under any accepted 
specific privileges. 
Power of the House To Deal with Contempt of the Honse/ 
Breach of Privilege: 
According to Halsburys, any act or omission which obstructs 
or impedes any Member or Officer of the House in the discharge 
of their duties, or which has a tendency to produce such a 
result would constitute contempt of legislature. Viewed in this 
light, the House needs to safe guard its authority and its dignity. 
For the sake of the work of the House as a collective body, each 
Member has duties and privileges; the House will safe guard the 
later for its sake. For this it has the power to punished any 
Member or any one else, interfering with a Member for contempt 
of its rulings. The punishment can extend to imprisonment or 
exclusion from the House which is non-justiciable. A committal for 
contempt or for breach of privilege is within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of each house and is not subject to appeal to any 
out side author i ty or to jud ic ia l review. But in case of 
Thamarikani , M.L.A., Madras Legislative Assembly were the 
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petitioner challenged the decision of the speaker of the House 
following fifteen days imprisonment for him and suspension from 
the House for the whole budget session, the Madras High Court 
directed to realise him on the bail which the speaker had 
accepted. Though earlier he (speaker) order to i-earrest' him in 
difference to the High Court order but later he had accepted in 
order to avoid confrontation between the Legislature and 
Judiciary." Otherwise If the conduct is derogatory to the dignity 
of the House and its Members and inconsistent with the 
standards which the House expects from its Members, the House 
is authorized to award punishment to the recalcitrant Members 
and outsiders ranging from imprisonment, fine, admonition, 
reprimand to suspension and expulsion from the House. Eriskon 
May said that the penal jurisdiction of the House to punish 
person for committing breach of privilege, within or outside the 
House is judicial in nature and is derived from the prist ine 
concept that Parliament is primarily a court of justice.^ In India 
when the speaker of Lok Sabha while reprimanding the Editor in 
the Blitz case, (1961) described the Lok Sabha as High court of 
Parliament.^'' 
22. "Times of India,' 26.3.1999, p. 1.. C.8. 
23 . Aslam Abdullah Khan, op. cit.. p.60. 
24. M.P. Ja in , op cit. 
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The scope of the phrase 'contempt of the House and breach 
of privilege is very broad and covers a variety of situations where 
the House can take action. Generally the case of contempt of the 
House and Breach of privilege arises if any act or omission 
obstructs or impedes it in the performance of its functions or 
which obstructs or impedes any Member or officer of the House 
in the discharge of his duties or which has a tendency directly 
or indirectly to produce such results. 
The matter of breach of privilege is such an important aspect 
that whenever any complaint is received the matter should be 
raised as soon as possible just after it has occurred. If it has 
occurred before the sitting of the House, it is raised before the 
commencement of usual business and if it arises out of the 
proceedings then it is taken at the earliest possible time. And 
whenever it is raised in the House by a Member, the committee 
either hears the question of privilege or permit him to explain his 
case in a written statement or hear any other Member of the 
House who may desire to place his views before the committee. 
In the light of its reports the House takes decision and action is 
taken on it. 
The right of the House to punish for its contempt is 
analogous to the right of a superior court to punish for its 
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contempt, and infact was justified in early days in England by a 
reference to the mediaeval concept of Parliament being the highest 
court in England, The principal reason behind the contempt of 
the House or Breach of Privilege is that 'unless Parliament can 
not keep its membership intact from out side interference, 
whether or not the interference was the motive of embarrassing 
its section it could not be confident of any accomplishment25 
thus, each House of Parliament collectively, and its Members 
individually, enjoy these privileges i.e. cer ta in r ights and 
immunities without which the House and its Members can not 
discharge the functions entrusted to them by the Constitution. 
The very basic aim of these privileges is to safe guard the 
freedom, the au thor i ty and the dignity of the House, i ts 
Committees and Members and where there is any question of an 
alleged breach of a privilege the matter is examined by the House 
and committee. The Member need not to go in court for any 
thing said or vote given in the House even he can refuse to 
attend as witness in any court on any important issue rather, 
the House is based on the principle that attendance of a Member 
in the House takes precedence over all other obligations and that 
the House has the paramount right and prior claim to the 
attendance and services of its Members and even the court also 
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sees, if it is possible, to arrange for the a t tendance of the 
Member after the session is over. But no Member is entitled to 
give evidence in relation to any debate or proceeding in the 
House except by its leave. Each House of the Parliament has the 
power to secure the attendance of persons of privileges and to 
punish for breach of privilege and commit the offender to custody 
or prison. This power of the House to punish for contempt or 
breach of privilege h a s been described as "Key Stone of 
Parliamentary privilege' and is considered necessary to enables the 
Members and the House to discharge their function safely. 
Without such power the House would sink into utter contempt 
and inefficiency. This power of the House to punish any person 
who commits who commits a contempt of the House or a breach 
of any privileges is the most important right, actually it is this 
power that gives reality to the privileges of Parl iament and 
emphasizes its sovereign character so far as the protection of its 
rights and the maintenance of its dignity is concerned. 
Its Effects: 
It is doubtless tha t the Parliament is engaged in most 
important functions chiefly statute or law making. All Members of 
Parliament enjoyed important personal privilege ensuring them the 
freedom to concentrate on their unparalleled work without any 
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hindrance or obstacle. They possess the power to punish all those 
who interfere in their deliberation or impede it. The House is 
thus made supreme in awarding punishment to the accused and 
no appeal is made in any other place or law court outside 
Parliament. This maintains the supremacy and dignity of the 
House as well as its personnel. 
The sphere of the breach of privilege is very wide empowering 
the House and its members to take action against those which 
seems derogatory to its dignity. The matter is so important that 
whenever it is raised it gains prime importance, committee hears 
it without any delay and gathers the facts for preparing its 
report. The House relies on its report and action is taken in the 
light of the report. The jurisdiction of the House to punish for its 
contempt and breach of privilege is so exclusive that most of the 
time the Parliament is called the highest court as in England. 
This has made the Members immune from any proceeding in 
any court related to any matter of the House even the Members 
can refuse to appear witness in any court howsoever important 
the matter is and no action is taken against them, this has 
made the privilege a key stone. 
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CHAPTER-III 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Freedom of Speech and debate is an essential attribute of 
every free legislature and may be regarded as inherent in the 
constitution of Parliament. 
The privilege of speech enables the Members to hold free and 
frank discussion on any matter and provide an immunity to the 
members from any action against them for any thing said or vote 
given on the floor of the House. Its original purpose was to 
protect Members against the King and is thus connected with 
precautions taken by the House against the publication of debates 
and its control over the admission of strangers. This was first 
confirmed by the practice of selecting a speaker in 1376 to carry 
out their agreed reply to the King when the King usually through 
his chancellor used to declare the cause of summons to the 
entire assembled Parliament and ordered the magnates and the 
commons to withdraw to different chambers to d iscuss the 
business laid before them and provide atleast the possibility of 
free discussion by the commons in the unofficial atmosphere of a 
private meeting. 
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At the instigation of Richard 11, the Lords in 1379 convicted 
Thomas Haxey of treason for introducing, in the Commons, a bill 
of reforms obnoxious to the King. But in Henry IV's first 
Parliament the Commons asked to reverse the judgement on the 
ground that it was 'against the rights and liberties and the 
course which had been usual in Parliament in violation of the 
customs of the Commons.'* This also let to Henry IV's recognition 
of the right to parliamentary freedom of speech. He said that it 
was his wish that Commons should treat all matters amongst 
themselves in order to bring them to the best conclusion and 
that he would hear no person before such matters were brought 
before him by the consent of the Commons."^ 
In 1401 when Sir Thomas Savage elected as speaker , 
informed the King of such matters, before the same had been 
determined and discussed and agreed upon among the Commons, 
by which the King might be incensed against them or some of 
them, to please the King and to advance themselves. But the 
King said that it was his wish that Commons should deliberate 
and treat all matters amongst themselves. In 1407 a more formal 
declaration was made by the King that it shall be lawful for the 
1. Knneth Mackenzie, The Emglish Parliament. ELBS, London, 1977, p.33. 
2. Hood Philips, Constitutional And Administrative Law. Sweet And Maxwell, 
London, 1962, p . l73. 
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Lords to commune among themselves in this present Pariiament 
and in every other in times to come, in the absence of the King 
of the state of realm and of the remedy necessary for the same 
and in the like manner . In 1407 the same principal was 
reaffirmed for the financial discussion when the king declared that 
•it shall be lawful for the Commons on the part, to commune 
together of the state and remedy aforsaid.'^ These declarations 
established the theoretical principle as the basis of the privilege, 
that "the King does not know what is said in debate", and it 
remained the constitutional form of principle untill 1512. 
In 1455 the first express claim for liberty of speech was 
made in the commons when Sir Thomas Younge, one of the 
knights for the shire brought a petition into the Commons 
complaining 'about his arrest and imprisonment in the Tower five 
years back, on the matters showed by him in the House. In 
1512 under Henry VIII when Strode, a member of the Commons 
House was imprisoned by the Stannary Court for having proposed 
certain bills in parliament to regulate the privilege of the tin 
miners, a statute was passed declaring in a general way that 
"any proceeding against any Member of the present Parliament or 
of any future Parliament for any speaking in Parliament should 
3. Sehuyler; Constitutional History of England, Farrold & Sons Ltd., 
Norwich, 1965, p.223. 
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be utterly void and of non effect."* This was the s ta tutory 
recognition of the freedom of debate. Since then it had become 
the custom almost from the very inception of the office of the 
speaker, upon his election, to ask the King to take no notice of 
any thing which he, as speaker, might report derogatory to the 
Crown and to believe that the Commons desired only that 'the 
rights of the Crown should be maintained'. This was more of a 
request than the claim for freedom of speech. 
Thomas More (1523) was the first speaker to beg the royal 
indulgence for any untoward expression by individuals in debate. 
In his speech before the King he pointed out that "in such an 
assembly, as the Commons, among so many wise men neither is 
every man wise a like" and asked the King to give to all your 
Commons here assembled your most gracias license and pardon 
freely, without doubt of your dreadful displeasure, every man to 
discharge his conscience, and boldly in everything incident among, 
declare his advice, and what soever, happened any man to say, it 
may like your noble Majesty of your inesteemable goodness to 
take all in good part, interpreting every man's words, how 
uncunningly solever they may be couched, to proceed yet a good 
zeal towards the profit of four Realm and honour of your Royal 
person ^ ,,,.1 A 
4. F.W. Maitland, History of England. Cafflbndge Univefsity Press, London 
1993, p.282. r ^ \ 
5. Kenneth Mackenzie; op cit.. P.35.j / \QQ J^ -^ )'"! 
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In 1541, for the first time, the speaker at the beginning of 
the session included freedom of speech as among the ancient and 
undoubted rights and privileges which the commons claimed of 
the King and thence onward, it became the regular practice that 
the speaker should demand this privilege. It is during the reign 
of Elizabeth that this privilege became a matter of contention. 
Freedom of speech has been regularly claimed as a right. 
Elizabeth however, punished Members for the words used in the 
Parliament and Members were warned in Parliament not to be 
free with their language. The same petition was moved by the 
speaker Moyle in 1542 and was allowed by Henry with the 
greatest humanity. The precedent was regularly followed during 
Elizabeth's reign and in 1565 it had become sufficiently usual to 
be included in Sir Thomas Smith account of Parliamentary 
Procedure. Henry VIII did pretend to the Pope that the 
discussions in the English Parliament were free and unrestricted 
and that the crown had no power to limit their debates or to 
control the votes of the Members but Elizabeth warned the 
Commons off the discussion on certain subjects like religion, 
trade and the succession. In 1571 when Stricland, who introduced 
some ecclesiastical bills, was called before the council and ordered 
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not to appear again. But in Parliament, the Queen gave way 
again.^ In 1576 when Peter Wentworth, a member of tregony, 
made his t r enchan t speech about freedom of deba te , the 
Commons became against him and themselves committed him to 
the tower. He was released after a month at the instance of the 
Queen and after apology and reprimand from the Speaker. 
In 1621 James I wrote to the speaker, commanding him "to 
make known in our name unto the House, that none therein 
shall presume hence forth to meddle with any thing concerning 
our government or deep mat te rs of state." In response the 
Commons made the famous protestation of 18 December, 1621, 
that "the privileges of Parliament are the ancient and undoubted 
birthright of the subjects of England and the Commons may 
handle any subject and enjoy a complete freedom of speech.*' But 
this was after ward torn out from of the journal by the King and 
disrobes the Parliament dissolved. Few days after the dissolution 
of Parliament in 1629, Eliot and some other Members were 
arrested and committed to the tower. The Attorney-General 
brought criminal charges against three of them, against Eliot for 
words spoken in the House, against Holies and Valentine for a 
6. Maitland, op. cit.. p.242. 
7. Ibid.. p.321. 
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tumult on the last day of the session. The prisoners pleaded that 
as alleged offences were supposed to be committed in Parliament 
they ought not to answer for them in another Court. They relied 
much on Strobes case and the Act of 1512. The judges held that 
it only applied to suits against Members of Parliament prosecuted 
in the Stannary Courts, and arguing that the King's Bench had 
the power to punish crimes wherever committed, sentenced the 
prisoners and to remain in prison till the King's pleasure.* But 
when the Parliament met again the Commons protested against 
this as a breach of privilege, and in 1641 and 1667 the Houses 
passed the resolution against this judgement. In 1667 both 
Houses agreed in declaring the Stordes act as a general act 
declaratory of the ancient and necessary rights and privileges of 
parliament and that the judgement against Eliot, Holies and 
Valintine was illegal. It was said that an ordinary crime such as 
theft committed by the Members in the House might be punished 
in the ordinary courts in the ordinary way but since restoration, 
there had not been any attempt, made by any court of law, to 
punish a Member for words spoken in the House. 
Though the struggle to the freedom of speech started very 
early but this claim was not finally substantiated in practice 
8. Ibid. 
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untill the constitutional struggle of sixteenth century had been 
won by the Parliament. It was by the Revolution of 1688 the 
freedom of speech received statutory confirmation. The Bill of 
Rights declared that the freedom of speech and debates or 
proceedings in Par l iament ought not to be impeached or 
questioned in any court or place out of Parliament. No action 
would lie against a Member of Parliament for words spoken by 
him in the course of parliamentary proceedings and similarly no 
action will lie for any publication among Members of Parliament 
by order of the House or in the ordinary course of parliamentary 
business'.^ It was held in Lake V. King (1667), 1 Saunders 131, 
that an action would not lie for defamatory matter contained in a 
petition printed and delivered to Members. Since then, no legal 
proceedings under taken by the Crown against Members for words 
uttered in the House. 
Present Position: 
Now a days it is more important to hold this freedom of 
speech good, not only against the Crown but also against private 
individuals. A Member speaking in either House is quite outside 
the law of slander. He may accuse any person of the basest 
9. Wade and Godfray, Constitutional Law. Philips, Logmans, Green and 
Co., London, 1953, p. 215. 
82 
crimes, may do so knowing that his words are false, and yet that 
person will have no action against him. In case if he uttered the 
same words else where he might have had to answer for them in 
a Court of law, but for what he says on the floor of the House 
he cannot be sued any where. 
In case of Duncan Sandys 1938, the House resolved that it 
was a breach of privilege to attempt to require a Member of 
Parliament to divulge to a court of inquiry, set up by the Army 
Council, the source of his information concerning the anti aircraft 
defences of London which he had used for the purpose of 
framing a question in the House. A select committee then advised 
that although Members are privileged from prosecution under the 
official secret Acts for disclosures made in the House, they should 
used their immunity with discretion. The government also should 
show discretion in exercising their powers under these Acts so as 
not to impede Members in the discharge of their parliamentary 
duties. Whatever a person thinks fit in debate he is entitled to 
use his expression. No action is taken against him for libel in 
any court of law. Sir Erskine May said that "it is this privilege 
essential to every free Council of Legislature, the fullest and most 
complete ventilation of every plan, object and purpose." It is also 
said that this privilege is necessary for wise and beneficial 
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legislation. This could never be secured if the Members should 
have been under the restraints imposed by the law of slander 
and libel upon private character. There is no doubt that this 
privilege may be grossly abused, since every word used in debate 
and frequently something more, is now reported to the public, but 
the danger to the general welfare from its curtailment is far 
greater than to individuals from its exercise.'° 
Position in India: 
In India this privilege is embodied in Article 105 cl(3) and (2) as: 
Subject to the provision of this constitution and to the rules and 
standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall 
be freedom of speech in Parliament (cl(l)l. Cl(2) says, No Member 
of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any Court in 
respect of any thing said or any vote given by him in Parliament 
or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in 
respect of the publication by or under the authority of either 
House of Parliament, of any report, papers, votes or proceedings. 
This privilege was expressly granted for the first time to the 
Indian Legislators under the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms and 
given statutory' recognition." According to this, a Member has the 
10. D.N. Banerjee. The Indian Constitution and Its Actual Working. Logmans 
Green Co., Calcutta, 1933, p. 193. 
11. Government of India Act. 1935, S. 67(1) 
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immunity from any proceeding in any court in respect of his 
speech or vote "in either chamber of Indian legislature.^^ It was 
argued that the immunity granted by Article 105(2) related to 
what was relevant to the business of Parliament and not to some 
thing which was utterly irrelevant. The Supreme Court rejected the 
argument as in case of Keshav Singh V. State of U.P. CI (2) of 
Article 105 of the Constitution was dealt with by their Lordships 
of the S.C. in Special Reference No.l of 1964. Gajendragadkar, 
C.J., speaking for the majority observed:'^ 
"Having conferred freedom of s p e e c h on the leg is lator cl(2) 
emphasizes the fact that the said freedom is intended to be absolute 
and unfettered. It is plain that the constitution makers attached so 
much importance to the necessity of absolute freedom in debates 
within the Legislative Chambers in the wide terms prescribed by 
cl(2). Thus cl(l) confers freedom of speech on the legislators within 
the Legislative Chamber and cl(2) makes it plain that the freedom is 
literally absolute and unfettered." 
In Tej Kiran Jain V. Sanjiva Reddy Case, Hidayatullah, C. J . , 
observed: 
"The Article, confers immunity in respect of 'anything said in 
Parliament, the word 'anything' is of the widest importance and is 
equivalent to 'everything'. The only limitation arises from the word 'in 
Parliament'. Once it was proved that Parliament was sitting and its 
TI. Ibid.. S. 28" 
13. A.I.R.. 1965, S.C.745. 
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business was being transacted, anything said during the course of 
that bus ines s was immune from proceedings in any court. This 
immunity is not only complete but is as it should be. It i s the 
essence of parliamentary system of govt, that peoples representatives 
should be free to express t h e m s e l v e s without fear of l ega l 
consequences, what they say is only subject to the discipline of the 
rules of Parliament, the good sense of Members and the control of 
proceeding by the speaker. The courts have no say in the matter 
and should really have none."''' 
The full bench of Supreme Court in this case held that the 
clause (1) of Article 105 confers freedom of speech on the 
legislator within the Legislative Chamber and cl(2) makes it plain 
tha t the freedom is literally absolute and unfettered. The 
protection given by above clause is to "any thing said" are of the 
widest amplitude and it is not permissible to read any limitation 
therein. The object of the provision obviously was to secure 
absolute freedom of discussion in Parliament and to allay any 
apprehension of legal proceedings in a court of Law in respect of 
anything said in Parliament by a Member there of."'^  
In case of Mian Bashir Ahmad V. State, Mufti Bahauddin, C. J., 
Observed: 
Where the Act of the legislature impinges on the freedom of speech 
in the Legislature, the High Court under Article 226 can not take 
cognizance of the dispute and grant relief to the Member of the 
i T A.I.R.. 1970. S.C. 1573. 
15. Ibid.. 1971. 
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Legislature against h i s pa ren t i n s t i t u t ion . For, if the Legis lature 
d e n i e s itself and its Members any avai lable privilege, t he cour t 
cannot step in and tell the Legislature why it has done so. This is a 
domest ic mat te r between the Member and h i s paren t House . The 
cour t canno t adjudicate u p o n the validity of such act ion at t he 
instance of a Member of the Legislature and tell the Legislature that 
it had committed an illegality in what it had done. His remedy lies 
else where. He has no locus standi to approach the court for relief 
in t h i s regard, more so, w h e n h a s b e e n a psurty to the dec is ion 
approving the measure on the floor of the House.'* 
The provision of Article 105 cl(4) is also applied to persons who 
by virtue of the Constitution, have the right to speak in and 
otherwise to take part in the proceedings of either House or any 
committee thereof as they apply in relation to Members of 
Parliament. 
For speeches and action in Parl iament , Members are 
subjected only to the discipline of the House and not to the civil 
or criminal proceeding against them in any courtJ^ In case of 
Suresh Chandra Banerji V. Punit Goala, Harries, C.J. observed: 
"Absolute privilege has been given in respect of any thing said in a 
House of the Legislature. It was thought in England and in India 
that unless such absolute privilege was granted Member of Legislative 
Assembly might be afraid to speak out thei r minds and freely to 
express their views." 
16. A.I.R.. 1982, J.&K., 23. 
17. A.I.R.. 1951, Calcutta, 176. 
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Members are completely protected from any proceeding in a court 
of law even if the words spoken by them are false and malicious 
to their knowledge.^* Debrata Mookerjee, J., Observed'^ in case of 
Jatish Chandra Ghosh V. Hari Sadhan Mukerjee as: 
"Article 194 (counterpart of Article 105, in states), of the Constitution 
m a k e s it clear t h a t t h e immun i ty from l iabi l i ty to p r o s e c u t i o n 
extends only what is said within the wedls of the legislature. In a 
democrat ic se tup th i s freedom of speech is qui te conceivably a n 
essential condition which guarant ies the proper functioning of the 
Constitution. 1 helps to secure a free frank and fearless discussion 
in the Legislature. 
In 1968 a police man made an enquiry in connection with the 
investigation of a case of alleged theft of the original document 
the photo state copy of which Bhupesh Gupta, a Member of the 
House, mentioned in the House on 26th of March, 1968. The 
matter was referred to the committee of privileges which observed: 
' I n Art icle 105 t h e word ' p r o c e e d i n g in P a r l i a m e n t " i n c l u d e s 
everything said or done by a member in excersie of h is functions as 
a Member in a committee of either House, as well as everything said 
or done in either House in the transaction of parliamentary business. 
This secure the immunity from civil or criminal cases on account of 
any thing said or done by them in thefr capacity as a Member and 
i s necessary corollary to the privilege of freedom of speech a n d 
debate or proceeding in Parliament.^ 
Ta. Ibid.. 
19. A.I.R.. 1956 Calcutta, 433-437. 
20. S.C. Kashyap, Parliamentarv Privileges - Digest of Cases (1950-1985). L.S. 
Secretariatr New Delhi, 1987, P. / / 6 
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It is commonly said that the essence of parliamentary democracy 
is a free, frank and fearless discussion in Parliament. It is 
therefore, necessary to immunize the Member from any fear they 
can be penalised for anything said by them within the House so 
that they can express freely in the House. 
Members are not only given the right to freedom of speech 
withip the walls of the House but their witnesses and petitions 
are also protected under Article 105(3) from suits and molestation 
in respect of what they say in the House or in committee thereof. 
It ensure the Member's freedom in House without interference 
from out side. Any molestation or threats against persons who 
have given evidence before the House or any committee thereof on 
account of what they have said in their evidence, is treated by 
the House as a breach of privilege. Molestation to any petitioner 
or counsel for having preferred a petition to the House or his 
conduct while discharging his professional duties as a counsel is 
considered contempt of the House too.^' Brining legal proceedings 
agains t any person for giving evidence in relat ion to any 
proceeding in the House or in committee thereof is also treated 
as a breach of privilege by the House. 
Based on the recommendations of the Reforms Enquiry 
21. Erskime May, Parliamentary Practice. London, 1974, p. 159. 
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Committee headed by Muddiman, under the Legislative Members 
Exemption Act, 1925, Members are exempted from appearance as 
ju rors or a ssessors , Also, no person is liable to ar res t or 
detention in civil case if: 
1. he is a Member of a Legislative body constituted under the 
Govt, of India Act, 1919, during the continuance of any 
meeting of such a body; 
2. he is a Member of any committee of such body, during the 
continuance of any meeting of such a committee; and 
3. he is a Member of either chamber of the Indian Legislature 
during the continuance of a joint sitting of the Houses or of 
a Joint Committee etc. of which he is a member and during 
the fourteen days before and after such meeting or sitting.^^ 
The right to freedom of speech was always claimed by the House 
as their ancient rights but frequently violated under the Tudors 
and Stuarts by an undue extension of the Crown's prerogatives. 
However, by the enactment of Bill of Rights, 1688, the Crown 
had been occasionally endeavored to control Parl iament by 
depriving Members of some post or office for acting in opposition 
to its wishes. 
22. S. C. Kashyap, History of Parliament of Indiei. Vol. I. Shipra Publications, 
New Delhi, 1994, p. 162. 
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Position in Other Countries: 
Freedom of speech and voting is guaranteed in almost all 
Parliaments. In most countries the constitution contains detailed 
provisions while in others they are supplemented by other legal 
provisions. Like U.K. India, U.S.A., Germany, Lebnan, Italy and in 
many other countries it is granted by the Constitution or Basic 
Law or statute and Parhamentary Rules. In Canada and Australia 
this freedom in both Houses is guaranteed by law. Pakistan too 
is the country where this provision is contained in the Contitution 
and the Rule of Procedure of Parl iament. No Member of 
Parliament can be questioned in any court of law or is liable for 
any proceedings in any court for any thing said or vote given by 
him in Parliament or for publications by or under the authority 
of Parliament of any report, papers, votes, or proceedings. In such 
countries no legal proceedings has been taken against Member for 
anything said or any vote given by him.-^ ^ It is the duty of each 
Member also to refrain from any course of action prejudicial to 
the privilege of freedom of speech which he enjoys. It was 
declared by the House of Commons by a resolution on 15th July, 
1947 as: 
"It is inconsistent with the dignity of the House, with the duty of a 
Member to h i s cons t i tuent s and with the maintenance of the 
23. Aslam AdduUah Khan, "Freedom of Speech' in Journal ParUamentarv 
Information. Association of Secfretaries General of Parliament". New 
Delhi, 1977. p.85. 
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privilege of freedom of speech of any Member of this House to enter 
into any contracted agreement with an out side body, controlling or 
limiting the Members complete independence and freedom of action 
in Parliament or stipulating that he shall act in any way as the 
representative of such outside body in regard to Etny matters to be 
transacted in Parliament, the duty of a Member being to h i s 
const i tuents and to the country as a whole, rather than to any 
particular section thereof.'^'' 
Duration of Immunity: 
There is considerable variation amongst Parliaments so far as 
their duration is concerned. In U.K. this immunity operates from 
the date of the first meeting of Parhament after an election, or 
an individual Member's first arrival and lasts indefinitely. In India 
the immunity in respect of any thing said or vote given in 
Parliament by a Member during his membership operates from the 
date of his election as a Member, it does not operate if any 
thing said or vote given in Parliament is repeated or disclosed 
outside the Parliament unless the publication of proceedings is by 
or under the authority of Parliament. Here no Member has ever 
been prosecuted for defamation or libel for any thing said in the 
Parliament. 
Privacy of Debates: 
To observe the freedom of speech in the House it is 
necessar>' on the part of the House to secure privacy of debates 
24^ H.C.D., 118, (1946-47). 
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and to publish its debates and proceedings outside the 
Parliament. By resolution of March 3, 1762, any publication of 
speeches made by Members is a breach of privilege. Until the 
eighteenth century the House resented and prevented any 
publication on accounts of its proceedings, but since the famous 
conflict between the House of Commons and John Wilkes, the 
privielge has not been insisted upon. The House, however, may at 
any time resolve that publication is a breach of privilege. 
Power of the Honse to Exclude Strangers: 
Each House of Parliament has been given the right to 
exclude strangers and to debate in closed doors. This is an 
important corollary to the freedom of speech. At the time of war 
and secrecy privacy of debate is necessary. This power vary 
greatly from country to country, from situation to situation. 
Countries like Australia and Canada, the power is available to 
withdrawal of strangers but not to ensure freedom of speech. 
Several secret meetings when held, as during war time, this 
power is always applied. In U.K., Pakistan and India, Parliament 
has the power to exclude strangers from the House in order to 
secure complete freedom of speech and debate. The Supreme 
observed-^^ in case M. S. M. Sharma V. Shri Krishna Sinha as: 
25^ A.I.R.. 1959 S.C. 395. 
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"... The freedom of speech claimed by the House and granted by the 
Crown is, when necessary, ensured by the secrecy of the debate 
which in i ts turn is protected by prohibiting publication of the 
debates and proceedings as well as by excluding strangers from the 
House. This right (to exclude strangers) was exercised in 1923 and 
again in 1958. This shows that there has been no diminution in the 
eagerness of the House of Commons to protect itself by secrecy of 
debates by excluding strangers from the House when any occasion 
arises. The object of excluding strangers is to prevent the publication 
of the publication of the debates and proceedings in the House.' 
Parliament is empowered to with draw license wherever it feels to 
do so and exclude them therefore, during the secret sitting of the 
House no stranger is permitted to enter on the floor or lobby and 
galleries except those who are the Members of the House and 
those who are authorised by the Speaker e.g. on February 27th, 
1942, to discuss the war situation a secret sitting was held, the 
speaker announced to clear all galleries except the gallery for the 
council of state and directed that the proceedings of the secret 
sitting will not be taken down, recorded or published. ^^  In this 
pursuance, all lobbies and galleries were cleared from strangers 
and all doors to various galleries were closed and locked. The 
official gallery and Governor. General's Box were also cleared and 
locked except the door to the council of state's gallery which was 
not locked but closed, and watch and ward staff was posted 
26. L.A.D., 27 2.1942, p.405. 
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outside the door to admit the Members of that chamber only. 
After that only the Member moved the motion. No record thus, 
prepared or published of that sitting. The only report, for the 
purpose of record, printed under the orders of the speaker of 
Legislative Assembly and read as: 
"The remainder of the sitting was in secret session and the Assembly 
discussed the following motion moved by the honourable Mr. M. S. 
Anney; that the war situation be t£tken into consideration'. And the 
procedure in all other respects in coiuiection with a secret sitting is 
in accordance with such directions a s the speaker may give." 
This right is supposed to exist for two reasons. First, that no 
stranger may be present and take part in division. Secondly, in 
order to prevent out side influence through the speeches and 
resolutions of Members being reported to the outside world. If any 
Member who is dissatisfied with the presence of stranger and 
taken notice of the same, the Speaker or the Chairman is bound 
by the resolution of the House, passed in 1875, to forth with put 
the question that stranger be ordered to withdraw, or the speaker 
or chairman may order their withdrawal at any time on its on 
initiative.-^^ 
Disclosure of proceedings or decision of a secret sitting by 
27. Edward Wavel Ridger, Constitutional Law of England. Stevens and Sons 
Ltd., London, 1905, p.69. 
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any person in any manner is treated as a gross breach of 
privilege of the House under Rule 252. Therefore, apart from the 
Member of the Houses, Secretary, Deputy Secretary and the 
Assistant Secretary and Marshal every stranger is ordered to 
vacate the House or even gallery. 
Parliamentary Privileges and the Press: 
The duty of the press is to report faithfully and not to 
distort the events of the Parliament. Further, the Press must 
observe decorum and do nothing that is derogatory to the dignity 
of the House or its Members. Parliamentary Papers Act, 1840, had 
made the publication of any report, papers, votes or proceedings 
of the House of Parliament ordered by the House, completely 
privileged whether the publication was only for the use of 
Members of Parliament or for a wider circulation. In India too, 
under Article 105(2), no person is liable to any proceedings in 
any court in respect of the publication of any report, papers, 
votes or proceedings by or under the authority of the House of 
Parliament. Thus, all persons connected with the proceedings of 
the House are protected if the same is made under the authority 
of the House itself. But the said Article does not protect 
publication made without the authority of the Hose. In England 
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somewhat wider privilege is available. In Case of Wason V. 
Walter,^^ in the course of a debate in the House of Lords, 
allegations disparaging the character of plaintiff were spoken. A 
faithful report of the debate was published in the "Time", the 
plaintiff asked the Times for libel. But the court dismissed the 
action, Chief Justice Cook Burn observed: 
"That it was of paramount public and national importance that 
parliamentary proceedings should be communicated to the public 
which has the deepest in te res t in knowing what pas ses in 
Parliament'. Practically speaking, therefore, it is idle to say that the 
publication of Parliamentary proceeding is prohibited by ParUament." 
May summarised it as: 
"So long as the debates are correctly and faithfully reported, the 
order which prohibit their publication are not enforced; but when 
they are reported mala fide, the publishers of newspapers are liable 
to punishment." 
In Wason - Walter case, the Court dismissed the action saying 
that: 
"The advantage to the community from publication of the proceedings 
of the House is so great that the occasional inconvenience to an 
individual arising from it must yield to the general good.'^' 
Therefore, a faithful and fair report of the proceeding of the 
House is not actionable in England. But Publication of a garbled 
l8. Wason V. Walter, L.R., 4Q.B. 73. 
29. Philips O. Hood, op. cit.. p. 151. 
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or partial report or of detached parts of proceedings with intent 
to injure an individual is however not entitled to protection. 
In India Article 361 A says that no person shall be liable to 
any proceedings civil or criminal, in any court in respect of the 
publication in newspaper of a substantially true report of any 
proceeding of either House of Parliament unless the publication is 
proved to have been made with malice. This immunity does not 
however, apply to the publication of any report of the proceeding 
of a secret sitting of any House of Parliament. Both Houses have 
declared, by resolution, that the publication of debates constitutes 
a breach of privilege. This privilege was enforced by the commons 
down to 1771, and in such accounts of debates as did appear, 
members were represented under fictitious names. In 1717, the 
House sent a messenger to ar res t Miller, a p r in te r of 
Parliamentary debate. The printer however, gave the messenger in 
custody for assaul t and the Lord Mayor and two aldermen 
committed him for trial and allowing him bail. Upon this, the 
House caused the entry to be erased from the book of 
recognizance and committed the Lord Mayor and two aldermen to 
the Tower. The House has , since then, waived the right to 
restrain publication of i ts debates which are however, still 
permitted upon sufferance only and in case of willful 
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misrepresentation the House would still exercise the right to 
punish the offender. 
A departure from the right path may constitute breach of the 
privileges of the Parliament and in serious cases may even 
amount to contempt of its authority. The conduct of the news 
paper must , of course , relate either to the proceedings in 
Parliament or to the service, the Members render to Parliament 
when any breach of privilege or contempt is brought to the notice 
of Parliament the matter is considered either by the committee of 
privileges or in the appropriate House itself and offending 
newspaper is called to account. Responsible person is treated 
according to the gravity of the offence. In these matter the House 
wields powers analogous to that of the courts of records to 
punish contempts of themselves. In Case of Suresh Chandra 
Banerjee V. Pnit Goala^ Haries C.J. observed: 
The rule to vicarious publication can not possibly apply to speeches 
made in the Assembly. Absolute privilege has been given in respect 
of any thing said in the House of the Legislature. It was thought in 
England and in India that u n l e s s such absolute privilege was 
granted, Members of Legislative Assembhes might be afraid to speak 
out their minds and freely to press their views." 
Reports of the proceedings of a legislature in an Indian 
newspaper, unless such are expressly authorised by the House, 
30. A.I.R.. 1951. Calcutta- 176. 
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are not the subject mat ter of privilege and may found a 
complaint for defamation under S. 500 of the penal code. 
In 1953, an issue was reased on the editorial comment in 
the Time of India,' Questions had been allowed and put in the 
House to the Minister of Finance for prohibition on the granting 
of liquor permits to Magistrate and judges. The questioner asked 
whether the govt, was 'aware of the feeling in the public that 
granting of liquor permits to magistrates and judges is likely to 
influence judicial decisions in prohibition cases' to which the reply 
was 'No'. Supplementaries secured the names of the judges, who 
got permits. Two days later, an editorial comment followed under 
the heading 'contemptible'. The questions asked were nothing 
short of degrading design to lower their Lordships in public 
esteem.... The singling out of magistrates and judges for public 
obloquy cannot be part of a deliberate pattern the questions 
should have been disallowed since they violate the conditions laid 
down for the admissibility of questions, and they were 'mean and 
petty' the entire performance in its malice and vituperation is 
unworthy of the Legislature of what was once a premier State. 
But perhaps it is too much to expect elementary good manners 
and good taste from those who know no standards and observe 
none". The committee of privileges, after hearing the editor and 
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his counsel, considered that the questions did not amount to any 
contravention of the Constitution which bans 'discussion' on the 
conduct of a Judge in the discharge of his duties; further that 
they were not contrary to the provisions of the rules regarding 
questions; finally, that the criticism in the editorial 'exceeds the 
bounds of decency, reason and fair comment' and 'is calculated to 
undermine the prestige and authority of the House'. The editor 
and the paper were then held guilty of contempt and therefore of 
breach of privilege of the House. The House thus, endorsed the 
findings and carried out the committee's recommendations to 
disapprove the conduct of the editor and, in the absence of a 
published unconditional apology, to withdraw the press facilities 
given to the paper.^^ It was observed in the Search light case 
that: 
"Parliament has the power or privilege of prohibiting the publication 
of even a true and faithful report of its proceedings." 
It is obvious from the above that if the Legislature has the power 
to prohibit publication of its true and faithful proceedings then it 
must necessarily have the power and privilege to prohibit the 
publication of an inaccurate or garbled version of its debated 
discussion and proceedings. The publ icat ion of report of 
31. W. H. Morris Jones, Parliament in India. Logmans Green and Co. Ltd., 
London. 1975, p.254. 
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proceedings of the House is subject to the control of the 
respective House which has this right to prohibit pubHcation of 
its proceedings. Supreme Court observed in this regard as.^^ 
"Our consti tution clearly provides that until Parliament or the State 
Legislature, a s the case may be, makes a law defining the powers, 
privilege and immunities of the House, its Members and conunittees, 
they sha l l have all the powers, privilege and immuni t i e s of the 
House of Commons... and yet to deny them those powers, privileges 
and immunit ies after finding that the House of commons had them 
at re levant t ime, will be not to in te rpre t the const i tu t ion bu t to 
remake it." 
The object behind the statement is to protect the right to freedom 
of speech by ensuring privacy of debate whenever necessary and 
prevails over the general right of the individual to freedom of 
speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution. Only the 
Secretary-General is authorised under the directions of the 
speaker to prepare and publish a full report of the proceeding. If 
a member publ i shes his own speech made in the House 
separately from the rest of the debate it becomes a separate 
publication unconnected with the proceedings in the House, and 
the member publishing it becomes responsible for any libelous 
matter contained there in under the ordinary law of the land. 
According to rule 251 and 225, disclosure of the proceeding or 
decision arrived at in a secret sitting of the House by any person 
32. A.I.R.. 1959, S.C. 395. 
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in any manner, until the ban of secrecy is lifted by the House, 
is treated as a gross breach of privileges. 
Premature Publication: 
Premature publication or publicity in the press to notices of 
questions, adjournment motions, resolutions, answers to questions 
and other matters related to the proceedings of the House is also 
considered improper according to the parliamentary practice, usage 
and conventions. Technically though, is not a breach of privilege 
or contempt of the House but the Speaker can express 
displeasure against person responsible for it. Other breach of 
conventions considered are: 
1. Publication of question before they are admitted by the 
speaker and before their answers are given in the House or 
laid on the table.^^ 
2. Publication of answers to questions before they are given in 
the House or laid on the Table.^'' 
3. Publication of notice of adjournment motions or resolutions 
before they are admitted by the speaker or mentioned in the 
House. On 27th March, 1933, a Member of the House - Lai 
Chand Navalrai, wanted to move an adjournment motion, 
33. Rule 334, A of the Procedure of the Business of the House. 
34. Ibid.. Rule 
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discussing the situation (serious and grove) in Sind. He gave 
notice of the motion at 20 minutes past 10 in the morning 
(the Members are entitled to give such notices before 11 
O'clock) The chair drew the attention of the House to this as: 
Though the notice was handed over at 10:20 in the morning but the 
notice of this motion had already appeared in the press a day before, 
and it is a weU established convention of the House of Commons that a 
Member who gives to the pres s , for publ icat ion of q u e s t i o n s or 
resolutions before they are admitted by the chair, commits a serious 
breach of the privilege of the House. The House of Commons and its 
spokesman, the Speaker, have got ample powers to deal with Members 
who do not observe that convention. But unfortunately neither the 
House nor its spokesman have such powers. In the absence of such 
powers the chair can only appeal to Hon. Members that this well 
established convention which is observed in the House of Commons 
should also be observed as one of the conventions of this House.•'-'^  
Similarly on 10th December, 1952, a notice of adjournment 
motion was given to raise a mat ter on a news which was 
published in the issue of "Hindustan Times", 6th Dec. 1952, that 
"Not six years have passed since India achieved her independence, 
and the man who is to swear allegiance at the coronation as 
India's representative is the man who has spent as many years 
in a British prison for his leading part in the struggle for that 
independence." Even before the motion, was admitted by the chair 
35. L.A.D. 27.3.1933, p. 2655. 
104 
there was a very flamboyant report of that adjournment motion in 
'Delhi Express' as: 
will Nehru swear allegiance to Queen ? 
Opposition M.Ps Prolest Against Reported Move. 
Adjournment Motion likely today. 
UK. High Commission denies knowledge of plan. 
The Deputy speaker observed in this regard as: 
"It is a breach of convention. The mischief is done by publishing it 
before the consent of the Speaker is given, whenever hon. Members 
are not taken into confidence, when the consent of the speaker is 
withheld and the motions are not even read out in the House ... It 
is improper to be published as it would be read and the mischief 
might be done. In those circumstances when this matter is with 
held, for the press to publish it can not be condemned in too strong 
words. "^ ^ 
He ruled out to take action against the paper and called for 
explanation. This is considered the breach of convention and it is 
desirable that no question or motion find advance publicity in the 
press rather the question and answer should reach together to 
the public. Later on 12th December, 1952, a letter of apology 
was given by the Managing Editor of the paper and was accepted 
by the House. 
4. Premature publicity of notice of motion of no-confidence 
against the speaker.^'' On 14th of March, 1975, question of 
privilege was raised by some Members against the 'Indian 
36. H.P.D., 10, 12, 1952, CC. 1973-81. 
37. L.S. D. 14.3.1975, CC. 206-8. 
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Express' against the UNI news which published the notice of 
no-confidence against speaker, given by Madhu Limaya, before 
it was not considered by the House. On this, the Speaker 
observed that: 
"Rule 334 A, notice shall not be given publicity by any Member or 
other person unti l it h a s b e e n admitted by the speaker and 
circulated to Members, provided that a notice of a question shall not 
be given any publicity unti l the day on which the quest ion is 
answered in the House. 
5. PubHcation of the report of the Committee or Commission, 
appointed by the govt, in pursuance of a resolution of the 
House or an under taking speech given in the House.^ On 
5th Sept., 1955, Minister of Labour, Khandubhai Desai, 
brought in notice of the speaker- the leakage and publication 
of an extract from the Bank Award Commission Report' in 
an Indian Newspaper before it was being placed on the Table 
of the House. The Speaker ruled as: 
"It i s equal ly the duty of the press to he lp observance of 
parliamentary convention; It is wrong practice to obtain information 
in the manner and give publicity to it before a particular matter is 
placed before the ParUament." 
He then hoped the press to follow this Kind of convention and 
help the House in that direction. 
Earlier on 6th March, 1940, F.E. James drew attention of the 
38. L.S.D.. 5.9.1955. CC.12183-85. 
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chair on a news report from certain press agency alleging certain 
decisions which had been arrived at in the course of the Select 
Committee proceeding on the 'Excess Profit Tax Bill' published in 
a number of newspapers. The same message was broad cast even 
by the Govt, of India itself from the All India Radio Station, 
Delhi, few days before the presentation of report on the floor, 
where as the select Committee is supposed to be confidential and 
what transpired during the deliberation of the committee cannot 
be discussed even on the floor of the House before it has been 
presented to the House, As May stated "Both as a breach of the 
Commons privilege and pursuant to the resolution of the House 
forbidding the publication, no Member, or any other person, may 
publish any portion of the evidence taken by, or documents 
presented to Select Committee, which have not been reported to 
the House; and his rule extends equally to the report of a 
committee before it has been presented to the House. The chair 
observed in this connection that:^^ 
The privilege of the House covers the entire proceedings of a Select 
Committee and it is equally a breach of that privilege whether the 
proceedings or the report of a select committee are publ ished 
verbatin or in detail or only a sujmmary or selected portions of its 
proceedings or of its reports is published before it is presented to 
the House. It is not permissible to a member of the select committee 
39! L.A.D. 6.3.1940, p.979. 
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or to any one who has access to its proceedings to communicate 
directly or indirectly to the press any information regarding its 
proceedings including its report or any conclusion supposed to have 
been arrived at finally or tentatively before the report has been 
presented to the House. It is equally expected of the press to 
cooperate vtrith the House in th i s matter and to obtain from 
publishing such information from whatever source it may have been 
received." 
6. Making important policy announcements by ministers outside 
the House while the House is in session. 
Publication of Expunged Proceeding: 
Publication of any expunged part of proceedings of the House 
is considered breach of privilege and contempt of the House. Rule 
380 and 381 empowers the speaker to order expunction of words 
from debates. What Supreme Court observed in this regard is:''° 
"The effect in law of order of the Speaker to expunge a portion of 
the speech of a Member may be as if that portion had not been 
spoken. A report of the whole speech in such circumstance though 
factually correct may, in law, be regarded as perverted and unfaithful 
report of a speech i.e. including the expunged portion in derogation 
to the orders of the speaker passed in the House may, prime facie, 
be regarded as constituting a breach of privilege of the House arising 
out of the publication of the offending news - items." 
The editor, publisher, printer or correspondent of a paper may 
tender an unconditional apology for the proceedings expunged by 
40. A.I.R.. 1959. SC.395. 
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the Speaker and if the House accepts it then only the matter is 
considered closed. The House requires the editor to publish the 
correction and apology in the next issue of the paper and report 
the fact to the House. On 21st Dec, 1959, matter was raised'" 
on the issue of 'Free Press Journal' of Bombay, which published 
certain expunged portion of the speech of 16th Dec, in the issue 
of 17th Dec, 1959. It was seemed intentional since at the end it 
was added that "this portion was later expunged by the speaker. 
The attention of the Speaker was drawn by the Member to take 
action against this breach of privilege as it is the tendency of the 
press to disregard the wishes of the House and also to defame 
the Member. The speaker then took the action, asked the Editor 
to give explanation about it otherwise the matter would be raised 
in the House. But the letter of unconditional apology from the 
Editor made the matter closed. 
For escaping liability in damages regarding defamation made 
by news paper publication, of report of parliamentary proceedings, 
three tests are supposed to be satisfied; namely, accurate and 
faith full publication, general importance of it and absence of 
animus injurandi. If the expunged publication is proved to be 
malicious then person responsible for such publication can not 
4 1 . L.S.D.. 21.12.1959 CC, 6264-66. 
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escape tortuous liability by claiming qualified privilege.''^ However, 
experience has shown that Indian Parliament, like House of 
Commons, does not exercise these powers, except in gross cases. 
It fully appreciates the benefit of publicity and accords all 
necessary facilities to the reports and encourages the publication 
of its debates and proceedings. 
Excemption to Freedom of Speech in Parliament: 
Speech and action in Parliament is said to be unquestioned 
and free from external influence or interference but it does not 
mean unrestrained licence of speech within the House. The right 
to freedom of speech in the House is described by the 
constitutional provisions and the procedure for inviting attention 
to incorrect statements made by Ministers or Members is governed 
by Directions and Rules of the House. In countries like U.K this 
is a constitutional right granted by the Bill of Rights. However, 
under the domestic procedural rules of Parliament, critical 
reference to the Head of State, judges etc. are permissible in the 
House on substantive motions only, but any disrespectful personal 
imputa t ion against a member of the royal family is 
unpar l iamentary and out of order. These are self-imposed 
restriction and are part of the internal rules and order. In 
42. Ibid.. Article, 194(4) 
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Canada, the ru les provide tha t a Member may not speak 
disrespectfully of the Queen, the Governor-General; either House 
and, save on a substantive motion, of a Members of either 
House, the judiciary and the public servants. In Pakistian under 
the Constitution, discussion cannot take place in Parliament with 
respect to the conduct of any judge of the Supreme Court or of 
a High Court in the discharge of his duties. He is not permitted 
to use the President's name for influencing the debate, utter 
treasonable, seditions or defamatory words, use offensive or 
unparl iamentary expressions or use his right of speech for 
obstructing the business of the House. In addition a Member can 
not reflect upon the conduct of a person in high authority except 
on a substantive motion, or make a personal charge against a 
member or refer to any matter of facts pending judicial decision 
in a court or use any offensive language against the conduct or 
proceedings of a House or the joint s i t t ing or any other 
assembly.''^ 
Position in India: 
In India the condition is more or less some as in U.K. and 
Pakistan. If any Member violates any of these restrictions the 
43. Aslam Abduallh Khan, op. cit.. p.84. 
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speaker may direct him to discontinue his speech or order the 
defamatory, indecent, unparliamentary or undignified words used 
by the Member to be expunged from the proceedings of the 
House, or direct the Member to withdraw from the service of the 
House. During Lok Sabha debate on Sep. 17, 1959, the speaker 
ordered Elias, Member of the House to withdraw from the House 
when he continued to speak on the serious food situation in 
West-Bengal. The speaker ruled as: 
"Because the Hon. Member is obstructing, I hereby direct that Shri 
Muhammad Elias will keep out of this House and withdraw from this 
House for the rest of the day." 
And when he still cont inued, the speaker ordered him to 
w^ithdraw otherwise, he would be forced to withdraw and the 
Marshal approached and requested him to withdraw from the 
House. The speaker further said that: 
"It shall have to take more serious action against him for this 
contempt of the authority of the speaker." 
Under 'don't' imposed by Members on them selves through the 
Rules and Standing orders, they could not; 
1. refer t o any matter subjudice. If a Member insists inspite of 
the chair asking him not to do so, the chair may ask him 
to discontinue his speech forth with. This rule, however, does 
not apply to mat ters of privilege where disciplinary 
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jurisdiction of the House with respect to its own Member is 
concerned. In such cases the chair and the House consider 
each case on its merit e.g. as during the Lok Saba Debate 
on 2nd Dec , 1974, about an import licence case, it was 
complained tha t a Member allegedly received bribe for 
furthering the cause of some import licence applicants with 
the govt, and had also allegedly forged the signatures of 
some Members of Parliament. The member concerned, wrote 
to the speaker pleading that since the matter had become 
subjudice it should not be discussed in the House, the 
speaker gave his ruling that: 
"In the present case the alegations of bribery and forgery, which 
had been prima facie established against the Member by CBI 
enquiry, were very ser ious and unbecoming of a Member of 
Parliament and the Member might be held guilty of lowering the 
dignity of the House. The House was therefore, free to discuss 
any motion relating to the conduct of the Member." 
2. make a personal allegation against another Member unless it 
has been established by the Court,'*'' or the House. The 
Speaker ruled out when Mudgal, in his speech referred the 
conduct of an hon. Member of the House which had not 
been established in the House as: 
44^ P.D. 24.9.1951, C.3243. 
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"It is not proper to refer to the conduct of any hon. Member, 
untill it had been established in a court of law or other wise has 
been held as unjust by this House and similar action has been 
taken. It is not usual to attack any hon. Member by surprise or 
for the matter of that refer to the conduct of any hon. Member 
not present on the floor of the House, pairticularly the private 
conduct of any hon. Member So long as it is not brought to the 
notice of the House in a proper and legitimate manner and so 
long as the court have not decided in their judicial capacity, no 
reference ought to be made to that kind of conduct because 
there is no basis on which we can proceed.... To the conduct of 
other. I will not allow any reference by way of misconduct or 
improper conduct of any other hon. Member here to be made an 
allegation. There for this kind of allegation is irrelevant." 
3. make use of offensive language regarding the conduct of 
central or local legislatures. On May, 2, 1972, Hukum Singh 
Kachwai while raising a matter of quorum, uttered derogatory 
words which were supposed to be unparliamentary and retarding 
the dignity and prestige of the House. The chairman ordered him 
to withdraw their words otherwise, withdraw from the House. But 
neither he withdrew his words nor did he go out, saying that "I 
will not withdraw from the House. Then the chairman named him 
and ruled out his suspension from the service of the House for 
three days under rule 374 (2) as it affected the dignity of the 
chair. 
4. reflect upon the conduct of his Majesty, the King/President, 
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Governor or any court of law. Neither House or its Members 
have jurisdiction over the other House or its Member. 
Therefore, neither House can punish any breach of privilege 
or contempt offered to it by a Member or officer of the other 
House. Proceedings of each House as well as all Legislatures 
are privileged and no action can be taken in one House for 
any thing that is said in another House.''^ On March 26, 
1959, a Member drew the attention of the House to a news 
appeared in Oriya daily "Samaj", 18th March, 1959, about 
the alleged remarks casted by chief minister of Orissa against 
the Members of Parliament. He asked to call the chief 
minister and the editor to the bar to explain their conduct. 
But the speaker refused his consent as each House is 
'Supreme' in its own proceedings and observed: 
"If really the hon. Chief Minister has said what he is alleged to 
have said, it is regrettable... if it is really true, this ought not to 
be continued... no House will cast any aspersion and no Member 
will cast any aspersion on any Metaber of the other House." 
On March 30, 1970, during debate in Rajya Saba, Niren Ghosh, 
Member of Rajya Sabha made certain allegations against a 
Member of Lok Saba. On this after some discussion, the speaker 
wrote to the chairman inviting his attention to the matter that: 
45. L.S.D., 26.3.1959, CC.7965-69. 
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•^ou will agree that it is not desirable for Members of one House to 
make allegations or cast reflection on the floor of the House on the 
Members of the other House." 
But the breach of privilege or contempt can be taken if the 
Member of the other House or any State Legislature has 
committed it outside the House to which he belongs. 
Right of the House to Punish Its Members for their Conduct: 
Under Article 105(3) Parliament has the power to punish its 
Members for disorderly conduct and other contempts committed in 
the House while it is sitting. In case of Raj Narain Singh V. Atma 
Ram Gobind Kher, High Court observed."*^ 
"A Legislative Assembly would not be able to discharge the high 
functions entrusted to it properly if it had no power to punish 
offenders against breaches of its privileges, to impose disciplinary 
regulat ions upon i t s Members or to enforce obed ience to i ts 
commands.'*" 
In 1958, it was observed by the Orissa High Court in a case 
related to the speech delivered in Orissa Legislative Assembly that: 
"Anything said or done in the House is a matter to be dealt with by 
the House itself and that the legislature or the speaker had the 
power 'to take suitable act ion against the Member who, while 
exercising h i s freedom of s p e e c h under c lause (1) of Art. 194 
transgresses the limits laid down in that clause." 
46. A.I.R.. 1954. Allahabad. 319. 
47. A.I.R.. 1958, Orissa, 168. 
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By Rule 378, the speaker, who preserves order in the House, has 
all powers necessary for the purpose of enforcing his decision.' 
The disciplinary powers of the speaker and the House are partly 
embodied in the Rule 373 and 374 which provides for the 
withdrawal or suspension of any Member whose conduct is 
grossly disorderly or who disregards the authority of the chair or 
abuses the rules of the House by persistently and willfully 
obstructing its business. 
When the things fall outside the ambit of this provision it 
becomes liable to be dealt by the Court in accordance with the 
law of the land. 
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CHATER-IV 
FREEDOM FROM ARREST 
The right to freedom from arres t is yet another major 
privilege enjoyed by the person as a Member of Parliament. 
Except on Criminal charges, under Preventive Detention Act or 
under Defence of India Act in the interest of public safety, it is 
considered breach of privilege or contempt of the House to arrest 
or to cause the arrest of a Member of Parliament in civil cases 
during its session or during forty days preceding and forty days 
following a session. It is supposed that "Members should not be 
prevented by trifling interruptions from their attendance on their 
Parliamentary work. The privilege of freedom from arrest evolves 
two things, 
1. freedom from arrest under process of law, and 
2. it is not actually a privilege but calculated to prevent a 
breach of privilege and to punish an infringement thereof. 
The privilege of freedom from arrest or molestation of Members of 
Par l iament , which is of great ant iqui ty , was of proved 
indispensability first, to the service of the Crown and now to the 
functioning of each House, L.D white said "In connection with 
most early amblies that were in any way identified with the King, 
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is to be found some idea of a royally sanctioned safe-conduct, the 
Kings peace was to abide in his assemblies and was to extend 
the Members in coming to it and returning from it. Naturally 
these royal sanctions applied to Parliament. But as the time went 
on, molestation of Members was more likely to be through some 
process of law than through direct bodily injury or restraint. 
Unless Parliament could keep its membership intact, free from 
outside interference whether or not the interference was with the 
motive of embarrassing its actions, it could not be confident of 
any accomplishment."^ 
Hansel stated "Its is peculiarly essential to the court of 
Parliament, the first and the highest court in this Kingdom that 
the Members who compose it should be prevented by trifling 
interruptions from their attendance on this important duty but 
should be excused from obeying any other call , not so 
immediately necessar>' for the great services of the nations. It has 
been therefore upon these principles, always claimed and allowed 
that the Members of both Houses should be dur ing their 
attendance in Parliament exempted from several duties and not 
considered as liable to some legal process to which other citizens 
1. Erskine May, Law. Privileges. Proceeding & Usage of Parliament. Butter 
Worth and Co. Ltd., London, 1924, 110. 
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not instructed with his most valuable franchise are by law obliged 
to pay obidience/^ Today the privilege of freedom from arrest is 
not of great value as it applies to civil process only, where as 
the imprisonment in civil process has been practically abolished. 
But it is of great historical importance since it was in connection 
with it that the Commons first gained the right to determine and 
enforce matter of privilege. Before the Tudor period questions of 
privileges were decided by the King and the Lords. 
Retrospective Views: 
The immunity of freedom from arrest originated in the 
ancient protection afforded by the King to persons travelling to 
and from his court. When the Commons began to come to 
Parliament this protection was extended to them. It was provided 
that persons should not be hindered by arrest from coming to 
Parliament. In the fifteenth century the Commons began to claim 
freedom from arrest except for treason, felony or breach of peace. 
But King and Lords though willing to release a part icular 
individual at the request of the Commons as a matter of grace, 
would not concede copy right. 
In 1404 on the petition of the Commons for the punishment 
2! Hatsel, V. I., p. 1-2. 
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of the assa i l an t of Richard Cheddar, servant of a Member 
attending Parliament, the Commons claimed the special protection 
of the King for themselves and their se rvan t s in "coming, 
remaining and returning," and it was enacted that in this and in 
similar cases for the future the assailant should pay double 
damages besides fines and ransom to the King. The same penalty 
was imposed by a general statute on assaul t on Members of 
either House coming to Parliament. A statute of Henry VI, C. l l 
in 1433 gave some sanctions to this privilege. It was he who 
assaulted a Member attending Parliament was to pay double 
damages. 
The privilege of freedom from arrest was some what wider, 
not only the Member did claim that they were not only to be 
arrested for words spoken in the House but they claimed a 
general immunity from ordinary law as the situation was grave. 
Not only in criminal cases but in civil cases to a debtor against 
whom a judgement had been obtained could be imprisoned untill 
he paid the debt, he could be taken into execution. A defendant 
in a civil action could generally be imprisoned as soon as the 
action was began unless he found bail for his appearance in 
court. However Lords used to enjoy a considerable immunity from 
arrest except on criminal charges. The representatives of the 
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Commons also claimed the similar liberty during the session of 
Parliament and for certain times before and after the session 
necessary for their coming and going. Exemption from arrest upon 
criminal charges at least in case of treason, felony or breach of 
the peace was not claimed. In 1453-54 Speaker Thomas when 
imprisoned for not paying a fine, the judges while recognizing the 
freedom from arrest, ruled that determination and knowledge of 
that privilege belonged to the Lords of the Parliament and not to 
the justices.^ Until the reign of Henry VIII, the Commons did not 
get the right to determine and enforce matters of privilege. 
However they had been obliged to petition for a writ out of 
chancery in order to obtain the release of an arrested Member. 
In 1543, George Ferrors, Burgeses for phTnooth, was arrested 
for debt during the time of Parliament and the Commons took 
the matter upto the Lords. They, judging the contempt to be very 
great, referred the punishment thereof to the order of the House 
of Commons. The Commons proceeded to order their Serjeant to 
require delivery of the burgess without any writ or warrant and 
when the Lords chancellor offered to grant a writ they refused. In 
1573 he delivered Smalley a Member's servant arrested for debt. 
In 1585 orders were enlarged and set at liberty James Digg, 
3. K. Machenzie, The English Parliament. Language Book Society. London, 
1962, p.39. 
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servant to the Archibishop of Canterbury, by virtue of the 
privilege of the court . In 1597 the se rvan t s of Lords and 
Archibishop of Canterbury, the officers who had arrested the 
prisoners were committed by the House. During seventies this 
privilege grew to huge dimensions and became almost impossible 
to get any justice out of a Member of Parliament. Sir Thomas 
Shirley who was arrested for debt in 1603 was released, resulting 
in the enactment of an act which gave statutory sanction to the 
existence of the privilege, yet made provisions for the benefit of 
the creditor. Since imprisonment in civil cases was very common, 
debtors were imprisoned by way of execution thus the privilege 
became an important matter and was carried to great length. The 
Members not only claimed it for themselves but for their servants 
too, and claimed that their property should be immune from 
execution. But statute of Anne and George III, 1770, carried that 
the servants and property of the Members were no longer be 
privileged, nothing was left but the freedom from arrest for 
Members themselves. 
By the statute of James I, the freedom of Members from 
arrest in civil cases has become a legal right rather than a 
parliamentary privilege. The arrest of a Member in civil cases is 
therefore i r regular as initio, and he may be discharged 
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immediately as in 1707 the serjeant was sent with the mace to 
the warden of the Fleet who obeyed its orders of the House and 
discharged Asgill - a Member then in execution. In 1831 the 
committee of privilege reported that the "privilege is not claimable 
for any indictable offence" the principle regarded by the House of 
Commons as being covering criminal contempt of Court therefore, 
in Long Wellesleys case, 1839, they did not ask for the release of 
a Member who had been committed by the Court of Chancery for 
taking out one of its words out of the jurisdiction/ 
It was decided in Goudy V. Duncombe Case (1847) that the 
immunity lasted during a session of Parliament and forty days 
before and forty days after it. It applied equally when Parliament 
was dissolved or prorogued and it could be claimed by any one 
who was a Member of the old Parliament but had not been 
elected to the new. 
History shows that its scope is very narrow as it was not 
protected from proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, neither 
probably from arrest on a criminal charges for a non indictable 
offence nor from proceedings for contempt of court. There is no 
protection in cases of refusal to give surety to keep the peace or 
4. Hood Philips, Constitutional and Administrative Law. Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 1962, p. 182. 
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security for good behaviour and all those cases which are not 
strictly of criminal nature but partake more of a criminal than of 
a civil character. This development is in conformity with the 
principle laid down by the Commons in a conference with Lord in 
1641 that "privilege of Parliament is granted in regard to the 
service of the commonwealth and is not to be used to the danger 
of the commonwealth." In 1807 Mill who had been arrested on 
mesne process, afterward elected for legislature, the House 
determine that he was entitled to privilege and ordered him to be 
discharged out of the custody of the Marshall of the King bench. 
Similarly Christie Burton, 1819, who was elected from Beverly but 
being in custody on execution and unable to attend parliamentary 
proceedings, the House ordered his discharge from the custody 
since he was entitled to this privilege. By 1869, the imprisonment 
for debt was abolished but there were still some cases in which 
a person may be imprisoned as for not paying t rus t monies 
which he had been ordered to pay by the court of justice.^ 
Recent Trend: 
Presently too, the immunity is granted to civil cases only but 
its duration is extended. A Member of Parliament is exempted 
from arrest in civil cases for a period of forty days before and 
5. F. W. Maitland, The Const i tut ional History of England. Cambridge 
University Press, Britain, 1955, p.244. 
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forty days after a meeting of Parliament in order to make them 
able to perform their du t ies in Parl iament without let or 
hindrance. The old rule was that the persons of the peers are 
always sacred and inviolable further, Irish and Scottish peers who 
had no seats in the House of Lords enjoyed this privilege thus, it 
was rather a privilege of peerage than a privilege of Parliament. 
William Anson denied this and confined it within the usual times 
of privilege of Parliament.' 
The main objective of this privilege is "to secure safe arrival 
and regular a t t endance of Members on the scene of their 
parliamentary duties." It does not protect from arrest on a 
criminal charges for an indictable offence nor from preventive 
detention by order of the executive authority under statutory 
powers, e.g. regulations made under defence Act in times of war.^ 
However, the Parliament has a right of receiving immediate 
information of the imprisonment or detention of any Member, 
together with the reasons for his detention. Provisions are made 
that before a Member was committed or detained there must be 
obtained the consent of the House of which he was a Member. 
When a Member of Parliament commits any crime he is 
6. Report (CPR, H. C ) , 1940 , p. 164. Detention as a result of words 
spoken in Parliament would be a vindication of privilege of freedom of 
speech. 
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arrested like an ordinary citizen and if he is convicted, the Judge 
notifies it to the speaker of the House. The Member is usually 
expelled from the House after being laying of the papers on the 
table at their request. If the arrest or molestation of a Member is 
made with mischievous and malicious intent and is protected from 
at tending the proceedings of the Parl iament or any State 
Legislature then the arrested person is entitled to compensation 
for the loss it has faced. In case of Bhim Singh, the court 
observed that: 
'Article 2 1 , 22(2) and 32 under Constitution of India, if a person 
is arrested with mischievous and malicious intent, the victim can 
be compensated by awarding suitable monetary compensation in 
appropriate cases. Arrest of Member of legislative Assembly while 
enroute to seat of Assembly and his deprivation of right to attend 
impending assembly constituted breach of privileges."" 
He was compensated with Rs. 50,000/- for the gross violation of 
right of not being produced before the magistrate within the 
requisite time. 
Even if a person is arrested by an order of speaker of the 
House but not produced before the magistrate, which in normal 
cases is done as a part of the procedure, is also considered a 
breach of privilege as in case of Gunupati Keshavram Redddy, a 
petition under Article 32 alleged that "a was arrested in Bombay 
l. A.I.R.. 1986. SC. 494. 
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on the 11th March, 1952, taken into custody to Lucknow to be 
produced before the speaker of the U.P. Legislative Assembly to 
answer a charge of breach of privilege. He was not produced 
before the magistrate within twenty four hrs. of his arrest and 
was in detention in the speaker's custody at Lucknow even at the 
time of petition." The chief Justice founded it a clear breach of 
provision of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India which is 
quite peremptory in its terms: 
"No such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said 
period without the authority of a Magistrate,"* making the said 
petitioner entitled to release. 
Period of Immunity: 
Members in the U.K. are exempted from arrest in civil cases 
for forty days on either side of the commencement and 
dissolution of Parliament and after a prorogation but no immunity 
is available for bankraptcy and insolvency. Similar position is 
applicable in India, A Member is liable to be arrested in criminal 
charges and under Preventive Detention Act. This immunity of 
freedom from arrest even under Preventive Detention Act is 
available in Pakistan for fourteen days before and fourteen days 
after a session except when peventive etention is for reasons of 
8. A.I.R. 1954, SC. 636. 
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State connected with defense, external affairs, security of Pakistan 
or any part thereof. Same immunity is available in Israel. 
Members of Bundestage in the Federal Republic of Germany enjoy 
immunity from arrest in criminal cases along with civil cases. In 
Thailand too, the immunity is available in criminal cases and 
prosecution.' No Member can, during a session, be arrested or 
detained or summoned by a warrant in a criminal case unless 
permission of the House of which he is a Member is obtained or 
he is arrested in flagrante delicto. But such arrest must be 
communicated to the President of the House concerned who may 
order the release of the arrested Member. In Lebanon and Italy 
Members enjoy immunity on criminal charge only. Immunity is 
also available to the Members of Italian senate from the arrest 
under preventive detention. The immunity is available in all the 
civil cases during membership only whether the case relates to 
the period before or after the election of a Member, but in 
execution of a sentence passed in a criminal case against a 
Member before or after his election is not suspended for the 
duration of his membership. In some other countries the position 
is different, fore example in Egypt, if the sentence has began 
9. Aslam Aabdullah Khan, 'Freedom From Arrest and Molestation," In 
Journal, Constitutional and Parliamentary Information. .Association of 
Scretaries General of Parliament, New Delhi, 1977, p.89. 
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before election it can not be suspended but if it has not 
commenced then Assembly's permission is required for its 
execution. In the U.K. not even the warrants and civil process 
may be served on Members within the precinct of the House 
when the House is sitting. It is a contempt to cause or effect the 
arrest serve even on criminal charges on a Member of the House 
of Commons during and forty days before and forty days after 
the session. Usually a Member who is already in custody or 
pending trial is generally not entitled as a matter of privilege to 
attend sessions of Parliament and can not be released or have 
his trial suspended to enable him to attend session. However, it 
is possible to produce a Member imprisoned on a resolution of 
the House. The court can also, at its descretion, release a 
Member who is in custody to attend the session.'° 
Position in India: 
Here, this exemption from arrest and detention under civil 
process was conferred in 1925 on the Members of Legislative 
body by the Legislative Members Exemption Act, 1925, Section 3, 
which inserted Section 135 A in the Code of Civil Procedure, 
1908, which was subsequently adopted by the Adaptation of Law 
Order, 1950, issued under Article 372 (2) provides that a Member 
10. Ibid., pioa! 
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of a Legislature is not liable to arrest or detention in prison 
under civil process during the continuance of any meeting of the 
House of the Legislature or its Committee thereof, of which he 
may be a member and during fourteen days before and fourteen 
days after such meeting. Legislature Members Exemption Act, 
1925 is based on the recommendations of the Reforms Enquiry 
committee headed by Mudiman, provided that no person was 
liable to arrest or detention in a civil case"" if: 
1. he was a Member of a legislative body constituted under the 
Govt, of India Act, 1919, during the continuance of any 
meeting of such a body. 
2. he was as Member of any committee of such body, during 
the continuance of any meeting of such a committee, and 
3. he was a Member of either chamber of the Indian Legislature 
during the continuance of joint sitting of the Houses or of a 
Joint Committee etc. of which he was a Member and during 
the fourteen days before and fourteen days after such 
meeting or sitting. 
Before independence, cases of detention of political offenders were 
brought to the notice of the House in the shape of notice of 
TT. Legislative Assembly & Council Rule. Standing Order 28(2) and 29(2) by 
the decision of the Chair. 
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adjournment motion. In case of a Member of Legislature S.C. 
Mitra who was detained and prevented from attending the House, 
Nehru moved an adjournment motion which was adopted by 64 
votes against 46 votes as a protest against the violation of the 
Member's privilege.*^ Similar motion was passed on 22nd January, 
1935, for protesting against preventing S.C. Bose from attending 
the Assembly session.'^ 
With the enforcement of the Constitution on 26 January, 
1950, the scope and duration of the privilege became the same 
as obtaining in U.K. i.e. forty days before and forty days after 
the session of the House and not merely for fourteen days which 
was provided in section 135 A of the Code of Procedure, 1908. 
The same view was also expressed on May 5th, 1952, by the 
Ministry of Home affairs. Govt, of India, in their letter no. 91/51 
Police 1, addressed to the Secretary govt, of the Erstwhile Madhya 
Bharat State. The Madras High Court in Case of Venkatesh held: 
"there is immunity extending for a period of forty days prior to 
the meeting and forty days subsequent to the conclusion of the 
meeting for a Member of Parliament from being arrested for a civil 
debt; that is if there is a decree against him, or , if he is sought 
to be a r r e s t ed before j u d g e m e n t , he can cer ta in ly c la im t h e 
immuni ty and freedom from ar res t . It is also clear t h a t s u c h 
12. L.A.D. 1927. pp. 18-40. 
13. L.A.D. 1935. pp.97-98. 
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immunity can not extend or be contended to operate where the 
M.P. is charged with an indictable offence."''' 
If a person is arrested in civil cases during the parliamentary 
session he is entitled to his release since he is exempted from 
such arrest which otherwise, is considered a breach of law. 
Preventive Detention: 
This immunity is not extended to preventive detention cases. 
If a Member is charged and detained under the Act or for any 
criminal act he is not liable to be released or any permission to 
at tend the proceeding of the House because the liberty is 
provided to the welfare of the state and not to endanger the 
state. In 1939, when captain Ram say - Member of Legislative 
Council was booked under preventive detention under Regulation 
18B of the Defence Regulations, 1939, by which the Home 
secretary had the power to certify that he had reasonable cause 
to believe that a person had been recently concerned in acts 
prejudicial to public safety or the defence of the realm or in the 
preparation of such acts, and that by reasons thereof, it was 
* 
necessary to exercise control over him. No Criminal charge was 
involved but committee viewed that Home secretary's action was 
not a breach of privilege, and captain Ram say was not released 
14. AJJRi. 1951, Madras, 272. 
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untill 5 years later. *^  In case of Ansumali Majumdar, the Calcutta 
High Court observed: 
"under such existing law persons returned as Members of State 
Legislative Assembly or the Council of State can not claim 
immunity from arrest for preventive detention and therefore they 
can be detained under the provisions of the Preventive Detention 
Act whilst their membership of the Assembly or the Council of 
State continues."'^ 
On May 27th, 1952, N.C. Chatterjee, a Member of the Lok 
Sabha, gave a notice of privilege motion on the arrest of a 
Member-Deshpande as it constituted a breach of privilege of the 
House since the House was in session. The speaker recieved the 
information of the same from the District Magistrate, Delhi, that 
he has been arrested under section 3 of Preventive Detention Act 
of 1950 as he was among others who took part in organising 
and directing meetings and demonstration over the intended 
celebration of an inter-communal marriage which led to a breach 
of peace and therefore, it was considered necessary to detain him 
in the interest of maintenance of public order. The committee of 
privilege found that "the arrest of V.G. Deshpande under the 
Preventive Detention Act did not constitute a breach of privilege of 
the House." Therefore no more action was taken by the House. 
15. Hood Philips, op. cit. p. 182. 
16. A.I.R.. 1952 Madras, 117. 
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Similar views were observed by the committee in case of 
Dashratha Deb, Member of Parliament who was arrested on 12th 
June, 1952, that "when a Member is arrested in the course of 
administration of criminal justice, immediately released on bail, it 
is under the law and practice of privilege of the House, give 
necessary information to the speaker. It is being clear that such 
an arrest does not in itself constitute a breach of privilege of the 
Hose," therefore no further action was taken by the House. 
Kunjan Nadar, a Member of legislative assembly, asked for writ of 
mandamus when arrested under preventive detention but the High 
court of Cochin observed as: 
'When a Member of Legislative Assembly h a s been arrested and 
detained and h is detention is legal and vinder due process of law, 
he cannot claim that his detention should be subordinated to his 
right to a t t end the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly. He 
cannot therefore pray for writ of Mandamous directing the state 
govt, to e n a b l e h im to a t t e n d t h e s e s s i o n of the Legislat ive 
Assembly, there is no statutory provision granting such privilege or 
immunity^'" 
In the same way the Supreme Court rejected the petition of 
K. Ananda, Namblar, who was detained under Preventive Detention 
Act and observed: 
"Under the Defence of India Rules, 1962, R 30 (1) (b) a Member 
can not claim any special s ta tus higher than that of an ordinary 
17. AIR. 1955, Travancore. Cochin 154. 
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citizen in so far as a valid order of detention is concerned and is 
as much liable to be arrested and detained under it as any other 
citizen."'* 
Exemption From Arrest within the Precinct of the House: 
Generally Members are quite safe within the precincts as no 
legal process is served on them while they are in. The Govt. Of 
India issued instructions on 7th Oct., 1958, by a letter no. 35 /2 / 
57 P. 11, to all the concerned authorities of State Govt, and 
Administration that no person should be served by any legal 
process, civil or criminal, by court of law through the speaker or 
secretariat. Concerned Members should be served outside the 
precinct of Parliament directly at their residence or any other 
place. No help either from speaker or Lok Sabha secretariat or 
any agency thereof, the court sought to inform the Member about 
the issue of legal process or in the execution of legal process-civil 
or criminal against Members. The Govt, of India also directed the 
police and administration through the state govt, that arrest 
within the precincts even after the permission of speaker should 
not be made as a routine matter. Such arrest is made by 
obtaining speaker's permission only in case of emergency when 
ife^a(^rn6?WiSv^%^el^Sffl^of^ei5"iSPiP%^li^ct?)¥PP^gjlefglfet 
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police, spelling out the reasons for the immediate arrest. In case, 
the House is not in session even then the permission of speaker 
is required to execute warrant.'^ In 1959, Punjab Vidhan Sabha 
held a policeman guilty of breach of privilege since he attempted 
to execute arrest warrant on the Member without obtaining the 
leave of the House. Who later on regretted and offered unqualified 
apology. 
The employees of legislative secretariat are kept away from 
this privilege. The speaker of the Kerala Legislative Assembly 
observed that "the prohibition against making arrest without 
obtaining the permission of the speaker from the precinct of the 
House is applicable only to the Members of the Assembly. It is 
not desirable to extend this privilege to the staff of the secretariat 
since it would have the effect of putting unnecessary restrictions 
and impediments in the due process of law.^° 
Intimating the House About Arrest - And Its Nature: 
1. Though the Members of legislature are immune from arrest 
within the specified period but if they are arres ted or 
detained, it is necessary on the part of the concerned 
authority to intimate the House about the arrest or detention. 
The information is supposed to be routed through the 
Ministry of Home affairs as: 
19. Rule of the House. 232 and 233. 
20. P.D., 1973, p.34. 
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a. The House should be informed about the arrest, detention, 
imprisonment or even release. For instance, the then Deputy 
Superintendent of Police informed the House through speaker 
by telegrams on 29 February, 1960, regarding the arrest of 
Nath Pai in Belgaum as: 
"Shri Nath Pai, Member-Lok Sabha, restrained under section 69 of 
the PoUce Act by Police Sub Inspector- Belgaum city Police station 
in Khade Bazar Police station limits today at 1140 hr. for refusing 
to conform the police station.'^' 
b. The place and duration where detenue is kept shold also be 
mentioned. On 3rd of March, 1960, the Sub Inspector of 
Police- Khanapur, informed the Speaker through a wireless 
message that: 
'Shri Nath Pai, Member Lok Sabha, arrested on 3rd is remanded 
to seven days magisterial custody. Remanded and sent to central 
prison, Hindalga." 
c. The reasons for the arrest should also be communicated. The 
House was informed on 4th May, 1974, through a telegram 
from the Suprintendent of Police, Birbhum - West Bengal 
regarding the arrest of a Member as: 
"In the early hrs. (at about 3hrs.) of May 3rd, 1974, the officer-
incharge, Nethali Police Station, went to a place in Nethali Police 
Station area for arresting some prisoners under Section 151 Cr. 
21^ L.S.D., 1.3. 1960. C. 3418. 
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P.C., Seven persons found at the place. A few of these persons 
did not disclose their identity at the time therefore, all of them 
were brought to Nethali Police Station for interrogation and for 
e s tab l i sh ing their identity. At Nethali Police Station it w a s 
discovered that one of the persons was Shri Gadadhar Saha 
Member, Lok Sabha, Shri Saha was re leased on personal 
recognition at 07.00 hrs. on 3rd May, 1974." 
d. Like civil cases information should also be sent in preventive 
detent ion and criminal cases Supr in tendent of Police, 
CBlrSPE: ACU VllI, New Delhi, communicated the information 
about the arrest of Shibu Soren on 5th Sept., 1996, as: 
"I have the honour to inform you that in connection with the 
investigation of CBI case no. RC.5(A)/96-ACU VIII under Section 
120-B IPC and Section 7, 12 and 13(2) read with 13(1) (d) of the 
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Shri Shibu Soren-Member of 
Lok Sabha, has been arrested by the Deputy Suprintendent of 
Police, CBI, ACU VIII and the investigation officer of this case 
today i.e. 5 Sept., 1996 at 1815 hrs. He will be produced before 
the competent court tomorrow in accordance with the provisions of 
law.'^2 
Failure on the part of the committing judge, magistrate, or 
executive authority amounts to breach of privilege and contempt 
of the House. The Hyderabad Legislative Assembly called a sub 
inspector of Police to the Bar of the House and held him guilty 
of the breach of privilege since he did not inform the speaker of 
the Assembly about the arrest of a Member.^^ Sinse he was the 
22. L.S.D.. 9.9., 1996, p.301. 
23. Hyd. L.A.D.. 18.6.1952, p.353 / Ibid., 19.6.1952 pp.393-98. 
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person concerned for the prevention of Member from attending the 
proceeding of ParHament or their committees and functioning as 
Member of the House. If the punishment awarding authority 
constitute a pannel then the responsibility lies with the senior 
most member. 
II. The information is not only required when the person is 
arrested but also if he is detained for some time and kept 
under custody of Police. The concerned officer is required to 
inform the House as soon as possible. On April 5, 1967, the 
police detained Swami Brahmanand and kept in custody for 
about 2 hrs. for offering Satya Graha out side the Parliament 
but his detention was not intimated to the speaker by the 
concerned official." The committee held while undertaking the 
matter that "teachnically the breach of privilege had been 
committed by the concerned official." 
Similar view was held when a Member of Lok Sabha, Krishna 
Chandra Haider, detained by the Police at Burdwan for 
participating in the demonstration inside the court compound and 
taken to Galsi on 14th November, 1973. The intimation was not 
delivered to the speaker thus, the committee of privileges observed 
that "Intimation regarding the restraint or detention of Shri 
Krishna Chandra Haider, M.P. on the occasion should have been 
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sent to the speaker, L.S., and failure to do this did constitute a 
breach of privilege." 
III. Not only the failure on the part of concerned authority about 
the arrest and detention is considered the breach of privilege but: 
a. it is equally considered guilty when it is delayed. The 
Deputy Commissioner of Police Intimated the Speaker on 
23rd of March, 1981, about the detention of Hukum Deo-
Member of Rajya Sabha, while he was arrested on 1st of 
March, 1981. Committee regretting delay, found it a 
breach of privilege of the House and of individual 
Member of Parliament. Action was also taken by the 
State Govt, for the lapse on the part of the concerned 
authority and censure was awarded for delay on their 
part in sending the information. 
b. it is imperative to communicate reasons for the delay in 
both civil and criminal cases. Like civil cases, reasons 
and grounds are required to be furnished in criminal 
cases also. In case of Jambuwant Dhote who was 
arrested on 25th April, 1973, intimated to the speaker 
about 21 hrs. late. The committee recommended that 
"when a Member of the Lok Sabha is arrested and 
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detained under the maintenance of Security Act, 1971, or 
under any other law providing for preventive detention, 
the concerned authority should, besides sending to the 
speaker immediate information regarding the arrest and 
detention of the Member together with the reasons for 
his arrest and detention, send a copy of the detailed 
grounds to the speaker Lok Sabha, simultaneously those 
grounds are supplied to the detenue under the relevant 
law providing for preventive detention." 
IV. Immediate information is also required if a person is released 
and rearrested. Sharan Bhushan Singh a Member, raised the 
issue on 23rd April, 1993, who was rearrested on 17th of 
April, was previously arrested on 8th of April and granted 
bail on 16th of April (not physically released) and released 
on 20th of April but not intimated to the House. The 
committee held "that a breach of privilege and contempt of 
the House had been committed in not sending intimation to 
the speaker Lok Sabha about the realse of Bhushan, M.P., 
on 21st of April, 1993."^'' It was only after unconditional 
apology tendered by Circle officer. Superintendent of Police, 
D.M., and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Gonda), the 
matter was closed. 
24. 'Privilege Issues', In Journal of Parliamentary Information. Lok Sabha 
Secretariat. New Delhi, 1994, pp.65-68. 
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V. When any such information is received in the House under 
rule 231, it is the responsibility of the speaker to inform the 
same to the House as early as possible. If the House is in 
session he delivers the message received by the arresstee in 
the House. He publishes the information in the Bulletin of 
the House if the House is not in session to inform the 
Members. On 3rd march 1960 the Speaker intimated the 
House as: 'I have the honour to inform the House that I 
have received the following telegram dated the 2nd March, 
1960, from Deputy Suprintendent of Police, Bailhongal."^^ 
Then read out the contents of telegram as: 'I have found it 
my duty in exercise of my power under section 54 criminal 
procedure code (Act V of 1898) to arrest Shri Nath Pai, 
Member of Lok Sabha in the limits of Indalhond village, 
Khanapur Taluka Police station today at 1130 hrs . for 
offences under sections 341 and 353 IPC registered at 
Khanapur Police Station." Similarly in 1996, Sept. the 9th, 
Deputy speaker informed the House about the arrest of Shibu 
Soren as: 
"I have to inform the House that the following communication 
dated 5th Sept., 1996, was received on 6th Sept., 1996, from the 
Suprintendent of PoUce, CBI: SPE: ACU VIII, New Delhi-'^e 
and then read out the contents of the letter. 
25^ L.S.D.. 3.3.1960. p. 39-86. 
26. L.S.D.. 9.9.1996, p.301. 
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Though the speaker and the House require immediate information 
about the arrest, place of detention and transfer from one jail to 
another of its Member but no breach of privilege can be claimed if: 
1. the concerned authority fails to intimate the speaker about 
the place of detention or transfer of Member from one jail to 
another. The Deputy Speaker observed on the arrest of 
Mahavir Tyagi, Member of Rajya Sabha as "Normally it takes 
some time for the Magistrate or whoever it is to prepare the 
warrant and other documents and to prepare the statement 
to be sent to the Parliament. Even allowing an hour or so 
for that I think the information should have reached us by 
now.'-^ '" 
2. the circumstances demand so. The committee on privileges 
held that "while it is well recognised that such intimation 
should be given promptly, it is not possible to lay down any 
hard and fast rule on the subject. Much would depend upon 
the surrounding circumstances of each case.'^^ 
3. a Member is arrested in the matter of administration of 
criminal justice and released immediately on bail then the 
27. S.C. Kashyap, Privilege Digest. 1950-85 , Lok Sabha Secretariat, 
New Delhi, 1987, p.55. 
28. P.D., 1975, pp. 37-47. 
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concerned magistrate is not required to intimate the House. 
The committee in Dashratha Deb Case observed, that "it is 
not on the part of the magistrate to inform the House as he 
was released immediately after he was produced before the 
magistrate ' and viewed that such arrest in itself did not 
constitute a breach of privilege of the House.^^ 
The committee in its report presented in 1958, held that 'no 
breach of privilege had been committed by the authorities in not 
sending intimation to the Speaker of the release of a Member on 
bail pending trial as it does not prevent the Member from 
attending the sitting of the House.^° 
Privileges in Cnstody: 
Beyond the said limit of forty days before and forty days 
after the commencement of the House, the Member can be 
arrested even in civil cases, but in all cases of arrest whether 
civil or criminal he is entitled for: 
1. the 'privilege of communication" with the House Speaker or of 
State Legislature or Chairman of Parliamentary Committee or 
Secretary General. Neither the "executive nor any other body 
has any right to with hold his correspondence addressed to 
29^ S.C. Kashvap. op. cit.. p.7. 
30. Kaul and Shakolhar, Practice and Procedure of Parliament. Metropolitan 
Book Co., New Delhi, 1986, p.206. 
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the Speaker or Chairman of Committee or Secretary General. 
With holding such correspondence by the concerned authority 
is breach of privilege. The Madras High Court held that : 
"A Member of a Legislature, in detention, was entitled to the right 
of correspondence with the Legis lature , and to make 
representations to the Speaker and the Chairman of the Committee 
of Privileges and no executive authority has any right to withhold 
such correspondence.''^' 
The committee on privileges in 1958 suggested in case of Kansari 
Lai Haider that "Provisions might be incorporated in Jail Codes, 
Security of Prisoners Rule etc of State Govt, and Administrations 
to the effect that all communications addressed by a Member of 
Parliament under arrest or detention or imprisonment for security 
or other reasons to the speaker of Lok Sabha or the Chairman of 
Rajya Sabha, as the case may be, or to the chairman of a 
Parliamentary Committee or of a Joint Committee of both Houses 
of Parliament should be immediately forwarded by the 
Suprintendent of the Jail concerned to the Govt, so as to be 
dealt with by them in accordance with the rights and privileges of 
the prisoners as a Member of the House to which he belong."^^ 
The same provision was suggested for the State Legislatures. In 
1959 all the state Govts, and Administrations were advised by the 
JT. A.I.R.. 1952. Madras. 117. 
32. 4 R (CPR-2LS), 1958. 
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Ministry of Home affairs to make necessary provisions in the 
relevent rules. Since then most of the State Govts, amended their 
concerned rules in order to employ these provisions. However, the 
immunity is not extended in case of a letter by a Member in 
custody from jail to another Member and if govt, with holds such 
communcations, no privilege can be claimed. 
2. Under arrest, they are supposed to get courtesy which other 
citizens are not entitled for. In case of alleged arrest and ill 
treatment of Bhupindra Singh Mann, Member Rajya Sabha, on 
7th July 1992, by police for carrying a trolley of wheat from 
Punjab to Haryana in Protest of 'Ban Order' on the carriage 
of wheat from Punjab to other s ta tes , the commit tee 
expressed displeasure over the arrest and ill treatment. The 
Chief Secretary of the Govt, of Punjab also instructed to all 
the District Magistrates and Senior Suprintendent of Police in 
the state to extend utmost respect and courtesy to M.Ps and 
M.L.As. The message was conveyed right upto the lowest level 
functionaries of govt, that extreme caution and care should 
be exercised while dealing with M.Ps and M.L.As etc.^^ So 
their privileges and prerogatives would be properly respected. 
33. "Privilege Digest," op. cit.. pp.69-71. 
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Molestation: 
Molestation like arrest, of any Member of Legislature with a 
view to prevent a Member from attending the House is also 
constitutes a breach. 
1. Ill t reatment or harassment while one is on his way to 
at tend Parliamentary business. Kumar Saha, Member Lok 
Sabha, raised a privilege issue about his harassment and ill 
treatment on 31st July, 1972, by certain Railway staff, Police 
and other officials while he was proceeding to attend a 
meeting of Parliamentary Committee. The Committee found 
that 'the Railway official and police have committed breach of 
privilege and contempt of the House," and recommended that 
'suitable departmental action be taken by the govt, against 
them and report to the House as early as possible." 
2. Filthy, abusive and insulting languages against a Member 
whether inside or out side the House is also a breach of 
privilege. On 22nd December, 1981, a matter was raised 
under rule 377, Satyanarayan Jha a Member of Lok Sabha, 
alleged assault and use of abusive remarks by the Police at 
Ujjain on 15th Dec , 1981. The committee urged ' that the 
Ministry of Home affairs should take appropriate steps to 
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curb the growing tendency on the part of law enforcing 
authorities of assault ing and ill treating M.Ps and other 
elected representatives of the people and of using abusive 
language in respect of them." The committee also desired that 
the Ministry of Home Affairs be asked to issue necessary 
instruction to the authorities concerned to ensure that such 
incident may not reoccur and if an officer acts in that 
manner then serious actions should be taken against him." 
3. On assaulting Members the committee emphasized that "M.Ps 
are entitled to the utmost consideration and respect at the 
hand of the public servants and as such the police or any 
other authority should not do any thing or act in a manner 
as it will hamper them in their functioning as public men. 
The authorities when dealing with M.Ps. should act with great 
restraints and circumspection and show all courtesy which is 
legitimately due to the representatives of the people."^'' Similar 
matter was raised on 13th Sept. 1991 by Sukomal Sen -
M.P., Rajya Sabha, as was allegedly assaulted when he was 
coming out of Parliament House Annexe to proceed to attend 
the sitting but because of unconditional apology tendered by 
the Deputy Commissioner of Police for misbehaviour by the 
34^ S.C. Kashvap, op. cit.. pp.23-24. 
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Police personnel under his charge and assured against the 
guilty. The committee then dropped the matter.^^ 
4. Breach of privilege also occurs if a Member is intimidated 
and obstruction is caused by an outsider in the discharge of 
his duties within the precinct of the House.^^ 
This privilege of immunity from assault is available only if person 
is obstructed in discharge of his duties as Member of Parliament 
or State Legislature. Members can not claim this immunity if they 
are not performing legislative duties. It also exempts the persons 
or officers of the House acting as witness and counsel, appearing 
before Parliament or its Committees. Their arrest within the 
precinct, without the permission of chair even in criminal cases 
or molestation, is considered guilty. Their obstruction whether 
direct or indirect in carrying out specific duties entrusted to him 
by Parliament constitute contempt of the House like Member of 
Legislature and for the same duration.s 
35. 'Privilege Issues," op. cit.. 1993, p.468. 
36. IIR (CPR-4LS) 26.8.1969. 
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CHAPTER V 
PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES AND 
THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
The troika Legislature, Judiciary and Executive, are the 
three different but important limbs of the Constitution which are 
complementary and supplementary to each other. The Constitution 
provides constraints on state's action since a sound government is 
the one which is based on checks and balances. This is the 
ethos of India's Constitution. Though, under the Constitution the 
powers of the two inst i tut ions, legislature and judiciary are 
separate yet they are marked by some sort if interrelationship in 
which the role of the judiciary is much more predominant. Its 
role in relation to Parliament assumes importance because of 
three factors: 
a) the power of the judic iary to in terpre t par l iamentary 
legislation and to give meaning to the words used in a 
statute, and to fill up the gaps. 
b) The judicial power to declare a statute unconstitutional, and 
c) The power to invalidate even a constitutional amendment. It 
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provides remedies to the petitioner under Article 32 and 
226 of the Constitution in the form of writs. 
The greatest reservoir for supplying power to the judiciary to 
invalidate a statute is provided by the fundamental rights mainly 
by Article 14 and 19, but almost since the inception of the 
constitution, an attempt has been made by the Parliament to 
weaken this reservoir, further it is thought that the Acts passed 
by the legislature are supposed to be superior as compared to 
the judges because the former are the representatives of the 
peoples and thus , there is the necessity of the judicial self 
restraint . Court too proceeds with the assumption that the 
legislature is the best judge of what is good for the community 
by whose suffrage it has come into existence, but the ultimate 
responsibility of determining the reasonableness of the restraints 
from the point of view of public interest rests with the court and 
the court can not shirk this solemn duty casted on it by the 
Constitution. In practice it is very difficult to draw a boundary 
between the competence of the cour t and the exclusive 
jurisdiction of each House, and thus provided many puzzling 
cases. Conflicts between the two is not a new phenomena to be 
settled. No doubt much have been focused to understand the 
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relationship between the judiciary and the legislature but still 
questions cloud their relationships. 
It was common ground between the Houses and the courts 
that privileges depend on the known laws and cus toms of 
Parliament, and not on the ipse dixit of either House. The 
question whether a matter of privilege should be judged solely by 
the House to which it is concerned even when the rights of the 
third party were involved or whether it might in certain cases be 
decided in the courts and if so, in what sort of cases. Granted 
that it could be decided in courts, were the judges are bound to 
act 'Ministerially', i.e. accept and apply the par l iamentary 
interpretation of the law, or were they free to form their own 
view of the law of Parliament ? 
Both the constitutional authorities were supreme in their 
own fields neither of which could compel the submission of the 
other . The House of commons and the House of Lords in 
England claimed to be the sole judges of there own privilege 
while on the other side the court maintained that privileges were 
the part of the law of the land and thus, the court is bound to 
decide questions coming before it in any case within their 
jurisdiction even when privileges were involved. 
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Version of the Legislature: 
The Houses claimed to be the exclusive judge of their own 
privileges especially the House of Commons, as actually it was the 
House of Commons that entered into dispute with courts. They 
were that time, engaged in establishing and maintaining their 
privileges therefore, could not admit the authority of any other 
body to decide what its privilege should be. 
Version of the Judiciary: 
At the end of 17th century almost after the establishment 
of superiority of Parliament and rights of the House of Commons 
the court started to draw a distinction between the constitutional 
position of the High Court of Parliament and of each House of 
Parliament alone, claiming that Parliamentary privileges were but 
a branch of the law of the land which they were bound to 
administer. The phrase that 'neither House could create a new 
privilege' proved the limits of the privileges and immunities. The 
court further argued that their refusal to adjudicate whether 
parliamentary privileges were involved would in many cases result 
in a failure of justice since the House of Commons could not 
give remedies or award damages or decides litigation between 
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parties. 
Reconciling the Two Views: 
The conflict was ultimately resolved by conceding to the 
courts the right in principle, to decide all questions of privileges 
arising in litigation before them with few large exceptions in 
favour of parliamentary jurisdiction, which include exclusive 
jurisdiction of each House over its internal proceedings and right 
of both Houses to commit/punish for contempts. C.J. Fortescue 
in Thropes Case in 1452, boserved that "they ought not to 
answer to that question, for it hath not been used afortyme, that 
justices should in any way determine the privilege of this High 
Court of Parliament; for it is so high and so mighty in its 
nature, that it may make law, and that is law it may make no 
law; and the determination and knowledge of that privilege 
belongth to the Lords of Parliament, and not to the just ices." 
Generally the court agrees with the decision of the House as 
judge of its own privileges," but despite that conflicts still prevail. 
The judiciary-parliament acrimony is not new. It has been 
in vogue since last many centuries when the members of the 
1. Erskine May. Law. Privileges. Proceedings and Usage of Parliamentary. 
Butter Worth Co. Ltd. London, 1924, p. 136. 
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House of common started to claim certain privileges and powers 
and struggled for their rights and immunities to be recognized 
against the King and his Lords. Since then the judges who used 
to give their judgement were not accepted by the House of 
Commons simply because they were the Members of the King 
and his Council and not willing to delegate much power to the 
House of Commons, but later the supremacy of Parliament was 
established and the British constitution al law recognized the 
supremacy of Parliament which can do almost every thing which 
is not naturally impossible and its Acts can not be nullified by 
courts on any grounds. Its errors are corrected only by itself that 
is why the English Judges do not sit as a court of appeal 
against Parliament. The position is different in U.S.A. where the 
constitutional frame work is quite and its Constitution is what the 
supreme court say it is. 
In India though the Const i tu t ion is based on the 
Westminister model but yet not a true replica of it, rather it has 
adopted a via media between the American system of judicial 
pa ramountcy and the English principle of par l iamentary 
supremacy. Here the judiciary is vested with the power to declare 
a law unconstitutional in case if it is beyond the purview of 
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legislature or contradictory to the Fundamental Rights or violates 
the Constitutional provision. 
In 1704 in England, it was said by Holts in Paty's case as 
"1 will suppose that the bringing of such actions was declared by 
the House of Commons to be a breach of their privileges but 
that declaration will not make that a breach of privileges that 
was not before. But if they have any such privilege they ought to 
show precedent of it. The privileges of the House of Commons 
are well known and are founded upon the law of the land and 
are nothing but the law. As we all know they have no privileges 
in cases of breach of the peace. And if they declare themselves 
to have privilege which they have no legal claim to, the people of 
England will not be stopped by that declaration. This privilege of 
theirs concerns the liberty of the people in a high degree, by 
subjecting them to imprisonment for the infringement of them 
which is what the people can not be subjected to without an 
Act of Parliament". But a contradictory view was shown in 
Stockdale v Hansard where a report was printed with the 
permission of the House of Commons, of the inspectors of prisons 
in one of which a book published by Stockdale, was described in 
a libelous manner. He brought an action against M/S Hansard 
who pleaded the general issue, and proved that the report had 
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been printed with the permission of the House of Commons, 
since the order held no sufficient defence to the action therefore, 
C.J. Denman pronounced the judgement adverse to the privileges 
of the House, directing that ' the fact of the House of Commons 
having directed M/S Hansard to publish all their parliamentary 
reports is no justification for them, or for any book seller who 
publishes parliamentary report containing a libel against any 
man . ' A committee was appointed to ascertain the law and 
practice of Parliament regarding the publication by orders of the 
House. On its recommendation the House passed a resolution 
declaring the publication of parliamentary reports, votes and 
proceeding an essential incident to the constitutional functions of 
Parliament; that the House had a sole and exclusive jurisdiction 
to determine upon the existence and extent of its privileges; that 
to dispute those privileges by legal proceeding was a breach of 
privilege; and that the court can not adjudiciate on matters of 
privileges o Parliament.^ The House directed M/S Hansard to 
plead when Stockdale commenced another action, and the 
Attorney General to defend them rather than to act upon its 
resolution. Denman, C. J., and other judges after hearing the 
case decided against the claim of privilege. A claim was also 
1. Ibid, p. 144. 
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made by the Attorney General that courts had no jurisdiction in 
matters pertaining to privilege as the High Court of Parliament 
was a superior court and the law of parliament is *a separate 
law'. It was argued that the declaration by either House on 
Parliamentary privileges was the judgement of a court with 
exclusive jurisdiction, therefore binding on other courts as they 
are supposed to be inferior to the House of Commons. But 
Denman in his judgement insisted that it is the court which is 
vested with the power to decide whether a particular claim of 
privilege fall within the jurisdiction of the House of Common and 
denied the law of Parliament as a separate law but he did not 
deny that both the Houses possessed certain privileges which 
are essential to the discharge of their functions. He held the 
House of Commons as court superior to any court of law, and 
none of whose proceedings are to be questioned in any way. 
Further it was observed that ... It is a claim for an arbitrary 
power... The supremacy of Parliament, the foundation of which 
the claim is made to rest, appear to me to completely over turn 
it, because the House of Commons is not the Parliament, but 
only a co-ordinate and component part of par l iament . The 
sovereign power can make or unmake the law, but the 
concurrence of the three legislative estates is necessary. The 
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resolution of any one of them can not alter the law or place 
any one beyond its control". Another judge Coleridge observed 
that "this and all other courts of law are inferior in dignity to the 
House of Commons, and therefore it is impossible for us to 
review its decision. As a court of law we know no superior but 
those courts which may revise our judgement for errors, and in 
this respect there is no common terms of comparison between 
this court and the House... the House is not a court of law at 
all., neither originally, nor by appeal, can it decide a matter in 
litigation between two parties. It has no means of doing so, it 
claims no such powers, power of inquiry and of accusation it has, 
but it decides nothing judicially, except where it is itself a party 
in the case of contempts. The third judge Patteson said, "in 
making this resolution, the House of Commons was not acting as 
a court either legislature, judicial or inquisitorial, or any other 
description. It seems to me, therefore, that the superiority of the 
House of Commons has really nothing to do with the question.^ 
From the views of the three judges, it is no doubt clear 
that they did not submit the superiority of the High Court of 
House of Parliament over the other law court as the judicial 
matter can not be decided inside the House. It was admitted that 
3. Stock dale V. Hansard, (1840), 11 Ad. & E.I., 253. 
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only the matter which is coming out of its internal proceedings is 
the only jur isdic t ion of the House but this jur isdict ion is 
exclusive and sole. Almost a century before i.e. in early 18th 
century the position was quite in favour of the court. It is clear 
from the Holts decision in paty's case who observed that "I will 
suppose, that the bringing of such actions declared by the 
Houses of Commons to be a breach of their privileges but that 
declaration will not make that breach of privilege that was not 
before. But if they have any such privilege, they ought to show 
precedent of it. The privileges of the House of Commons are well 
known, and are founded upon the law of the land, and are 
nothing but the law. As we all know they declare themselves to 
have privileges for which they have no legal claim to, the people 
of England will not be estopped by that declaration. This privilege 
of theirs concern the liberty of the people in a high degree, by 
subjecting them to imprisonment for the infringement of them, 
which is what the people can not be subjected to without an act 
of Parlimanet.*'' Later in many cases contradictory views were 
expressed accepting the Members of each House of Parliament as 
the sole judges whether their privileges have been violated and 
whether thereby any person has been guilty of contempt of their 
authority, and that they must adjudicate on the extent of their 
4. Ashby v. White Paty, 1704, 2 Lord Raymond 1105. 
161 
privileges. This was established in case of Sheriff of Middlex. 
Regarding the contempt of the House and breach of 
privilege, if the House mentions specific grounds for holding a 
person guilty of its contempt or breach of privilege, and the 
warrant ordering imprisonment is a speaking warrant then only 
the court can go into the question of validity of the committal 
and can scruitinise the grounds to ascertain whether these are 
sufficient or adequate to consti tute contempts or breach of 
privilege of the House. But if the warrant mentions contempts in 
general terms and not mentioning the grounds which the House 
held to be its contempt, in such cases the courts have nothing to 
do and its validity too can not be questioned. In sheriffs case 
since the warrant did not mention the facts constituting the 
contempt of the House, the court refused to issue the writ, 
because of the absence of such specific nature, of habeas corpus 
to discharge the sheriff from imprisonment saying that "if the 
warrant merely stated a contempt in general terms the court is 
bound by it*. This shows that the House may reprimand or 
suspend a Member from the House and use force as may be 
absolutely necessary for the purpose. The jurisdiction of the 
House in matters of discipline maintaining within the four walls 
and over its Members is absolute and exclusive. The court is not 
5. Brad Lough V. Gossette, 12 Q.B.O. 27 (1884). 
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supposed to interfere with a resolution of the House during 
expulsion or suspension of a Member.^ 
This is because the courts regarded the House of Commons 
and treated the House as a court and its warrants as that of a 
Superior Court. On the other hand the House too, accepted the 
s u m m o n s from the cour ts and is represented if a person 
imprisoned under order of the House moved petition for habeas 
corpus. Only in case of general warrant the decision of the 
superior court i.e. the House of Commons is not and can not be 
reexamined. In the medieval times the power used by the British 
Parliament was in a manner which would shock every body. In 
the last 100 yrs. Or so it has used to exercise its power with 
commendable res t ra in ts . The House of Commons not only 
tolerated public criticism but recognised them as absolute 
necessity. Gladstone observed in the House of Commons in 1888 
that "Indeed, it is absolutely necessary that there should be 
freedom of comment, that freedom of comment may of course be 
occasionally abused, but I do not think that it is becoming the 
dignity of the House to notice that abuse of it.^ 
6. R.C.S. Sarkar, 'Privileges of Parliament," In Journal Constitutional & 
Parliamentary Studies . Inst i tute of Constitutional & Parliamentary 
Studies, New Delhi, 1967, Vol. 1, pp.48-49. 
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Recognising the importance of comment and freedom of 
expression, Patanjali Sastri, J., observed that "Freedom of speech 
and of press lay at the foundation of all democratic organisations, 
for without free political discussion no public education, so 
essential for the proper functioning of the process of popular 
government, is possible.'^ 
On the other hand if a prisoner is committed by the House 
for contempts and he obtained a writ of habeas corpus a return 
of which was that he had been committed for a contempt of the 
House, the court would inquire no further but would remand the 
prisoner to gaol.* After prolonged conflicts and controversies in a 
number of cases between Judiciary and the House of Commons 
an understanding has been emerged between the two on the 
following accounts: 
1) Neither House of Parliament has the right to do any thing 
in contravention of the law, in the assertion of its privileges, 
so as to affect the rights of persons exercisable outside the 
four walls of each House. 
2) Each House of Parliament is the sole judge of the question 
7. J.N. Panday, Constitutional Law of India. Central Law Agency. AUahabad, 
1988, p. 113. 
8. F. M. Maitland - Constitution^ History of England, Cambridge University 
Press, G. Britain, 1955, p.378. 
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whether any of its privilege has been infringed; but whether 
the House does infact possess a particular privilege is a 
question for the courts to decide. 
3) Neither House alone is competent to declare the extent of its 
privilege and this is subject to judicial de terminat ion 
However, it does not affect the power of Parliament to 
legislate on the subject of Parliamentary privileges. 
4) If the House commits for contempts of privilege which is not 
specified in the warrant the courts are powerless, they can 
not examine it, this is denied by the courts in India. 
5) The courts deny the right of the House to define its own 
privileges but given an undoubted privilege it is for the 
House to judge on the occasion and of the manner of its 
exercise. 
6) The courts will not interfere with interpretation of a statute 
so far as the regulation of internal proceedings are 
concerned. Each House has unquestionable authority as 
regards the regulation of internal procedure if any proceeding 
in the House affects the rights of other person arising out of 
the ordinary law of the land and exercisable out side the 
walls of the House. The ordinary courts of land shall at once 
h a v * » th*» i i i r i < ! H i r t i r » n tr» H < a t p r m i n p T»7hf»th*»r t h f » r»rivil*»a*» 
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claimed by the House exists and if so whether it would go 
so far as they justify the breach of the ordinary law of the 
land. 
A balance has been established between the judiciary and 
legislature that the courts will recognise those privileges which 
have the sanction of common law, a new privilege can be created 
for the House only by a law passed by the Parliament and not 
merely by a resolution of one House; and whether a particular 
privilege claimed by the House 'exists or not' is a question for 
the courts to decide. The courts have the right to determine the 
nature and limits of parliamentary privileges. 
Position in India: 
In India the position is different. Here the Parliament and 
state legislature's claim is limited by the presence fundamental 
Rights and the doctrine of judicial review. The court, in the 
ordinary circumstances have accorded the speaker of the House 
as the judge to decide the privileges of the House. For instance, 
the common practice in India to arrest a Member is through a 
warrant but the case of R.S. Patel, M.L.A., who was arrested in 
December, 1953, without warrant during the session, deviated 
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from the normal practice, but agreeing with the commiting 
authority the committee found no difficulty in saying that the 
membership of the House conferred no immunity, since the 
arrest was made under the ordinary law on charges involving 
offences for which, under the Indian Penal code, a person is 
liable to be arrested without warrant. Further on one occasion 
the speaker of Uttar Pradesh Assembly instructed the leader of 
opposition to out from the day's sitting.' The committee of 
privileges also agreed with the behaviour of the House as a result 
of which a resolution was passed to suspend him for the rest of 
the session. But the Member pleaded against the action of the 
speaker on the ground tha t double punishment had been 
awarded in contravention of Article 21 of the Constitution. The 
court rejected by holding that "disciplinary action for breach of 
parliamentary rules was not punishment as intended by the 
chapter on fundamental rights, therefore the question of double 
punishment did not arise and what is more, the resolution 
passed by the House was an internal matter which the courts 
have no power to scrutinise which is quite clear from the Article 
122(1) which says tha t the validity of any proceeding in 
Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any 
9. Morris J o n e s , Par l iament In India. Logmans. Green & Co., London, 
1957, p.254. 
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alleged irregularity of procedure. The CI(2) of the same Article 
says that "no Officer or Member of Parliament in whom power is 
vested by or under this constitution or regulating procedure or 
the conduct of business or for maintaining order in Parliament 
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the 
exercise by him of those power." The same view is applied to the 
states under art 212 CI(1852). But it is also noticed that there 
was no agreement among the judges on general position thus, 
emerging two contradictory views, one was that in reconciling the 
privileges of Parliament as set out in Article 105 and 194 with 
the rest of the Constitution it had to be taken that the framers 
had not in tended the privileges to be over ruled by the 
fundamental r ights." While others were of the opinion that 
fundamental rights were more fundamental Article 14 8& 18 of 
the Indian Constitution guarantee the right to equality to every 
citizen of India embodies the general principle of equality before 
law and prohibits unreasonable discrimination among citizens. 
Article 18 abolishes title and Article 14 declares that the state 
shall not deny to any person 'equality before the law' and 
provides equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. 
This provision expresses equality before the law and equal 
protection of the law. 
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However, on the other hand it is also argued that equality 
does not mean absolu te equali ty among ci t izens which is 
physically not possible to achieve. Jenings strengthened this view 
by saying that equality before the law means that among equals 
the law should be equal and should be equally administered, 
that like should be treated alike. Where as Dicey calls quality 
before the law as the rule of law in England which means that 
no man is above the law and every person, whosoever be his 
rank or condition, is subject to the jurisdiction of ordinary 
courts. 
On this occasion a question very often comes into mind that 
is there any longer the same need for parliamentarv^ privileges? 
At whose expense are parliamentary privileges asserted in the 
modern democratic states ? Also in the context of the Indian 
Constitution, are parliamentary privileges more fundamental than 
Fundamental Rights. If the privileges get defined by the law then 
they will become unambiguously subject to the Constitution and 
it will become the duty of the Supreme Court to determine cases 
where the privileges and fundamental rights are contravened with 
one another. But if privileges remain so long as those of the 
House of Common in India, the Supreme Court would probably 
uphold this power and protect it against restrictions even by the 
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fundamental rights. In case of codification the court is entitled to 
enquire into the const i tut ional i ty of such privileges. It is 
suggested that the area of privileges be determined by the court;s 
in the context of citizen's right than by the legislature in its 
description as most modern privileges seems to consist conflicts 
between the l^islature and the public and not between the l^islature and 
executive. 
Since the powers are not defined clearly, conflicts appears 
between the two bodies as it has happened in West Bengal. The 
Speaker of the Assembly granted temporary permission to two 
communist M.L.As to remain on the Assembly premises in order 
to avoid arrest under the Preventive Detention Act. The court 
observed that general immunity can not be conferred upon 
Members from arrest. The only immunity permitted by established 
practice in Britain is that the arrest can not be effected within 
the precincts of the chamber when the House is actually sitting. 
In practice the legislature claims an absolute power to 
commit a person for its contempts and a general warrant, if 
issued by it, has a nature of conclusive and free from judicial 
scrutiny. The question however raised whether such a claim can 
be accepted in India where there is unlike England, written 
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Constitution with fundament rights and doctrine of judicial review 
of legislative action. 
Regarding its own proceedings the Houses of Parliament 
have an inherent right to conduct its affairs wi thout any 
interference from an out side body. Constitution restricts the 
jurisdiction of court in this regard, the validity of its proceedings 
can not be questioned in any court. By Article 122, no Officer 
and Members in whom powers are vested for maintaining order 
and regulating procedure can be called in court for their acts. 
This was clear from the case of Raj Narayan in which Allahabad 
High Court observed that: 
th is court i s not , in any sense whatever, a court of appea l on 
revis ion a g a i n s t t h e l eg i s l a tu r e or a g a i n s t t h e r u l i n g of t h e 
speaker who, as the holder of any oflBce of the highest distinction, 
h a s the dignity of the House. This court h a s no jur i sd ic t ion to 
issue a writ, direction or order relating to a matter which affected 
the internal affairs of the House."^' 
In a number of cases the courts have decided the question 
whether a particular privilege claimed by a House exists or not 
and when once it is decided that a particular privilege exists it 
is for the House then to judge the occasion and the manner of 
10. A.I.R.. 1958 Allahabad 168. 
11. A.I.R.. 1959 S.C. 395. 
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its exercise and the court would not sit in judgement." The 
Court was of the opinion that provisions contained under Article 
105(3) and 194(3) are const i tut ional laws, therefore, are as 
supreme as Fundamental Rights, Freedom of speech in the 
legislature in Part III including Article 208 and 211, rights under 
Article 19(1) (a) can be restricted by law for breach of such law 
if they affect the: 
1) Sovereignty and integrity of India. 
2) Security of the State. 
3) Friendly relations with foreign states. 
4) Public orders 
5) Decency or morality 
6) Contempt of court 
7) Defamation, and 
8) Incitement to an offence 
Where as cl (2) of Article 194 clearly says that Member of 
Legislature is not liable to any proceedings in any court in 
respect of any thing said or done on the floor or during the 
proceedings of the House. Provision contained under Article 194(2) 
is different from that of 19(1) (a) and therefore can not be cut 
down in any way by law contemplated by 19(2), on this ground 
TJ. A.I.R.. 1958. Orissa 168. 
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the court dismissed the petition. Article 105 (2) vests exclusive 
control in the House of legislature. Supreme Court ruled in case 
of Kameshwar Rao that "It can not call the question of validity 
of its proceeding on the grounds of alleged irregularity of the 
procedure. In case of Surender Mohanty vs Nabha Krishna the 
Orissa High Court observed that: 
no law court can take action against a Member of the Legislature 
for any speech made by him there even when a Member in a 
speech casts reflection on High Court in the House."^ 
Though the tendency of the court is to uphold the 
legislation rather than to quash it but however, when the power 
of the executive (legislature) interfere or contravenes with the 
rights of an individual without providing procedural safeguards the 
court then acts sensitively and its action is justified on the 
grounds that it is necessary to check administrative arbitrariness 
in a society governed by the rule of law and which has vast 
powers to affects the life, liberty and property of the people. The 
Supreme Court ruled that if a citizen moves this court and 
complains that his fundamental rights under Article 21 had been 
contravened, it would plainly be the duty of this court to 
examine the merits of the said contention. The impact of the 
fundamental constitutional right conferred on Indian citizens by 
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Article 32 (to move the Supreme Court is decisively against the 
view that a power or privilege can be claimed by the House 
though it may be in consistent with Article 211. Thus, in courts 
too wide and unfettered powers are vested under Article 32 and 
226 of the constitution and fundamental rights guaranteed to 
citizen. Secondly, it ought to be pointed out that the powers 
enjoyed by the House of Commons were incidental to its 
legislative function and an integral part of its privilege. Under 
these two considerations it was held that legislature in India are 
not the superior court of records as in England, only such 
powers can be exercised by the legislature of the House of 
Commons which are integral parts of its privileges and are 
incidental to legislative function, but not those which are used 
by the House of Commons as superior court of record or as a 
result of convention the Supreme Court gave its opinion that 
"Courts in India can not only examine the validity of an order of 
commitment made by the legislature, whether the issued warrant 
is speaking warrant or a general one but It was also held that 
courts have jurisdiction to issue interim order in the proceedings 
before it and grant of bail to a person who stands committed for 
contempt . This is because these function were under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts and legislature did not 
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exercise any of them in part . This is clear from the Keshav 
Sing's case who while reprimanded by the speaker of U.P. 
Legislative Assembly for his objectionable behaviour, asked for the 
writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 in the Allahabad High 
Court, alleging his detention as illegal as he was not given an 
opportunity to defend himself therefore his detention was mala 
fide and violative of natural justice. As a result of which an 
interim bail was awarded by the court to him. But the House, 
keeping in view its powers, again passed a resolution alleging 
that his advocate (Soloman) and the two judges who passed 
interim bail had committee contempt of the House therefore be 
brought before it in custody. This resolution was challenged by 
the judges under Article 226 in the High Court on which a full 
bench of 28 judges of the court ordered stay on the 
implementation of the resolution. The House then passed a 
clarificatoiy resolution saying that the question of contempt would 
be decided only after giving opportunity to judges to explain why 
the House should not proceed against them for contempt. On 
referring the matter to Supreme Court, the court by 6 to 1 
majority held that the two judges of High Court had not 
committed any contempt by issuing bail order rather Article 211 
restricts the state legislature and Article 121 restricts Parliament 
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to discuss the conduct of judges of the court, therefore, no action 
can be taken against them for the discharge of their duty and 
fearless and independent judiciary is the foundation of the 
constitutional structure in India and is uncontrollable by Article 
105(3). The cour t further declared tha t in presence of 
fundamental rights the order of the House can be challenged 
under Article 21 . 
The Supreme Court's verdict thus, achieved two objectives -
1) To maintain judicial integrity and independence, for if a 
House were to claim a right to question the conduct of 
judge then judicial independence would be seriously 
compromised and the constitutional provisions safeguarding 
judicial independence largely diluted. 
2) To concede to the House quite a large power to commit for 
its contempt on breach of its privilege for even though the 
judic iary can scrut inise legis la ture 's committal for i ts 
contempt. 
The conference of presiding officers in Bombay adopted a 
resolution saying that the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court 
had the effect of reducing legislature to the status of inferior 
courts of the Land which was against the underlying intentions 
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of the Constitution makers who had actually meant to oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts. On the occasion speaker Hukum Singh 
read out what Ambedkar once said "under the House of 
Commons powers and privileges, it is open to Parliament to 
convict any citizen for contempt of Parliament and when such 
privilege is exercised, the jurisdiction of court is ousted. That is 
an important privilege.. But there is not the slightest doubt in 
my mind and I am sure , also in my mind of the drafting 
committee, that Parliament must have certain privileges, when 
that Parliament would be so much exposed to calumny, to 
unjustified criticism that the parliamentary institution in this 
country might be brought down to letter contempt and may loose 
all the respect which parliamentary institutions should have from 
the citizens for whose benefit they operate." Suggestions was also 
made in the conference to amend Articles 105, and 194 to clear 
beyond doubt the powers, privileges and immunities of legislature, 
their Members and Committees, not being subject or subordinate 
to any other provision of the Constitution. Later on after realising 
the importance of legislature, on March 10, 1965, the Allahabad 
High Court dismissed the petition, ordering him to surrender his 
bail and to be served with the remaining punishment imposed on 
him by the U.P. Assembly. It was also observed by the court that 
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"once we come to the conclusion that the Legislative Assembly 
has the power and jurisdiction to commit for its contempts and 
to impose the sentence passed on the petitioner, we can not go 
into the question of the correctness, propriety or legality of the 
commitment. This court can not, in a petition under Article 226 
of the Constitution, sits in an appeal over the decision of the 
Legislative Assembly committing the petition for its contempts." 
The Legislative Assembly is the master of its own procedure and 
is the sole judge of the question whether its contempts have 
been committed or not. As a result of which in various later 
cases the court has refused to entertain the writ petition against 
the legislature keeping in view the dignity of legislature, as in 
1986 membership of tem DMK legislators were terminated by the 
Tamil Nadu Assembly for tearing and burning of few pages of the 
Constitution. The challenged the decision of the House but the 
Madras High Court dismissed their petition. 
The legislature too for itself claims that it has the power to 
decide by it self, mat te rs ar is ing in connection with the 
proceedings of the House, the judiciary contends that it has 
power to interpret the Const i tu t ion. In 1970 when court 
summoned some members including a former speaker of the 
House to appear either in person or by advocate before the 
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Supreme Court in a case related to Jagad Guru Shankarcharya, 
the privilege issue was raised in the House. But the speaker 
directed them to ignore the notice, directing the Attorney General 
to bring to the notice of the court that what is contained in the 
case is something which is covered by Article 105 of the 
constitution. The speaker further ruled out that "whether the 
court issues a summons or notice does not make any difference 
to us. Ultimately, the privileges of the House are involved when 
Members are asked to defend themselves for what they said in 
the House" and when a member desired to defend himself in the 
Court the speaker ruled out that "If he appears before the court, 
fully knowing Article 105, I think we will have to bring a 
privilege motion against him". It was said that the only question 
before the House is that If once we accept that the courts have a 
right to call it whether it is an optional notice or judicial 
summons, our privileges are at an end. So, in the circumstances, 
it was my duty to reques t the Honourable. Members of 
Parliament to ignore the notice.*'^ It is clear that though both 
are the important organs of the Constitution but more emphasis 
is put on the Members of Legislature as the law makers who 
enjoy some what more privileges than a common man. The 
13. L.S.D., 3.4 1970, CC. 28-225/L.S.D. 22.4.1970 235 - 258. 
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Supreme Court while upholding the powers and prestige of the 
Legislature, restr icts itself from interfering with its internal 
proceedings. Only in cases when such things cause civil disputes, 
the court steps in. 
Kaul says that "for his speech and action in Parliament, a 
Member is subject only to the discipline of the House itself and 
no proceeding, civil or criminal can be instituted against him in 
any court in respect of any thing said or any vote given in 
Parliament or a committee thereof so that Members may not be 
afraid to speak out their minds and can freely express their 
views. Members are therefore completely protected from any 
proceeding in any court even though the words uttered by them 
in the House may be false and malicious of their knowledge. 
Though a speech delivered in the House by a Member of the 
house may amount to contempt of court, no action can be taken 
against him in a court of law as speeches made in the House 
are privileged. To commence proceedings in a court of law against 
any person for his conduct in obedience to the orders of either 
House or in conformity with its practice, or to be concerned in 
commencing or conducting such proceedings is a breach of 
privilege. Both Houses treat the brining of legal proceedings 
14. May, op. cit.. p. 158. 
180 
against any person on account of any evidence which he may 
have given in the course of any proceedings in the House or 
before one of its committees is a breach of privilege. The House 
of Commons resolved in 1818 "that witness, examined before this 
House, or any committee thereof, are entitled to the protection of 
this House in respect of any thing that may be said by them in 
their evidence,'*'' 
It is not the matter whether the' power was available in the 
past or not, but whether they lie under the Indian constitution 
or not which is very much clear by the Article 105(3) whose 
language is so plain and unambiguous about which Sarkar J. 
Who while expressing minority opinion in Keshan Singh's case 
said that I can not imagine more plain language than this, the 
language can have only one meaning and that is that it was 
intended to confer on the State Legislature, privileges and 
immunities which the House of Commons in England had.*^ 
Further it is also not correct to say that Parliament in India does 
not enjoy any such power, rather impeachment of president 
under Article 61 and removal of judges under Article 124 (4) or 
218 of the Constitution are all judicial in nature. 
T5^ R.C.S. Sarkar. op. cit.. p.53! 
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Emphasizing the importance of freedom of expression 
Hidayatullh, C.J, in Tej Kiran vs Sanjeeva Reddy case observed 
that: 
"once it was proved that Parliament was sitting and its business 
was being transacted, any thing said during the course of that 
business was immune from any proceedings in any court. This 
immunity is not only complete but it has as it should be. It is the 
e s sence of Parl iamentary sys t em of Govt, that peop le ' s 
representatives should be free to express themselves without fear 
of legal c o n s e q u e n c e s what they say i s only subject to the 
discipline of the rules of Parliament, the good sense of members 
and the control of proceedings by the speaker. The courts have no 
say in the matter and should really have none.'* 
The speaker, apart from as a defender of privileges, adopts control 
measures too against M.Ps & M.L.As when they cross their limits. 
As on August, 1st, 1974, some 38 legislators of Maharashtra 
Legislative Assembly were suspended by the speaker for three 
days for persis tent ly defying the chair and h inder ing the 
proceedings of the assembly.'^ Similarly on March 16, under the 
cover of privileges the members of opposition (congress) rushed 
towards podium and started shouting slogans and interrupting the 
speech of Governor, within the 5 minutes of his address, against 
the govt. (TDP) inaction in the wake of suicides by cotton growers 
17. The Hindustan Times. August 2, 1973. 
18. Ibid.. March 17, 1998. 
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in the s ta te . They also tore the copies of the speech and 
flunging them in the air but exercising his power to maintain 
discipline and self restraints by the legislators, the speaker Y. 
Rama Nadu suspended 26 Members for the day from the A.P. 
legislative Assembly and described the episode as very 
•unfortunate development." He also said that "we should also 
exercise restraint and maintain self discipline."'* The full bench of 
Supreme Court in Tej Kiran's case held that cl. (1) of Article 105 
confers freedom of speech on the legislators within the legislative 
chamber and cl(2) makes it plain that the freedom is literally 
absolute and unfettered. The protection given by above is to "any 
thing said" are of widest amplitude and it is not permissible to 
read any limitation there in. The object of the provision obviously 
was to secure absolute freedom of discussion in Parliament and to 
allay any apprehension of legal proceeding in a court of law in 
respect of any thing said in Parliament by a Member thereof. 
Article 26 restrict the High Court from issuing a writ to any 
House of Parliament or speaker or any of its officers to restrain 
the House from enacting any legislation even if it may be ultra 
vires. The court would interfere with the legislative process in a 
House either in the formative stage of law making, or with the 
presentation of the hill as passed by the House of Parliament to 
19. "Privilege Issues," In Journal of Parliamentary Information. Lok Sabha 
Secretariat, New Delhi, 1994, pp.410 - 411. 
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the President for his assent. The related case was seen in the 
United Kingdom when a Member of the House of Commons, 
Tonny Benn reaised a privilege issue on the grounds of the 
action taken by the court on Rees Mogg's application interfering 
with Bill while it was in discussion before the Parliament. The 
Speaker Rt. Hon Bitty Boothroyd observed that "I do take with 
great seriousness any potential question of our proceeding in the 
courts, ... There has of course been no amendment of the Bill of 
Rights, and that Act places a s tatutory prohibition on the 
question of our proceedings. Article 9 of the Act reads that 
the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament 
ought not to be inpeached or questioned in any court or place 
out of Parliament.'^ 
The power is not only awarded in terms of speech and 
expression on the floor of the House but it is also vested within 
the House to prohibit any stranger or out sider to report its 
proceedings, punish even expel from the House if breach of its 
privilege happens. This was agreed by the Supreme Court also in 
1958 during Search light case in which majority of the Supreme 
Court led by Chief justice S.R. Das ruled that: 
"the House of Commons had at the commencement of our 
constitution the power or privilege of prohibiting the publication of 
2 0 AIR, 1959, S.C. 395. 
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even a true and faithful report of the proceedings. The effect in 
law of the order of the speaker to expunge a portion of the speech 
of a Member may be (Sic) as if that portion had not been spoken. 
No such statement occurs in such circumstances, though factually 
correct may in law, be regarded as perverted and unfaithful.'^" 
Power to expel a member existed even in subordinate legislative 
bodies established under a statute of British Parliament though 
such a body had no power to regulate its own constitution 
therefore such inherent powers can not be denied to the State 
Legislative Assemblies in India. 
Usually the courts themselves show great reluctance to 
interfere with the working of the legislature, only in case of mala 
fide or perversity they go into the matter otherwise the power of 
the House is so wide, enabling the House to enforce its own 
decision. That was the reason why the Allahabad High Court 
while considering the Keshav Singh's petition on merit after 
Supreme Court's opinion, refused to interfere with the judgement 
of the House. Article 122 and 212 of the Constitution of India, 
Section 37 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 and 
Section 26 of the Delhi Administration Act, 1966 restrict the 
jurisdiction of the courts to enquire into the validity of the 
proceedings of Par l iament , Sta tes and Union Territory's 
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Legislatures on grounds of any irregularity of procedure. It is 
further stated that courts have no jurisdiction over any Officer or 
Member for exercising the powers vested in him under 
Constitution/Govt, of Union Territories Act, 1963. The Delhi High 
Court on one occasion has said that: 
"the court will not intervene in maters relating to the conduct of 
the business and internal management of such statutory bodies 
like the metropolitan council when such matter fall within their 
authority of power.^' 
The Constitution guarantees immunity from proceedings in any 
court in respect of any thing said in the House of Parliament or 
State Legislature and the word 'any thing' according to Supreme 
Court version is equivalent to every thing, thus Articles 122 and 
212 of the const i tu t ion, Section 37 of the Govt, of Union 
Territories Act, 1963, and Section 26 of Delhi Administration Act, 
1966, strengthen the provisions contained in Article 105, 194 
and Section 16 of the Govt, of Union Territories Act, 1963, 
respectively. 
On the other hand when MPs ignore the summons sent by 
the Supreme Court or any other court, seems strange since 
Article 144 of the Constitution says: 
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"All authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India 
shall act in aid of the Supreme Court". It is significant that no 
qualifications or exceptions are given. If as representatives of the 
peoples M.Ps do not "act in aid of the Supreme Court' and thus 
set an example how can they logically expect their constituents to 
do so ? And is the Supreme Court meant to be ignored by the 
constituents and their representatives when the later expect the 
court to interpret their laws."^ And to say that it is no possible 
to reconcile the powers and immunities of Member essential to 
the legislative process with the Fundamental Rights of the citizen 
is only to sanction abuse of privielge.^^ 
22. The Hindustan Times. "Apr. \Q, 1970. 
23. The Times of India. Feb. 17, 1968. 
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CONCLUSION 
Parliament in India has played a pioneering role in the 
working towards the goals of nat ional recons t ruc t ion and 
nurturing the values of freedom, secularism and democracy. As a 
microcosm of the nation, it has consistently reflected the feelings, 
hopes and aspirations and even weaknesses and frustrations of 
the people. It has been clearly emerged as the most crucial 
political institution on whose working depends the success of any 
nation. This is possible only if its Members devote themselves 
whole heartedly to meet the rising expectations of the teaming 
millions. A proper exercise of their duties and responsibilities 
warrant certain liberties and immunities on their part so as to 
enable them to carry out their obligations which are necessary to 
indicate unhindered by external and internal pressures. 
The term par l iamentary privilege is applied to certain 
especial r ights and immuni t ies enjoyed by each House of 
Parliament collectively, i ts Members individually and its 
Committees thereof. They are indispensable for an effective 
democratic process. This is not a new practice rather in vogue 
since time immemorial when petition was demanded from the 
King or ruler of the state, the position was different from what 
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we have today. The representative elements were insignificant and 
for the most part of the reign of Edward II, they could not make 
constitutional claim to share parliamentary functions which were 
exercised by the Council. Later the Commons acquired the right 
of giving counsel on the matters of policy and their grant of 
supply became conditional to it. The Parliament in India is very 
much modelled on the British pattern which had been developed 
from a council of nobles and high ranking clergy that used to 
advice the King of England. After the Norman conquest in 1066 
this informal advisory group became a formal assembly known as 
Great Council which used to meet thrice a year to help the King 
in deciding matters of state policy. 
During the early 1200's King John began to call knights, 
elected from the shires (counties), to some meetings of Great 
Council. He used to summon the knights to obtain their approval 
on taxes he had levied because tax collection was difficult without 
their cooperation. In the mid 1200's, the English statesman 
Simon de Montfort enlarged the council and was named as 
'Parliament' to include elected representatives from the towns, 
shires and boroughs. The meeting which the King Edward I called 
in 1295 became the Model Parliament. By the mid 1300's the 
elected representatives began to meet separately from the nobles 
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and bishops and thus, division of Parliament took place (into two 
Houses). By the late 1300's Commons obtained the right to 
consider tax legislation before it was discussed by the Lords. 
However, they had no power to initiate legislation. In early 1400's 
they got the right to introduce bill. As the role of the 
government increased, the Parliament demanded more and 
more power. During 1620's the struggle between Parliament and 
King became bitter and in 1628 it forced the King (Charles I) to 
sign the 'Petition of Rights', a document that limited royal power 
but he refused it and did not allow Parliament to meet since 
1629 till 1640, and when he called it, the Parliament refused to 
provide any money unless he obeyed the petition of rights. On 
his denial a civil war broke out. Parliament ordered the execution 
of Charles in 1649 and the Legislature led by the Puritan 
General Oliver Cromwell declared England a republic and ruled 
untill 1653. The Bill of Rights, 1689, established the right of 
Parliament to meet frequently providing freedom of speech during 
debates and confirmed the right of the Commons to control 
financial legislation. By the early 1700's Parliament gained nearly 
total control over the monarch. They struggled mainly to: 
1. narrow down the sphere of ordinance, and 
2. providing a limit to the powers of the King for making laws 
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outside the Parliament. 
In the 16th century when speaker demanded the privileges 
they were jus t four in numbers as : freedom from arrest; freedom 
of speech; access to the royals; and favourable construction of all 
their proceedings but later many more have been added. 
Its relationship with other organs of the State: 
In a democratic set up every organ of government occupy 
importance of its own. In India the provision of fundamental 
rights especially under Article 14, 18 and 19 strengthened the 
judiciary vis a vis the privileges but since the inception of the 
Constitution an attempt has been made by the Parliament to 
weaken this equilibrium. In England the House of Commons and 
Lords claimed to be the sole judges of their own privileges 
however, the court maintained that privileges were part of the law 
of the land and that the judic iary cannot be s idet racked. 
However, the scope of judicial review of the previleges in England 
is limited. The court is not authorized to nullify its parliamentary 
acts on any ground. The Supreme Court in U.S.A., on the 
contrary, enjoys judicial review and there ' the Constitution is 
what the judges say it is". The position in India is a mid-way 
between the Judicial paramountcy of the USA and Parliamentary 
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supremacy of UK. 
So far as press is concerned the press and media play a 
unique role. Their criticism and comments are considered to be of 
utmost importance for the proper understanding of political 
literacy but their freedom is hedged by the privileges and liberties 
accorded to the Parliament. Premature publications, disclosure of 
impugned proceedings, misrepresenting the proceedings, and 
casting aspersions on Members of the House, constitute breach of 
privilege and contempt of the House. In 1982 quest ion of 
privilege was raised by Satish Agrawal, M.P., against R.K. Agrawal 
editor-in-chief of Blitz, Bombay, and Rajpal Chaudhury, editor, 
Delhi recorder, for alleged misrepresenting the proceedings of the 
House and casting aspersions on Satish Agrawal in a news report 
and in an article published in the Blitz. The committee viewed 
that both persons have committed breach of privilege and 
contempt of the House* and the matter was dropped only when 
the two rendered an unconditional apology. A similar incident 
occurred in Aug., 1992, when the matter was raised by Gufran 
Azam, an M.P. for casting aspersion on M.Ps in general and on 
him in particular by 'Dainik Jagran' under the heading "Sansad 
Mein Prashno Ke Zariye Swarth Poorti Karne Wala Giroh Sakriya" 
1. 5R (CPR) 7th L.S., pp. 1-11. ~~" ~ 
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(Gang active in exploiting Parliamentary questions for selfish 
interest), for that too was considered derogatory and unfair by 
the commitee and the editor and reporter had to apologise. 
Power to Punish: 
Parliament not only enjoys the liberties and privileges but 
also possesses the power to punish those who interfere with 
Members or contempts of its ruling. Once the punishment is 
awarded, there is no remedy for it ei ther in court or in 
Parliament itself. The phrase 'contempt of the House' or 'breach 
of privilege' covers a wide area and of utmost importance. 
Whenever the mat ter is raised, immediate action is taken 
particularly w^hen arrest or molestation of Members is made with 
mischievous and malicious intent or is protected from attending 
the proceedings of the House. This right of punishing is 
analogous to the right of a superior court to punish for its 
contempts thus , described as a "Key Stone" of parliamentary 
privileges wi thout which the House would sink into u t te r 
contempt and inefficiency. 
But on the other hand, it is also t rue that making 
statements within the privileged precincts of Parliament have the 
effect of unjustly injuring the reputation of individual citizen or 
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the public in general. Unrestricted speech on the floor of the 
House is no doubt valuable provided it is not misused. Further, 
the privileges can not be claimed so easily by the Legislature in 
the light of the Fundamental Rights and the doctrine of Judicial 
Review. Despite these cons t ra in t s the legislators do enjoy 
enormous power and privileges. Often these priviliges are misused 
affecting the sanctity of the House. The nation has witnessed 
noisy sessions, shouting slogans, mongering and walkouts even 
when crucial bills are under considerations. They do not hesitate 
even to throw articles on each other as what we saw in U.P. 
Assembly in October, 1997. Snatching and tearing of papers even 
from the hands of chair is now not unusual. On March 16, 1998, 
the opposition members (BJP and BJD) in the Orissa Legislature 
Assembly tore the speech of the Governor^ which was circulated 
to the Members earlier because they urged the Governor K.V. 
Ranguna than Reddy to abrogate his speech, advising the 
government to step down but the governor paid no heed to 
them. A similar drama was staged on the same day in A.P. 
Legislative Assembly, the Governor was forced to end his speech 
abrupt ly within five minutes of his address because the 
opposition (Congress) members rushed towards the podium and 
started shouting slogans against the government's (TDP) inaction 
^-^r— . _ . ^ - 5 — — : : • 
Z '"^t Ti^ ^J %<)^' J 17-J^i^ZWd 
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in the wake of suicide by cotton growers in the state. The 
opposition tore the copies of the speech and flung them in the 
air one of which landed on the shoulder of the Governor.^ These 
incidents are a sad commentary on the working of the 
parliamentary institutions. Speaker Y. Ramanudu described it 'as 
unfortunate development' and appealed for restraint and self 
discipline. Later, 26 M.L.As were suspended for the day. 
Under these circumstances 'can the President or Governor of 
the state expel a Member who shows disrespect to him or 
interfere in discharging his constitutional responsibilities ?' There 
persists two opinions, according to one-being a part of Parliament 
he is competent enough to expell any Member who disrupts the 
proceeding of Parliament or make attempts to do so even he can 
call the services of the uniformed marshal. But the other opinion 
is that being the pres id ing officer, Speaker alone is the 
competent authority vested with the power to expel or take any 
action against the irrate Members and that too with the approval 
of the House. The President is only the Const i tut ional or 
ceremonial head who attends the House just for addressing it 
and thus, have no punitive power and if he exercises this power 
3. The Hindustan Times. March 17, 1998, 
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this will be only at the cost of loosing his office. 
Nonetheless , a highly unruly scene was witnessed in 
Parliament on Ju ly 14, 1998, when the bill regarding the 
reservation quota for women in the legislature was about to be 
presented before the Lok Sabha. It was, however, not new. A 
similar Pandemonium was staged in the Lok Sabha in 1963 
when the Official Language Bill was introduced. The speaker had 
to summon the uniformed Marshal to bodily remove the defiant 
Members, Mani Ram Bagri, (socialist), and Rameshwaranand (Jan 
Sangh) from the House. Later, the party members staged a 
walkout, threw all canons of parliamentary decorum to the winds 
and made an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the introduction of 
the bill." 
Our Par l iamentary proceedings are 'an open book' 
constantly being watched by the millions of people all over the 
country and now by the world through media. Any lowering in 
the quality of its functioning or deviation from requisite norms 
becomes much more perceptible and pronounced. This not only 
affects the image of the Key Institution before the world but also 
taxes the nat ions resources. It is a supreme forum expected to 
4. Hindustan Times. April, 14, 1963. 
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set the tone and tenor, provide a pattern of discussions and 
deliberations. The select committee of the House of Commons has 
provided answers to various questions, which have been raised in 
India from time to time as the basic problems in both the 
countries are identical. It declared that "in ordinary cases where 
an M.P. has a remedy in the courts he should not be permitted 
to invoke the penal jur isd ic t ion of Par l iament ." From the 
statement it seems a little advantage flow towards the court but if 
we go into depth this too goes in favour of the legislators as it 
covers the cases when a Member claims tha t he has been 
defamed, but what is to be done when the claim is opposite and 
someone outside Parliament has been defamed by an M.P. under 
the cover of privileges. No satisfactory answer till yet has been 
given to that. 
Today the standard of Parliament is so degrading that its 
Members do not even hesitate to get involved in corruption and 
bribery cases. In JMM-MPs bribery case the Supreme Court 
judgement has the direct confrontation with legislators. Congress 
M.P. Meira Kumari says that Parliament is supreme' as M.Ps have 
certain privileges and the judgement puts a question mark on its 
supremacy. Though she said that nobody is above the law, take 
action against any person M.P or MLA but let Parliament take 
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action but no action against the culprits has been taken so far. 
The Supreme Court had interpreted the prevention of corruption 
to declare that M.Ps were not beyond the purview of the Act and 
were public servants but according to Congress leader Pranab 
Mukharjee the government could if not satisfied with the 
interpretation, take a fresh look' and make amendments if 
necessary. But at th is point a question is raised that is 
Prevention Corruption Act not enough and complete in its own 
sense to book an M.P. or M.L.A.? 
The Powers and privileges of the House and its Members 
exist for the maintenance of the dignity and independence of 
the House but the real guarantee for such dignity and 
independence lies not so much in the existence upon 
parliamentary privilege as in the character, calibre, wisdom and 
sense of self respect of the Members of the House themselves. 
J .F .S . Ross stated "It is not primarily professional skill or 
technical knowledge that are needed in the legislative branch of 
government but high quality of mind heart and character . 
Intelligence, breadth of vision, warm human sympathy, 
receptiveness to new ideas, judgement, capacity for hard work, 
mastery of details, such is the equipment to be desired in the 
person who undertakes to direct public policy on behalf of their 
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fellows. Nehru once said "you may define democracy in a 
hundred ways; but surely one of its definition is self discipline of 
the community." The statement when absolutely suits the common 
man why not then for their representatives as the less the 
imposed discipline the more will be the self discipline and higher 
the development of democracy. The Supreme Court made it clear 
in 1970 in case of Jagat Guru Shankaracharya that "It is the 
essence of Parliamentary system of government that peoples 
representatives should be free to express themselves without fear 
of legal consequences. What they say is only subject to the 
discipline of the rules of Parliament, the good sense of Members 
and control of proceedings by the speaker. The court have no say 
in the matter and should really have none." In view of this 
attitude there have been a demand from the Press that M.Ps 
should become very responsible and careful in using this freedom. 
Freedom of speech does not mean licence, the greater the 
freedom the greater should be the responsibility that accompanies 
its exercise, if the Supreme Court has held that freedom to be 
absolute the public would expect tha t responsibili ty to be 
absolute.^ Further, privileges are available to individual capacity 
only in so far as they are necessary for the House to perform its 
functions freely and without any let or hindrance. They do not 
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exempt the Members from such obligations to the society as apply 
to other citizens Parliamentary privilege do not place an MP on a 
footing different from that of an ordinary citizen in the matter of 
application of laws, unless there are good and sufficient reasons 
in the interest of Parliament itself to do so. 
The moot point in this regard is that democratic institutions 
in India are yet to be laid deep roots, fifty years are too short a 
period in the history of the country. With the passage of time 
the task of presiding officer has become more and more difficult 
in controlling the proceedings of the House and maintaining 
decorum. Lack of political stability, party discipline and frequent 
floor crossing have furher complicated matters for the presiding 
officers. The lack of tolerance on the part of the Members and 
their inability to listen to the view point of other is another 
malady. This has often resulted in unruly scenes and noisy 
sessions. And in the process democratic norms and parliamentary 
niceities are thrown to winds. The respect for parliament and its 
institutions are awfully lacking especially in the recent past. 
Accusation and counter-accusation in the House, with scant 
respect to the chair, have made the credibility of Parliament 
suspect in the public eye. Lack of interest on the part of 
Members and their attendance in the House have bacome the 
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order of the day. It is a deviation from the days of Nehru when 
he used to sit in the Parliament right from eleven in the 
morning till lunch and through out the question hour whether it 
was the Prime Minister 's day or not. He replied, when a 
journalist asked him why he spent so much time in Parliament, 
that "1 consciously and deliberately remain present in Parliament 
because through my presence I want to feel the pulse of the 
Parliament and through it the pulse of the Nation and that is 
absolutely necessary for a democratic experiment."^ 
Parliamentary system of Government works on the basis of 
give and take. A proper and healthy equation among leaders of 
different political par t ies in Parliament is essent ia l . Rigid 
postures, open defiance of the chair , desrespect to the head of 
s t a t e , which is often manifested through walkouts dur ing 
Presidential and Governer's addresses, are the major irritants in 
the working of Parliament in India. Pary whips, besides being 
accomplishing their normal duties of making and keeping the 
House, should establish and maintain good and amicable relations 
through tactful handling of situations between the government 
and the opposition. Whips of government and of parties in 
opposition should understand and accommodate each other on 
6. R.C. Bhandari, "How To Be An Effective Parliamentarian," In Journal 
Parliamentary Information. Lok Sabha Secretriat, New Delhi, 1994, p.520. 
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crucial occassions and arive at concrete understanding. 
Ideally, the Members are required to have broad knowledge 
of vast field, assess importance and gravity of the matter and 
know what is good and what is not. There is a lot of difference 
between the parliamentary speech and public speech, by keeping 
in view, self-discipline is the sure and sobre remedy to ensure 
the effectiveness of the Parliament. 
Money and muscle power have come to occupy a significant 
place in the electoral parties which in turn has affected the 
quality of Parliament and parliamentarians. No political party is 
an exception to this phenomena and it is not surprising that 
man with criminal background often found entr>'^  to the august 
body. What adds fuel to the fire is the flexibility of the 
Constitution and laws which some time play an adverse role. 
Legally one is not and can not be a culprit, even if he has 
committed serious crime, unless and untill his guilt is proved 
beyond all doubts in a law court, and by the time the court 
gives its verdict these people get elected and have a gala time. 
One remedy to create a sobre atmosphere in Parliament is to 
induct more and more women members. They are less coercive 
and their par t ic ipat ion could be productive. Unlike their 
counterparts they are less distructive and more committed to the 
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task they are assigned to. But unfortunately women in our 
Parliament and State Legislatures are awfully represented. 
The press has an important role to play in crea t ing 
democratic thos and inculcat ing respect for pa r l i amenta ry 
institution. It should refrain from publishing scandalous and 
defamatory writeups, false account of proceedings, premature 
publication of any report, leakage of budget proposals and casting 
aspersions on Members, making imputations, publishing cartoons 
or jokes with malicious captions or divulging confidential reports 
and taking notes from other than the press gallery. 
Another factor which maximise the problem is 'the critical 
police behaviour'. Its help is needed to maintain law and order. If 
an M.P or M.L.A. is arrested or detained by the police resulting 
in the breach of privilege of the Member and the House 
ultimately, it is incombent on the authorities to inform the House 
immediately. The authori ty who detains the Member should 
intimate the House as early as possible and treat him with the 
respect he deserves. 
Last but not the least is the court's alleged superiority. 
Parliamentarians often make complaints about its interference in 
their proceedings and decisions. It is advisable for the courts not 
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to take cognizance when a mistake is committed in following the 
procedure or irregularity of procedure. Only when they exercise 
such power which are not vested with them, the court shall claim 
its jurisdict ion. It should differentiate clearly between the 
irregularity in procedure and illegality of procedure. All the three 
branches of the government must try to create harmonious and 
smooth relationship and consider difficulties and intricacies 
involved in each other's case. The Parliament gains supremacy by 
the mandate it receives in election but on the other hand it too 
should refrain from discussing the conduct of Judges, President 
or Governors. It is only then the harmonious functioning of the 
government can be ensured. 
It is absolutely incorrect to assume that the new elected 
representatives are not good and have not enough skills which 
would help them to behave properly, rather their educational level 
has been increased, about 72% of the seats have been shared by 
the graduates and postgraduates and more than 5% by doctorate 
degree holders. Only a very small portion of about 2.9% is 
occupied by the under matriculates whereas intermediates occupy 
about 18.18% of the total seats. What we need at the moment is 
a change in the attitudes which should enable the Members to 
become active participants in the task of nation building and 
should not remain static. It is the living institution, constantly 
reflecting the needs, urges desires and aspirations of the people. 
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